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Abstract 
 
Jelle Leunis 
 
The Road to Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies: 
An Analysis of the (Re-)Articulation of the Norms Governing the Legitimate Use 
of Force 
 
Keywords: Monopoly on Violence, Privatisation, Norm Change, Norm 
Entrepreneurs, Legitimacy, Realist Constructivism. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, private military and security companies have 
gained a prominent place on the international battlefield. In an attempt to reduce 
monetary and political costs, states have not only outsourced some of the 
defense functions previously performed by uniformed personnel; they have also 
partly privatised the provision of security. Traditional accounts of the rise of 
private military and security companies have explained this evolution in terms of 
changing demand and supply of military force after the Cold War, in a neoliberal 
ideological environment. This rationalist account, however, overlooks the role of 
norms, which, as the constructivist research tradition has demonstrated, 
constrain state behaviour even in the domain of national security. From this 
constructivist point of view, the rise of private military and security companies is 
surprising given the existence of an anti-mercenary norm and a norm on the 
state monopoly on violence, both of which have precluded the private exercise 
of violence. How, then, should the rise of private military and security 
companies be understood in light of this hostile normative environment? Against 
a realist-constructivist background, this text draws upon models of norm change 
and epistemic communities to show that private military and security companies 
have used their pragmatic legitimacy and epistemic power to decisively shape 
the discursive construction of a new regulatory framework that legitimises the 
exercise of non-state violence. 
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1  
Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Thomson (1990 and 1994) set out to explain why 
states succeeded in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of 
violence. Embarking upon the observation that the organisation of military force 
is “neither timeless nor natural”, she (Thomson, 1994: 1) traces the evolution 
from the marketisation and commodification of violence to its successful state 
monopolisation. Since time immemorial, non-state actors have decisively 
shaped the face of organised violence.1 In this perspective, the normative 
consolidation or, in other words, the successful legitimation of the state 
monopoly on violence in the nineteenth century can indeed be seen as an 
historical aberration. Nevertheless, this aberration came to define the 
international politics of the twentieth century as it was canonized in international 
law, in which “sovereign states [are the] proper legitimate authority to wage war, 
and no one else” (Reitberger, 2013: 64).2 
 
Not more than twenty years later, Thomson’s (1994: 3) main research question 
- “[w]hy is coercion not an international market commodity?” - seems obsolete. 
In the meantime we have witnessed a move in the opposite direction: from state 
monopolisation back to marketisation and commodification of violence. The 
state monopoly on violence other than in self-defense, that established itself as 
a defining characteristic of modern states,3 has come under increasing pressure 
                                                          
1
 In the “state of nature” before the arrival of the Leviathan, the use of force for the 
furtherance of private interests was widespread (Owens, 2008: 980, Hobbes, 1998: 82-
86). What concerns mercenaries, these have been present in theatres of war since at 
least 1294 B.C., under the Egyptian Pharao Ramses II (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1977: 6). 
2 The non-state actors that did participate in armed conflict, for instance in a 
liberationist or secessionist struggle for self-determination, were often characterized as 
“proto-states” (Williams, 2013: 72). Furthermore, article 1 (4) of the 1977 ‘Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts’ states that “armed conflicts in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes are 
to be considered international conflicts”. <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470> 
(accessed 01/07/2014). 
3
 For instance Weber (1994: 310) defines the state as a “human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory” and Tilly (1990: 1) as “coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from 
households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all 
other organizations within substantial territories”. For Bourdieu (1999: 57) the state is 
“the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of 
2  
from non-state actors to the extent that a norm change might be taking place 
(Krahmann, 2009 and 2010). Some scholars argue the character of war and 
warfare has changed since the end of the Cold War (Kaldor, 2001). Contributing 
to this transformation is the rising inclination toward the outsourcing of activities 
that have traditionally been performed by uniformed state personnel. As the 
result of a neoliberal political project that started in the late 1970s, but that 
gained impetus after the collapse of the bipolar world order, private military and 
security companies (PMSCs) have obtained a prominent place on the domestic 
security market as well as on the international battlefield (Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2011, Avant, 2005, Schwartz and Swain, 2011). Contractor presence 
in theatres of war has inflated from a ratio of one to fifty in the first Gulf War 
(Stanger and Williams, 2006: 4) to roughly one to one in the final stages of the 
contemporary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan (Schwartz, 2011: 9,13). 
Schwartz and Swain’s (2011) estimations indicate that, in 2011, the number of 
PMSC personnel has surpassed the number of US troops in Iraq; and that, prior 
to 2010, contractors were slightly more numerous than US troops in 
Afghanistan. Despite significant divergences between European Union member 
states, outsourcing nevertheless accounted for more than seven per cent of all 
defence expenditures in the EU in 2012 (European Defence Agency, 2013). 
PMSCs have furthermore become current in EU Common Security and Defence 
Policy operations (Krahmann and Friedendorf, 2011). The United Kingdom is at 
the vanguard of this European outsourcing trend with, in 2010, sixty per cent of 
its “overseas operation defense sustainment effort” being spent on contractor 
support to operations and thirty five per cent of Ministry of Defence employees 
in Afghanistan being contractors (Heidenkamp, 2012: 2). The  ratio of Ministry 
of Defence contractor personnel to British soldiers has shifted from one to 
twenty three in the 2003 invasion of Iraq to one to two in 2008 (Kruck, 2014: 
123-124). Whereas the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department 
for International Development have hired private companies for personnel and 
site protection, it must nevertheless be noted that most PMSC involvement in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or 
(better) informational capital, and symbolic capital”. The state monopoly on violence 
culminated in the establishment of military forces to protect the state from external 
competitors in the emerging interstate politics. On the other hand, it culminated in the 
establishment of police forces on the other to secure the state internally against 
aspirations of rivalling political groups (Bourdieu, 1999: 58). 
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UK military operations has been limited to technical and logistical support 
functions (Kinsey, 2009: 91-115). In light of the above, it comes as no surprise 
that traditional military powers would now “struggle to wage war without such 
private companies” (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 1).  
 
This bubble of the private military and security industry in the recent campaigns 
in Iraq and Afghanistan forces us to reconsider some of the research questions 
answered by Thomson. Although of recent origin, a substantive research 
tradition has already addressed why states have increasingly come to rely on 
private providers of violence; and why the exercise of legitimate violence has 
been partly reprivatised, remarketized and redemocratised. This debate 
predominantly addressed realist-materialist explanations for the steep rise in 
PMSCs’ popularity and a sustained analysis of why PMSCs came to be morally 
accepted in the twenty-first century has been notoriously absent. This lacuna is 
remarkable for several reasons. First, the materialist-oriented realist perspective 
overlooks the findings of an established constructivist research tradition, that 
has demonstrated the role of norms in directing state behaviour (cf. Percy, 
2007a, Finnemore, 1996, Katzenstein, 1996, Checkel, 1998). Conventional 
wisdom has attributed the emergence of PMSCs mainly to a shifting demand 
and supply of military force after the end of the Cold War. In a neoliberal 
environment, departments of defence did not escape the wave of “new public 
management” inspired by managerial economics and business administration 
(Deitelhof and Geis, 2009: 18, Ortiz, 2010). Prominent military powers 
drastically slimmed down their standing forces and relied on PMSCs as force 
multipliers. In turn, PMSCs were staffed by discharged service personnel. 
Assuming that private companies possessed a comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
state agencies and that, through competition, the market would be able to 
provide security services at a greater cost-effectiveness than unwieldy and 
bureaucratic government agencies (Cockayne, 2009: 198), military outsourcing 
fits in and is “a product of the wholesale privatization of goods and services 
across a whole range of activities previously regarded as the exclusive domain 
of the state” (Jones, 2006: 361). Even if outsourcing does not ipso facto entail 
monetary savings for the government (Parker and Hartley, 2003, Fredland, 
4  
2004)4, cost savings need not be restricted to the monetary level. Contracting 
PMSCs might reduce political costs through shortening “political and 
bureaucratic lead time” and through shifting decision-making to the executive at 
the expense of the legislative branch of government (Avant, 2007: 457-459). In 
this light, Deitelhof and Geis (2009: 25) speak of the “deparliamentarisation and 
self-empowerment of the executives” in the security field. PMSCs might open 
up the opportunity to circumvent the casualty sensitivity (Gelpi, Feaver and 
Reifler, 2005) of contemporary, post-heroic societies (Luttwak, 1995) or even to 
wage war by proxy (Newton, 2005, Mumford, 2013). Since PMSC casualties 
seldom make it into the media headlines - amounting to what has been called a 
“media mystery” (Pew Research Center, 2007) - governments feel less obliged 
to justify their use vis-à-vis their citizens. This might lead to a greater willingness 
on the side of governments to engage in military operations abroad5, but entails 
risks of losing control. It also disadvantages public and parliamentary oversight 
by reducing transparency (Avant and Sigelman, 2010).  
 
So, despite some anomalies6, from a realist point of view the rise of PMSCs is 
comprehensible. However, this calculation of material costs and benefits 
ignores the findings of an established constructivist research tradition. An 
economic cost-benefit analysis of the provision of goods and services through 
public or private agents only makes sense once it has been normatively agreed 
which goods and services are socially desirable and which are not (viz. which 
are legal and which are illegal) (Brauer, 2008: 109). Mechanisms of supply and 
demand are only allowed to operate once social mores have come to accept 
security as being eligible for trade on the market. Thus, before any decision can 
be made on how best to provide a good or service, it should be clarified whether 
the good or service is public or private in “character” (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 
                                                          
4
 To put it less euphemistically, PMSCs frequently drive up operating costs in 
comparison to the in-house provision of the same services by government employees 
(Markusen, 2003). What is more, evidence of the comparative advantage of uniformed 
military personnel in some areas of service provision was available when initial 
outsourcing decisions were on the drawing board (Parker and Hartley, 2003, 
Markusen, 2003, Petersohn 2011). 
5
 For instance, Schooner (2008) notes how the use of private contractors, whose 
casualties are less extensively reported in mainstream media, can affect the popular 
support of a government and thus steer the chance of reelection.  
6
 For instance, in the long term, states may lose their built-up capacity and knowledge, 
due to the ‘brain-drain’ of qualified military personnel to private companies. 
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2008: 308). Public or private are indeed social constructs (Owens, 2008: 979) 
and the boundaries between public and private goods are fluid (Brauer and Van 
Tuyll, 2008: 311).  
 
Furthermore, privatisation is fundamentally a political decision. Even if profound, 
shifts in the demand and supply of military force after the Cold War might as 
well have been written off as a “passing phenomenon” (FCO, 2002: 12). They 
did not compel outsourcing. As Hartley (2003: 108) argues, policy makers had a 
variety of options at their disposal confronted with the post-Cold War decline of 
real defence budgets and rising capital and equipment costs. One of those was 
to cut down ambitions and to reconsider their defence policy by reducing 
training levels and forestalling investments in equipment. Another option was to 
pursue defence integration on the multinational (e.g. European) level. Turning to 
the private sector was one option among many and, indeed, governments’ 
responses towards PMSCs have varied considerably, even in comparable 
circumstances.7 What has sometimes been overlooked in the debate is that 
governments could only turn to the private sector if this was morally accepted, 
viz. if relying on PMSCs was viewed as a legitimate option. 
 
Surprising in this regard, is that PMSCs came to prominence in a hostile 
normative environment. A strong anti-mercenary norm, particularly manifest 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, resulted in several, admittedly flawed, anti-
mercenary conventions (Percy, 2007b). Arguably, this anti-mercenary norm was 
an expression of the “foundational norm” of the state monopoly on violence 
(Krahmann, 2013: 58). As recently as 1997, United Nations Secretary General 
Koffi Annan, still claimed that “the world may not be ready to privatize peace” 
(UN, 1998), hereby expressing a reluctant, not to say abolitionist stance 
towards the engagement of PMSCs. Fifteen years later, however, a pragmatic 
consensus has crystallised in policy circles and academic literature. PMSCs are 
no longer pariahs but are recognised as legitimate actors. The focus has shifted 
to identifying shortcomings in the current regulatory framework and to 
formulating best practices for future governance (Percy, 2006, Chesterman and 
                                                          
7
 Whereas the US and the UK have been at the forefront of privatising and outsourcing, 
other West European states have taken a more reluctant approach (Jäger and 
Kümmel, 2007). 
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Lehnardt, 2009).8 Today, instead of outlawing PMSCs, as propagated by the 
abolitionist approach (Chesterman and Lehnardt, 2009: 1), the world seems 
ready to privatise peace and has done so to a significant extent.9 This 
remarkable switch from abolitionism to pragmatism gives support to the claim 
that what we are witnessing today is a normative change on who possesses the 
authority to instigate violence. In this market environment, not only states, but 
also multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations (cf. 
Spearin, 2008) can hire a PMSC. In short, the commodification and 
marketisation of military violence - as was the common form of military 
organisation before the nineteenth century (Thomson, 1990) - might very well 
have returned at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Walker and Whyte, 
2005: 651); thus reducing the state monopoly on violence to the relatively short 
interval of the twentieth century. What accounts for this changing normative 
approach towards private providers of military force? This is the research 
question this text wants to address: how did PMSCs become normatively 
accepted actors in the international security domain despite a normative 
environment that was hostile to the private provision of military force? Via which 
dynamics of legitimation did PMSCs successfully claim a legitimate role in the 
global provision of security?  
 
Legitimacy is essentially a social construct. In his often-cited definition, 
Suchman (1995: 574) describes legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions”. The constructivist turn in international relations theory has 
demonstrated that identities and norms decisively steer state behaviour; even if 
seemingly contrary to a realist cost-benefit analysis, and even in sensitive areas 
such as the organisation of military force. In a process which constructivist 
scholars refer to as the mutual constitution of agents and structures, norms 
                                                          
8
 An assessment that is also shared by the 2013 Annual report to the Human Rights 
Council of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination. 
Accessible at <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/432/64/PDF/N1343264.pdf? OpenElement>, 
(accessed 01/07/2014). 
9
 Even the UN has hired PMSCs for a variety of functions (Østensen, 2011). 
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shape the identities and permissible actions of agents. At the same time, 
however, this normative environment is itself constantly shaped and reshaped 
by the practices of individual actors. In reply to the above questions, this article 
will trace how normative claims have steered the rise of PMSCs and how 
PMSCs have themselves impacted upon this set of norms. The challenges to 
the anti-mercenary norm, and by extension to the norm on the state monopoly 
on violence, sat uneasily with constructivist scholarship and have given rise to 
seemingly contradictory claims. On the one hand, some authors have stressed 
the continued relevance of these two norms. Percy (2007a), for instance, has 
argued that the centuries-old norm against mercenaries is still relevant today; 
and that it has decisively impacted upon the development of the contemporary 
private military and security industry. On the other hand, in light of the current 
popularity of PMSCs and of the switch from abolitionism to pragmatism, Percy’s 
observation seems counterintuitive. The norms seem to have been regularly 
transgressed. As a consequence, they might have lost their prominence - an 
argument that was reinforced by claims that PMSCs were operating in a “law-
accountability vacuum” (Walker and Whyte, 2005: 687); or that the industry is 
regulated by “simple economics” rather than by the rule of law (Singer, 2004: 
524). These statements confer the image that we have returned to a situation of 
realist self-help, unrestrained by intersubjective rules. Even if, strictly speaking, 
PMSCs are not mercenaries and, as such, are not covered by the anti-
mercenary conventions, they nevertheless carry the “taint of a mercenary 
reputation” (Salzman, 2008). By focusing on the persistence of the norm against 
mercenaries, Percy overestimates the relevance of that norm and loses sight of 
its changing nature and influence (Panke and Petersohn, 2012). She overlooks 
how PMSCs have themselves impacted upon existing norms and accepts a 
relatively unchanging structural normative environment. A second normative 
discussion focuses on the relevance of the state monopoly on violence. Subject 
to erosion from above (delegation to international and supranational 
organisations) and from below (delegation to subnational and non-state actors), 
the state is struggling to maintain its monopolistic decision-making power in the 
domain of military violence (Bailes, Schneckener and Wulf, 2007). Although 
they are still “crucial”, states no longer enjoy the privilege they once did in 
theories of state sovereignty (Pierson, 2004: 158-159). Interest in the changing 
norm on the state monopoly on violence is on the rise (cf. Krahmann, 2009 and 
8  
2013). Nevertheless, existing accounts have frequently overlooked the 
mechanisms of norm change and in particular the role of norm entrepreneurs in 
the process of the legitimation of non-state actors. It is my argument that this 
confusion is fuelled by the underdevelopment of existing models of norm 
change. More specifically, constructivist scholarship currently seems unable to 
incorporate the present instance of norm rearticulation. Nevertheless, I also 
consider social constructivism to be the most fruitful approach towards 
international relations. Therefore, in order to maintain this claim, this text first 
and foremost proposes a reconceptualisation of the conceptual versions of 
normative change, that will serve as a heuristic tool for analysing the 
contemporary debate. The present, confused and confusing, debate on the anti-
mercenary norm and the norm of the state monopoly on violence serves as an 
illustration of the desirability of such a tool. If this heuristic device can usefully 
steer research in this domain, it might be substantiated in further research and 
contribute to strengthening the constructivist curriculum. Secondly, this text 
aims to overcome the traditional divide between realist and constructivist 
accounts of military change.  
 
To deliver on the above promises, this text counters the orthodox, realist-
informed, narrative of the rise of PMSCs. Constructivist scholars argue that 
“cultural imperatives” and “ideational foundations” more accurately explain the 
structuring of armed forces and are to be preferred over a model that sees 
states as rational maximisers driven by financial considerations (Petersohn, 
2011: 153-154). Realist and constructivist approaches have developed next to 
each other and do not adequately recognise each other’s explanatory 
successes. I will argue that, independently, neither model can fully explain the 
rise of PMSCs. Instead of contrasting both approaches, this text therefore 
combines diverse explanatory variables. It brings Barkin’s (2011: 1-8) argument 
against paradigmatic castle-building into practice and goes one step further to 
state that the rise of PMSCs cannot be understood without fully integrating 
various accounts into one comprehensive model. It analyses why norms have 
changed and, above all, why they have shifted in a particular direction. The 
latter question has not been adequately addressed in existing research on 
PMSCs. Constructivist scholarship does not provide sufficient clues to reveal 
who can authoritatively shape the outcome of a discursive negotiation. It has 
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been recognised by constructivist scholars that the ideational environment is not 
given a priori but emerges intersubjectively. However, existing accounts of norm 
change suffer from the criticism made by Barkin (2011: 111-114) in the sense 
that they remain embedded in constructivist, meta-theoretical assumptions of 
co-constitution of structures and do not adequately incorporate a notion of 
agency. This text elaborates existing models of norm change, but complements 
them with an explicit recognition of the role of power. Doing so, I build upon 
realist constructivist theory to show that realism and constructivism are not 
either/or accounts. There is no compelling reason why an ideational foundation 
should a priori exclude the distribution of material resources as an explanatory 
variable or vice versa. The privatisation of military activities can neither be 
explained solely by material, nor solely by ideational elements. By combining 
realist and constructivist elements into one account, this text wants to overcome 
the current division of the literature. Only the combination of these two 
approaches, it is argued, can adequately explain the popularity of PMSCs. The 
realist constructivist ‘style of reasoning’ that informs the central argument of this 
text allows the analyst to take into account material and normative elements 
that contributed to the reconfiguration of the organisation of military force. 
Against this background, I will start from the model of norm change developed 
by Sandholtz (2008), but move beyond it in two regards. Firstly, I will look for 
analogies between the current transformation in the military domain and 
previous changes in the organisation of military force, i.e. the shift away from 
mercenary use towards citizen armies in the nineteenth century. Secondly, the 
epistemic communities’ literature will provide insights in the role of epistemic 
power in instances of norm change. This will allow to better comprehend which 
norm entrepreneurs can decisively shape a new norm. The conclusions drawn 
from these theoretical reflections will guide the empirical analysis of this project.  
 
I will trace the processes that resulted in three regulatory initiatives that helped 
shape the future governance of the private military and security industry. I 
understand process-tracing in the sense of Collier (2011: 823) as a “systematic 
examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research 
questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator”. Process-tracing aims to 
uncover the causal process that leads from an independent variable to a 
10  
particular outcome (George and Bennet, 2005: 206-207).10 This research 
project thus resorts under the subcategory of “explaining-outcome” process-
tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 3).11 Following Beach and Pedersen (2013: 
18), explaining-outcome process-tracing has the ambition to “craft a minimally 
sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiently defined as an 
explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no 
redundant parts being present”. Explaining-outcome process-tracing is case-
specific and combines structural and case-specific causal links that explain the 
outcome in question. It draws upon theoretical insights as “heuristic 
instruments” that embed a particular case in more general theories (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013: 19). Explaining-outcome process-tracing is an “iterative” 
research process in which a deductive and inductive strategy continuously 
interact. First, existing theories are scanned on potential explanatory 
mechanisms for the outcome in question. If, after empirical testing, these 
theories do not fully explain the outcome, they are “reconceptualized” on the 
basis of the newly gathered evidence from the case-specific empirical analysis. 
The resulting theory is then tested and modified “until the result is a theorized 
mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular 
outcome” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 19-20, 63-64).  
 
Furthermore, this text takes legal stipulations to be the reflection (Thomas, 
2001) and formal codification (Sandholtz and Stiles, 2009: 1) of norms. Norms, 
as shared beliefs, are only observable in their consequences, i.e. when they 
induce (state) behaviour or in the discourses and rhetoric surrounding an issue 
(Bjorkdahl, 2002: 13). In the latter case, they are most visible in “codified and 
recorded” forms, such as international laws, conventions and their preparatory 
works (Farrell, 2002: 60). Another indication of the strength of a norm is 
provided by references to an international norm in political discourse, domestic 
policies and institutions (Farrell, 2002: 61). Justificatory discourses for non-
compliance leave a “trail of communication” (Bjorkdahl, 2002: 13). From this 
point of view, change in the legal framework is indicative of a change in 
underlying norms. This text will delve into the contemporary reformulation of the 
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 In light of the meta-theoretical framework of this text, it might be better to speak of 
contingent and “empirically plausible” (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 272) causal 
processes. 
11
 The other two categories are theory-testing and theory-building process tracing. 
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legal framework governing the use of force. Doing so, I will focus on three 
governance initiatives that have contributed to this reformulation: the United 
Kingdom’s policy of self-regulation of the industry, the intergovernmental 
‘Montreux Document’ and the ‘International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Providers’. At first sight, these governance initiatives can be seen as 
the outcome of a “general deliberation” (Manin, 1987: 352) or as a “negotiated 
consensus” (Steffek, 2003: 267). Especially in the former two cases, the 
negotiations leading to the policy proposal or to the signing of the document are 
particularly well documented. In addition, various organisations have reacted to 
these policies. These regulatory initiatives therefore lend themselves to a 
process-tracing analysis. A comparison of the negotiated outcome with the 
discourses of the various actors involved in the negotiation will consequently 
provide evidence of the relative weight of each of the participants in the drafting 
process.  
 
Notably, the process-tracing will show that NGOs succeeded in creating a 
debate on the appropriate governance of the industry, but that their arguments 
were not accepted as compelling reasons for the delegitimation of PMSC 
activities. This was because the norms NGOs defended clashed with the aims 
and interests of government and the private military industry. NGOs furthermore 
lacked the material resources to set the terms of the debate, as well as the 
pragmatic legitimacy to provide state security in the absence of PMSCs. 
Simultaneously, PMSCs cooperated with the UK government to shape the 
conditions of the debate, which is why they were able to influence the outcome 
of the deliberation. The option proposed by NGOs was perceived as morally 
optimal, but practically unachievable. This outcome shows that PMSCs 
possessed considerable realist constructivist power – meaning they had the 
ability to participate in this deliberation and to shape its final outcome. In 
contrast to Steffek (2003: 267), who stresses that governance as a “negotiated 
consensus” is only successful if its justificatory discourse is rationally assented 
to by the people it affects; this research project will thus show that assent can 
(also) simply be the result of a lack of material or epistemic resources to call 
into question the existing normative framework.  
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The focus of this research project is on the United Kingdom. It is so for several 
reasons. First, while the UK is at the forefront of outsourcing and privatisation in 
Europe, other states are slowly moving in the same direction. From this 
perspective, the UK policy can be seen as a ‘quasi-experiment’, which offers 
lessons to later adopters. Military innovation in one country, if perceived as 
successful (Posen, 1993: 82) can be the source of innovation, through imitation 
in other countries (Waltz, 1979: 127). In the case of defence privatisation in the 
EU, the UK is “testing the boundaries” (James, Cox and Rigby, 2005: 155). But 
also other EU member states are experimenting with military services 
privatisation (cf. Richter (2007) for Germany and Bakker and Sossai (2012) for 
other EU member states). Partly this is because the financial pressures on their 
defence budgets resulting from the economic and financial crisis has urged 
them to look for cost savings (Mölling and Brune, 2011: 42). Budgetary 
pressures have driven cuts in state spending and have subjected defence 
spending to stronger scrutiny (Meyer and Strickmann, 2011: 75). From this 
perspective, PMSCs offer a venue to increase state capabilities in the security 
domain at a lower financial cost. In addition, the push for harmonisation of the 
European regulation of the private military and security industry (Krahmann, 
2005a: 292) might well lead to the further diffusion of the regulatory approach of 
the UK; especially since UK officials take a central position in governance 
networks of European security (Mérand, Hoffman and Irondelle, 2011: 129-
131). Methodologically, the UK thus displays elements of a “revelatory case 
study”, in the terminology of Yin (2009: 48). The scope and depth of outsourcing 
and privatisation in the UK and the British regulatory approach have not been 
observed in other European cases. Focusing attention on the UK might reveal 
empirical and theoretical insights relevant for other states and other research 
domains. Following one of the case selection techniques of Gerring (2007: 101), 
the UK is therefore an “extreme” case. As such, it is not representative of the 
broader population of states, but it can serve as an “exploratory method” 
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 302) to identify possible causes of norm change 
not observable in other cases. This can help strengthen existing models of norm 
change. 
 
The text will proceed as follows. The first chapter defines PMSCs. It sketches 
the international environment that formed the background to the rise of PMSCs 
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and discusses the orthodox, neorealist informed narrative of the rise of the 
contemporary PMSC industry. The second chapter reviews competing 
explanations of military change, applied to the disappearance of mercenary 
armies and their replacement by citizen armies in the nineteenth century. This 
change in military organisation has been attributed to changes in material 
conditions, in morality, in mutual expectations of statesmen and in the power 
distribution of domestic coalitions - all of which will be reviewed. This discussion 
will reveal that some questions remain, necessitating a refinement of the 
models discussed. Therefore, the third chapter will introduce the realist-
constructivist style of reasoning that underlies this text and will link 
constructivism to other styles of reasoning, noting similarities and divergences. 
Furthermore, this chapter discusses diverse models of norm change and draws 
up an eclectic model to inform this study. Consequently, the fourth chapter 
discusses the concept of epistemic communities. It frames the PMSC industry 
as an epistemic community. This chapter will argue that the crucial role of 
PMSCs in the current instance of norm change lies in their epistemic power, 
which grants them the opportunity to help shape the decisions of states and the 
future regulatory environment of the industry. Finally, the fifth chapter will 
empirically check the theoretical model in the three cases mentioned above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14  
1. Military Outsourcing and Privatisation 
 
Terminological and conceptual confusion hampers even the most basic debate 
on the private military and security industry. Despite a continuing quest for a 
universally agreed upon definition of private military and security companies 
(PMSCs), no agreement has currently been reached, neither in the academic 
nor in the political and legal domains. This terminological discord reveals a 
more fundamental theoretical confusion that extends to the (still unclear) 
reconfiguration of the state monopoly on violence. This first chapter proceeds 
into this “definitional morass” (Isenberg, 2008: 14) to expound how PMSCs will 
be understood in this text and to sketch their rise and their relation with 
uniformed military personnel. Section 1.1 consists of a presentation of 
contemporary PMSCs; followed, in section 1.2, by a sketch of the international 
environment in which these actors gained popularity. Section 1.3 presents the 
traditional (neo)realistic justification of the outsourcing and privatisation of 
military activities. Studies on the private military and security industry frequently 
lack an encompassing theoretical framework. Underlying the present text is the 
assumption that more explicit attention to theoretical presuppositions and even 
“styles of reasoning” (Hacking, 2002) can help make sense of the shifting roles 
of new and traditional actors in the security sector. The third chapter will 
therefore elaborate on the constructivist theoretical framework that informs this 
study and that contradicts some of the meta-theoretical foundations of 
traditional (neo)realistis accounts. 
 
1.1 Private Military and Security Companies 
 
For the sake of this text, private military and security companies will be 
considered as private, for-profit enterprises that operate in situations of armed 
conflict; where they offer military and security services traditionally performed by 
uniformed state personnel, irrespective of the clients of these services, which 
can include corporations, non-governmental organisations and government 
agencies. Contemporary PMSCs are professionally organised businesses, 
legally registered under private law and driven by an intention to make profit 
(Branovič, 2011: 5). More specifically, this text will focus on those activities that 
might induce private companies to use military force. It deserves attention that 
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in this text, the term ‘PMSC’ only refers to those corporations working in, or in 
preparation for situations of armed conflict, which are themselves defined as 
circumstances where governmental or territorial issues are contested by means 
of armed force (cf. Uppsala Conflict Data Project, 2014). In this environment, 
PMSC employees carry out services that were once reserved for uniformed 
military personnel (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 17). Originally, furthermore, the 
term private military company (PMC) was reserved for companies that provided 
‘military’ services, including training, instruction and simulation, but also logistic 
and equipment support and even operational capabilities and frontline services. 
Private security companies (PSCs), then, are those companies that ensure 
protection - whether through consulting, intelligence provision, guarding, 
electronic supervision - in relatively pacified, non-conflict zones (Wulf, 2005: 
43). This text, however, groups these two categories under the comprehensive 
term ‘PMSC’ for several reasons. First, different organisations use different 
categorisations. Even companies that would classify under the PMC category 
will seldom refer to themselves as such. They prefer the term PSC, which 
carries with it a more neutral connotation, partly because PSCs are naturalised 
in established democracies. Second, the distinction between offensive, military 
activities and defensive, protection tasks is not always easy to draw and 
opinions on its utility diverge. In practice, the distinction between offensive and 
defensive services not only tends to be blurred in unstable and rapidly changing 
environments, where security guards can experience sustained attacks by 
armed forces; but is also situation-specific. Similar activities can sometimes be 
offensive, while at other times defensive (Holmqvist, 2005: 5). If, in zones of 
conflict, guarding activities are meant to prevent critical infrastructure from being 
destroyed, this resembles military support activities to a large extent. 
Significantly, international humanitarian law does also not distinguish between 
offensive and defensive military operations, but groups them together under the 
term “taking part in hostilities” (Gillard, 2006: 31). Similarly, the following 
paragraph makes clear that analytical distinctions are not always sustainable in 
practice. Next to this, it moreover needs to be noted that, on the globalised 
market, the major companies offer services domestically as well as on the 
international market (Carmola, 2013: 23). What is more, in many instances, 
military oriented services are offered alongside more traditional security 
services by some of the major companies in this segment of the market 
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(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 38-57). In this respect, it is interesting to see 
how Chesterman and Lehnardt (2007: 3) at first do argue for the utility of the 
distinction between PMCs and PSCs, invoking a difference between more 
offensive services in conflict zones provided by PMCs and more defensive or 
guarding services in stable environments, provided by PSCs. In their view, 
PMCs are defined as “firms providing services outside their home states with 
the potential for use of lethal force, as well as training of and advice to militaries 
that substantially affects their war-fighting capabilities” (Chesterman and 
Lehnardt, 2007: 2-3). So it says a lot that, in the second volume of the same 
research project, the editors matter-of-factly opt for the term PMSC 
(Chesterman and Fisher, 2009). ‘PMSC’ is now the most widely adopted term in 
academic literature to refer to companies offering protective services in 
situations of armed conflict. Most PMSCs no longer openly perform offensive 
combat activities and only offer defensive services for the protection of their 
clients in insecure environments. Nevertheless, the boundary remains sketchy. 
 
Taxonomies and typologies of PMSCs vary depending on the author or 
institution designing them. Singer’s (2004: 91-100, cf. also Avant (2005)) “tip of 
the spear” typology divides the private military industry into military support 
firms, military consultant firms, and military provider firms. Her categorization is 
based on their position on the battlefield and ranked from long distance to close 
proximity to the frontline. The arguments in this text mainly concern the latter 
category, closest to the frontline. PMSCs engage in consultation and planning, 
logistic and support activities, technical services, maintenance and repair of 
military material, training, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and even 
combat activities (Wulf, 2005: 45-46). To these functions can be added 
intelligence gathering, “reconnaissance, surveillance and monitoring” (Schreier 
and Caparini, 2005: 25). Based on a review of the literature on PMSCs’ 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, Taylor (2011: 447) divides armed conflict and 
peacebuilding operations into four spaces. In the first space, supplies are 
delivered to ensure the continuity of military activity. The second space 
concerns “activities within relatively secure bases to keep people and 
equipment ready for use”. The third and fourth spaces respectively deal with 
“military operational activity; and reconstruction and development”. In the former 
two spaces, support for military operational activity is provided. This support 
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concerns both troops and equipment because military personnel needs 
housing, food, laundry services and communication services; while equipment 
needs to be maintained and repaired (Taylor, 2011: 448). Maintenance is often 
of a high-tech nature and necessitates civilian specialists. The boundary 
between support for operational activities and operational activities themselves 
is not always strictly defined. Transport of military equipment is frequently 
carried out by contractors. Nevertheless, this constitutes a preferred target for 
attacks, necessitating armed protection, frequently outsourced to contractors 
(Taylor, 2011: 448). In the operational space, the use of PMSCs is generally 
limited to non-combat activities such as interpretation, interrogation and 
intelligence analysis (Taylor, 2011: 448). In the reconstruction and development 
space, Taylor (2011: 448-449) indicates that PMSCs are involved in the 
provision of two kinds of services. On the one hand, they protect the people 
engaged in reconstruction and the material used for it. On the other, they 
provide (operational) training “for local armed forces, gendarmeries and police” 
(Taylor, 2011: 448). Of course, these ideal-type spaces are constantly 
challenged by the permanent flux of the private military and security industry. In 
this respect, Jameson (2010) already notes how PMSC personnel are in fact 
taking up combat activities, e.g. the operation of drones for the Dutch military in 
the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the casualty figures are an 
extra indicator of the very thin line between combat and non-combat activities. 
Contractor casualties constitute nearly thirty per cent of US deaths in the war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011 (Schooner and Swan, 2012: 19). 
 
1.2 Rise of PMSCs 
 
Military privatisation is not a recent phenomenon.12 Private military entities have 
been present on the battlefield at least since the second millennium B.C. 
                                                          
12
 The early roots of PMSCs go back, if not to ancient mercenaries, then at least to the 
forces protecting the early modern trading companies - most notably the Dutch East 
India Company and the English East India Company, termed “embryonic private 
military companies” by Ortiz (2007: 11). More recently, since the 1950s with Budget 
Bureau Bulletin 55-4, the US Federal Government formally decided to procure products 
and services through the market if this is not contrary to public interest. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the UK saw the emergence of several private military service providers 
(O’Brien, 2000). However, the real boom in the private military services industry only 
came after the end of the Cold War. 
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(Dupuy and Dupuy, 1977: 6). Military privatisation has manifested itself 
differently throughout history, but underlying these different forms was an 
international system dominated by non-state violence (Thomson, 1994: 3). 
Thomson (1994: 3) asserts that “[i]n the six centuries leading up to 1900, global 
violence was democratized, marketized, and internationalized”. Although the 
state monopoly on violence only came to its full deployment at the end of the 
nineteenth century and although even then this monopoly resembled a 
normative and theoretical ideal construct rather than a factual situation. It 
emerged as one of the constituting elements of modern states. Nonetheless, 
this social ideal construction has now come under pressure as a result of the 
contemporary inclination toward the outsourcing and privatisation of activities 
that, until recently, were performed by uniformed state personnel. From this 
point of view, the twentieth century could even be seen as an interlude in which 
the state (haphazardly) succeeded in establishing a monopoly on violence; 
which is now again giving way to organisational mechanisms of coercive power 
and military capability, that actually rhyme with pre-nineteenth century 
mechanisms. At least since the 1980s, domestic private security providers as 
well as their international counterparts have contributed to these evolutions. In 
the domestic security domain the trend toward private policing manifests itself 
nearly everywhere in Europe (Van Steden and Sarre, 2007), the United States 
(Krahmann, 2010), Africa and Asia (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). 
 
The focus of this text, however, bares on the international dimension of armed 
conflict and, more specifically, on the transformation in the composition of the 
armed forces conducting military operations. The rise of PMSCs contributes to, 
but is itself also part of a broader evolution toward a new type of organised 
violence. Kaldor (2001: 3-4) distinguishes between old and new wars. The latter 
manifest themselves since the 1980s and 1990s, partly in reaction to the end of 
the Cold War, but instigated no less by a renewed emergence of globalisation. 
New wars are defined by a blurred distinction between war, organised crime 
and large-scale violations of human rights (Kaldor, 2001: 2). Münkler’s (2003) 
analysis of the wars of the early twenty-first century overlaps to a large extent 
with Kaldor’s observations. Both authors argue that new wars are characterised 
by an overlap of the private and the public sphere, of state and non-state 
involvement, of formal and informal participation and of economic and political 
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motives. Kaldor (2001: 4) asserts: 
 
The new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the 
autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the 
disintegration of the state. In particular, they occur in the 
context of the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate 
organized violence. This monopoly is eroded from above 
and from below. 
 
PMSCs contribute to this evolution, but are by no means the only actors defying 
the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence. Instead, Kaldor (2001: 92) identifies 
five main groups - public and private, state and non-state - fighting in 
contemporary armed conflict: “regular armed forces or remnants thereof; 
paramilitary groups; self-defence units; foreign mercenaries; and finally, regular 
foreign troops generally under international auspices”. This author is not 
isolated in placing PMSCs under the fourth category of foreign mercenaries, but 
this classification has been the subject of a lively academic debate. Positions 
have varied from equating PMSCs with mercenaries (Bjork and Jones, 2005, 
Adams, 2002) to typifying PMSCs as “new model mercenaries” (Percy, 2007a: 
206), or as “the corporate evolution of the age-old profession of mercenaries” 
(Singer, 2005: 119); to pointing out the differences between them and 
classifying them in different categories, frequently on the basis of a strict 
interpretation of article 47 of the Geneva Conventions and the International 
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (for instance Isenberg, 2009). The legal aspect of these 
discussions will be highlighted in the third chapter. The “global ungovernance” 
(Leander, 2002) at the turn of the century did lead to some notable instances of 
unregulated and unaccountable PMSC behaviour, among which the Nisour 
Square Shootings and the Abu Ghraib scandals stand out.13 The perception of 
                                                          
13
 On the Nisour Square Shootings, cf. Johnston and Broder  (2007) “F.B.I. Says 
Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause”. The New York Times. 14/11/2007. p. A 1. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html? 
pagewanted=2&_r=1&sq=17.%20nov.%202007&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=5&adxnnlx=12
73766420- cNwM0%202GG97voGrMuBOQeA>, (accessed 01/07/2014). On the Abu 
Ghraib Scandal, see among others Schooner (2005) and Musgrove (2009): “Court 
Rejects Suit Against CACI Over Abu Ghraib Torture: Contractor Granted Wartime 
Immunity”. The Washington Post. 12/09/2009. p. A 14. 
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unaccountability and ungovernance has however stimulated the development of 
several governance initiatives aiming at the strengthening of the regulatory 
framework of PMSCs (Francioni and Ronzitti, 2011). 
 
Four interrelated developments are usually invoked to explain the contemporary 
tendency toward military outsourcing and privatisation. In his landmark 
publication Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 
Singer (2004) mentions three of them. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010) add 
a fourth one. These developments help describe the international environment 
in which military outsourcing and privatisation takes place, but fail to offer 
compelling reasons for such decisions. Although Singer (2004: 66) only 
discusses the “tidal wave of global privatization” as the third factor in the rise of 
PMSCs, I maintain that we can only make sense of the other factors by 
acknowledging a ‘paradigm shift’ from Keynesianism to neoliberalism (cf. Hay, 
2001) as the primary dynamic. A cost benefit analysis of the provision of goods 
and services through public or private agents only makes sense once a 
normative analysis has established which goods and services are deemed 
socially desirable and which are not (legal versus illegal) (Brauer, 2008: 109) 
and which modes of provision are morally acceptable. The mechanisms of 
supply and demand are only allowed to operate once social mores have come 
to accept security as being eligible for trade on the market. In this respect, the 
1979 electoral victory of Thatcher in the UK, followed by that of Reagan in the 
US in 1981, provided the neoliberal lens through which later changes in the 
security environment were conceptualized in terms of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’. 
The policies propagated by the US and the UK - and previously in Chile, after 
the coup of Pinochet in 1973 (Harvey, 2007: 9) - were quickly picked up by 
international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to be promoted 
throughout the Third World. 
 
Outsourcing manifested itself through various practices that had in common that 
states transferred control over the means of production (in the case of goods) or 
provision (in the case of services) to private companies, in an attempt to drive 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/09/11/AR2009091103285.html>. (accessed 01/07/2014). 
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up efficiency. It was increasingly assumed that through competition the market 
would be able to provide security at a greater cost-efficiency than unwieldy and 
bureaucratic government agencies (Cockayne, 2009: 198). In light of the finite 
amount of resources at the disposal of the state, turning to the private sector 
holds an appealing promise: if private contractors can provide the same goods 
or services as in-house personnel, using less resources; then the state can 
achieve more of its objectives for the same availability of resources. 
Outsourcing even took place in areas that used to be considered inherently 
governmental, such as the management of prisons and postal services (Singer, 
2003: 67). It is worth dwelling for a moment on the difference between 
outsourcing and privatization. It can be made clear by referring to the analogy of 
rowing and steering (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). When an organisation 
decides to outsource certain functions, it deliberately releases control over the 
means of production (rowing), but retains firm control over the aims at which the 
services or goods will be directed (steering). It is a strategy to enhance the 
capacity of the state or to do ‘more with less.’ Whereas the state has partly 
given up its hierarchical command and control mode of regulation (Crawford, 
2006: 450), it still sets out the course to be followed by the private actors. An 
example of this is the privatisation in the 1980s of some of the formerly 
nationalised British defence companies (Walker and Whyte, 2005). 
 
Privatisation, in a narrow sense, then, refers to the transfer of the steering 
function to private agents. The state retreats to a post-regulatory position (Scot, 
2004) and defines the boundaries within which international and non-
governmental organisations and corporations can provide their own security. 
Privatisation took a central place in the “loosely connected set of concepts, 
distinctions and ideas” of neoliberalism (Kjær and Pedersen, 2001: 221), which 
saw the state as the protector of the rule of law and of individual property rights 
in order to facilitate “marketization” or the replacement of government control of 
economic interactions by free economic exchange (Simmons, Dobbin and 
Garrett, 2008: 2). Harvey (2007: 65) states that “[w]hile personal and individual 
freedom in the marketplace is guaranteed, each individual is held responsible 
and accountable for his or her own actions and well-being” - which increasingly 
came to include security.  However, this neoliberal project comes into collision 
with international law that continues to see states as an exclusive controller of 
22  
the use of violence. The last chapter will focus on the friction this generates. 
 
The second dynamic consists of the end of the Cold War. This event entailed a 
shift in the global security market, partly driven by an increase in levels of 
conflict around the world due to state-implosion, the reappearance of 
international wars and the growing influence of international markets (Singer, 
2003: 50-51). Non-state groups (e.g. criminals, insurgents and warlords), 
unregulated by the world community, took up their place in these armed 
conflicts. Combined with the emergence of new conflicts, they created a 
demand on the security market that was met by PMSCs (Singer, 2003: 49-52). 
Non-state groups as well as government elites trying to protect themselves 
hired PMSCs. PMSCs themselves benefited from a market flood of labor and 
tools, instigated by the downsizing of military equipment and the demobilisation 
of experienced military personnel (Singer, 2003: 53). Contributing to this 
dynamic was the “decline of local state governance”, which is intrinsically linked 
to the incapability of these states to maintain a fully functioning military 
apparatus. Once again it created opportunities for PMSC assistance (Singer, 
2003: 55-58). In fragile states, the political survival of government elites often 
depended on their ability to militarily control strategic, resource-rich areas. 
Contracting PMSCs offered an advantage in this struggle. 
 
Thirdly, Singer (2003: 64) distinguishes “transformations in the nature of 
warfare”. The above-mentioned empowerment of non-state actors and the 
related criminalisation of warfare opened up further opportunities for PMSCs; 
because this kind of warfare is often messier and more intractable than previous 
forms (Singer, 2003: 64-66). A more fundamental transformation, however, is 
the enhanced technological complexity of contemporary military technologies. 
This complexity leads to a blurring of the line between military and civilian 
technologies, occupations and functions (Singer, 2003: 62-64). In Singer’s 
words (2003: 64): “[T]he weapons systems required to carry out the highest 
levels of conflict are becoming so complex that as many as five different 
companies are often required to help just one U.S. military unit carry out its 
operations”. 
 
Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 322) add that PMSCs helped the UN and 
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other international organisations to overcome the capacity gaps caused by the 
significant increase in peace operations at the beginning of the 1990s. Not only 
these capacity gaps but also the reluctance of the major powers to intervene 
militarily in international conflicts not directly related to their own security 
opened up opportunities for the private military industry. 
 
These conditions roughly constitute the international environment in which 
military outsourcing took place. However, they do not offer a compelling 
explanation for the rise in outsourcing. In this environment, governments still 
had to make the make-or-buy decision concerning military force. Some states 
chose to outsource the activities others wanted to keep in the hands of 
uniformed state personnel. Nevertheless, even states that displayed an initial 
reluctance to the outsourcing of those activities have recently shown a more 
receptive attitude. In contrast to the UK, where outsourcing was a preferred 
policy option, The Netherlands has long resisted the international outsourcing 
trend (Gielink, Buitenhuis and Moelker, 2007), although recently it also yielded 
to the lure of PMSCs (Krahmann and Friesendorf, 2011: 15, Jameson, 2010). In 
spite of the increasing use of PMSCs, outsourcing levels in Germany and 
France do not come close to those in the US and the UK, neither quantitatively 
nor qualitatively (Kruck, 2014: 125-127). This indicates that the decision to 
resort to private sector suppliers of military services is not solely an economic 
cost-benefit analysis. It also involves a profound normative debate on the 
proper role of state and non-state actors in the international society. 
 
1.3 Reasons for Outsourcing and Privatisation 
 
Several arguments have been offered to justify the outsourcing of military 
activities, frequently framed in terms of “advancing the public interest” (Likosky, 
2009: 11-12). Schwartz and Swain (2011: 2) summarise these arguments as 
follows: 
 
Since contractors can be hired faster than DOD [i.e. the US 
Department of Defence] can develop an internal capability, 
contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical 
support capabilities when necessary. Contractors also 
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provide expertise in specialized fields that DOD may not 
possess, such as linguistics. Using contractors can also save 
DOD money. Contractors can be hired when a particular 
need arises and be let go when their services are no longer 
needed. Hiring contractors only as needed can be cheaper in 
the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house 
capability. Using local nationals as contractors could also 
help develop the local economy and workforce, contributing 
to stability and counter-insurgency operations. 
 
However, the remainder of this section will show how these traditional 
arguments have been contested by recent research. 
 
Inherent in the privatisation wave of the 1980s and 1990s was a belief in the 
greater cost-effectiveness of PMSCs in comparison to uniformed state 
personnel. Brauer (2008: 104) makes explicit the economic rationale underlying 
the outsourcing of military activities and asserts that “in an exchange, as one 
good is received, another good (often, but not necessarily, money) is given up. 
The benefit received is greater than the value of what is given up, or else the 
agent would not wish to buy”. Even though the agent can sometimes make 
mistakes, it can be assumed that he or she will not repeatedly buy goods which 
produce a smaller benefit than the value of what is given up (Brauer, 2008: 
104). However, a purely financially motivated cost-benefit justification frequently 
falls short of explaining particular outsourcing decisions. In their economic 
analysis of the financial costs of the most recent war in Iraq, Stiglitz and Bilmes 
(2009) demonstrate that military outsourcing has benefited PMSCs, while not 
significantly reducing operational expenses for the US government, on the 
contrary. These authors (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2009: 11) note that the increasing 
US reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, “has increased operational 
expenses far more than if we had relied solely on the Army”. Not only are 
PMSCs driving up operational expenses, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2009: 12) argue 
that the military is also competing against itself because the Army is forced to 
raise bonuses for re-enlisting due to the higher wages experienced personnel 
are offered by PMSCs. Next to this financial argument against outsourcing, the 
authors point out two supplementary elements tipping the balance in favour of 
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the ‘make-decision’ of military force. They argue that PMSCs fall outside the 
reach of military discipline and supervision and they extensively illustrate that 
profiteering and corruption abound (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2009: 12-13). Stiglitz 
and Bilmes are not isolated in taking this position. Both of these arguments are 
supported by academic research and investigative journalism (Dickinson, 2009, 
Cameron, 2006, Frulli, 2011). Next to the increasing cost for the US 
government, PMSCs also generate negative effects for the local Iraqi economy 
and consequently for the US’ image by importing cheaper, foreign workers from 
low-wage countries, thus undermining Iraqi economic recovery (Stiglitz and 
Bilmes, 2009: 143). Despite a policy intention of engaging more local nationals 
as contractors, this percentage recently dropped significantly in Afghanistan and 
Iraq combined (from 49 per cent in December 2009 to 36 per cent in March 
2011) (Schwarz and Swain, 2011: 8). Stiglitz and Bilmes (2009: 194) 
unsurprisingly conclude that the taxpayer is not receiving value for money and 
that “the risks of losing control may well outweigh budgetary considerations”. 
 
The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan’s (CWCIA) 
final report to the US Congress depicts an even less favourable assessment of 
US military outsourcing in these recent conflicts. This Commission concludes 
that the US government is currently over-relying on PMSCs and mentions the 
operational, political and financial risks entailed. Regarding operational risks, 
the Commission (CWCIA, 2011: 29) estimates that the over-reliance on PMSCs 
leads to a loss of “mission-essential organic capability” by the government. 
Such knowledge can shift to contractors because of the inconsistent, and often 
too short, rotation periods of service members across military services and 
civilian agencies (CWCIA, 2011: 29). The members of his commission express 
the concern that in this way PMSCs may de facto take over control of “defense, 
diplomatic, and development activities” (CWCIA, 2011: 29). Concerning political 
risks, the authors note how employing local contractors can boost the local 
economy, which leads the host-nation and its citizens to look up to the US 
(CWCIA 2011: 29). At the same time, however, the economic benefits for the 
local economy are counterbalanced by a twofold risk. On the one hand, an all 
too intrusive penetration of the local economy can exceed the absorptive 
capacity of that economy, distorting economic activity and causing inflation, 
fraud and corruption. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the US military 
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contractors leaves many local employees without a job, undermining economic 
recovery and leading the unemployed to seek other job opportunities, often 
offered by local insurgent groups (CWCIA, 2011: 29-30). The third category of 
risks entailed by the over-reliance on PMSCs amounts to the financial losses 
governments make by outsourcing. The authors point out that “extensive 
contingency-contract waste, fraud, and abuses are the most obvious” and 
estimate the wasted amount between $31 and $60 billion, a number which was 
“foreseeable and avoidable” (CWCIA, 2011: 30-32). The diversion of money 
paid to military contractors, but ending up in the pockets of local warlords and 
insurgents to grant safe passage for convoys and personnel contributes to 
runaway spending on PMSCs (CWCIA, 2011: 32). 
 
An interesting addition to the risks identified above is provided by the Iraq war 
logs, i.e. leaked documents concerning the war in Iraq released by Wikileaks. 
These allow an inside perspective on the conduct of that war. Glanz and Lehren 
(2010) have discussed these documents in a New York Times article entitled 
“Use of Contractors Added to War’s Chaos in Iraq”. The documents make clear 
that contractor personnel are often involved in fire fights and difficult to identify 
due to the lack of a standardised uniform (Glanz and Lehren, 2010). 
Furthermore, the indiscriminate and mostly unjustified shootings by PMSC 
personnel at civilians, American and Iraqi security forces and other contractors 
evoked public outrage which did not make work easier for the coalition troops 
(Glanz and Lehren, 2010). Glanz and Lehren (2010) add the following: 
 
For all the contractors’ bravado — Iraq was packed with 
beefy men with beards and flak jackets — and for all the 
debates about their necessity, it is clear from the 
documents that the contractors appeared notably 
ineffective at keeping themselves and the people they 
were paid to protect from being killed. 
 
Furthermore, the documents reveal that PMSCs are suffering from a lack of 
accountability. Because this issue has extensively been debated in previous 
research (Francioni and Ronzitti, 2011, Chesterman and Fisher, 2009), this text 
will not repeat those arguments. 
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Taken together, the above-mentioned arguments paint a grim picture of the 
military outsourcing policy. Nevertheless, indicators of a change in policy and/or 
of a reconsideration of the strategy toward PMSCs remain scarce (Kruck, 2014: 
122-123). However, a purely realist-informed narrative of the popularity of 
PMSCs, focusing on material incentives for states pursuing their own interests 
fails to account for at least two irregularities. First, as discussed in this section, 
states often act against their own interests in contracting with PMSCs. Second, 
the above narrative overlooks the role of norms in the international realm and 
conceptualises states as actors without normative concerns. This is surprising 
since international law has long considered states, or state-like entities, the only 
actors authorized to use violence in the international realm (Reitberger, 2013: 
64). PMSCs have been approached from a normative point of view before. 
Percy (2007) explains the contemporary persistence of the norm against 
mercenary use and how this norm has shaped the governance of mercenaries 
throughout several centuries, thus also exerting influence on the governance of 
PMSCs today. However, by focusing on the persistence of this norm, she loses 
sight of its changing nature. Therefore, a model of norm change is necessary to 
approach the rise of PMSCs. The following chapter will argue that the current 
instance of military change is not fully captured by existing theoretical 
perspectives. In response, the third chapter will make explicit the theoretical 
backbone of this study, which subsequently informs a new theoretical model of 
norm change. 
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2. Change in Military Organisation 
 
Change in the organisation of military force has inspired military theorists, 
historians and political scientists alike to draw up various theoretical models of 
military change, grounded in diverse theoretical backgrounds. This second 
chapter reviews competing accounts of a specific manifestation of military 
change at the end of the eighteenth, beginning of the nineteenth century. This 
manifestation is the disappearance of mercenary armies and their replacement 
by citizen armies, usually composed by means of conscription. Although a 
precursory shift away from ad hoc mercenary armies to more permanent 
standing armies can already be discerned in the fifteenth century with the reign 
of Charles VII in France (1429-1461); the state only succeeded in consolidating 
its monopoly on violence in the first half of the twentieth century. The American 
and French Revolutions were critical in this regard. Afterwards, the actors 
traditionally dominating the international ‘market’ for violence - such as 
mercenaries, privateers, pirates and overseas trading companies - were nearly 
completely brought under the control of their home states.  
 
In the following, these arguments will be discussed in function of the recent 
move in the opposite direction, i.e. away from the state monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force (Krahmann, 2009, Bailes, Schneckener and Wulf, 2007). 
The aim of this exercise is to see if these accounts can help explain this move 
through analogical reasoning and by providing a theoretical framework for 
change in military history. In this respect, four theoretical models of the 
development of the state monopoly on force can roughly be discerned - more or 
less coinciding with the broader evolution in international relations theory. The 
academic debate on this topic, as it is structured in this text, culminates in the 
work of Avant (2000), the last of four models presented below. While Avant’s 
combination of material and ideational factors in domestic power coalitions goes 
a long way in remediating the gaps of rivalling models, some elements in her 
proposal remain unclear. These obscurities are the impetus to a structured 
review of the literature on norm change in the following chapter. Combined with 
the insights of Avant, the findings presented there will allow us to systematically 
tackle the research question.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section sets out realist and 
materialist arguments for military change, complemented with a rational choice 
perspective. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 will respectively address Thomson’s 
sociological institutionalist argument and Percy’s constructivist argument. Even 
though both authors attribute a central role to norms in the emergence of the 
state monopoly on violence; this subdivision is warranted, since they not only 
attribute a different content to the norms, but speak of a different kind of norm 
altogether. The fourth section discusses the argument made by Avant (2000), 
who sees material and ideational factors as antecedent conditions, but 
attributes a central role to domestic power coalitions.  
 
2.1 Change in Material Environment 
 
From a realist-oriented point of view, military systems emerge as functional 
reactions to environmental constraints. In a continuous “struggle for wealth, 
power and prestige” (Andreski, 1968: 7) states will rationally choose those 
policies that are most useful in ultimately strengthening their power (Waltz, 
1979, Keohane, 1986, Donnelly 2000: 7). Strategic responses to material 
pressures thus result in changes in military practices (Gooch, 1980, Cohen, 
1985). As catalysts for change, arguments in this tradition typically stress 
population growth (Posen, 1993), technological evolutions (McNeill, 1982), 
tactical military changes (Palmer, 1986), and sometimes economic motives 
(Brauer, 1999). Cohen (1985: 25) elaborates on this view in his discussion of 
the American military system and notes that in the design of their military 
service system, states are guided by two sorts of demands, namely “those of 
external necessity - the constraints placed on their participation in world politics, 
their status as sovereign members of the state system, and their location on the 
globe - and those of ideology”. The military system in a particular country is thus 
shaped by geopolitical necessities such as the length of its borders and the size 
of its population. It is also shaped by the imperatives of war itself, because 
different types of war require different types of military organization. Large-scale 
military operations require another type of military force than small wars, which 
again differs from the forces needed in, for example, counter guerilla warfare 
(Cohen 1985: 25, 35-38). In this perspective, ideology refers to an ideal military 
strategy. It comprises the ideas of individuals or groups on what strategies will 
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most likely lead to victory. It is important to note from the beginning that these 
ideological drivers differ from normative constraints. While ideology need not be 
intersubjectively shared, this is a prerequisite of a norm.14 
 
Realism explains the gradual disappearance of mercenary units as a functional 
response to external necessities. Citizen armies won wars because they were 
more sizeable (Cohen, 1985) or better motivated (Posen, 1993). Eventually, the 
mass conscript armies territorial states were able to raise, emerged as the new 
path to success and set the example for European nation states (Gooch, 1980: 
25). In this respect, military evolutions are closely linked to the formation, 
evolution and reconceptualization of states. The competition between European 
states required them to militarily adapt to technological and tactical innovations, 
causing a change in political organisation (Downing, 1992: 56-83). The mutually 
constitutive relationship between states and war has been elaborated on most 
explicitly by Tilly (1975: 73), as summarised in his adage “war made the state 
and the state made war”. Tilly (1990) demonstrates how state-building is not 
confidently planned and depends on external factors such as geopolitics, war 
and international relations; but even more on how the interplay of capital and 
coercion generates cities and states. To stage and wage a war, rulers depended 
on the financial, technical and human resources they were able to extract from 
their subordinates and “[w]ithin limits set by the demands and rewards of other 
states, extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central 
organizational structures of states” (Tilly, 1990: 27-28). Consequently, national 
differences can be explained by the struggle of subordinate social classes 
against resource extraction and by the methods wielded to overcome that 
resistance (Tilly, 1990: 27-28). Tilly (1990: 58) hints at the realist arguments 
when he notes that, in a competitive environment, the political entity most 
efficiently staging mass armies eventually gained an advantage over smaller 
actors, subsequently driving the latter out of the political arena. In this 
competitive arena, it was the magnitude of the standing army that decided over 
victory or loss. The military advantage went to those political entities that were 
able to draw upon their own population to create a large standing force. As Tilly 
                                                          
14
 Knight (2006: 619) offers a broad definition of ideology as “the way a system - a 
single individual or even a whole society - rationalizes itself”. Interpreted in this way, 
ideology need not be intersubjectively shared. 
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(1990: 58, 63) says: “states having access to a combination of large rural 
populations, capitalists, and relatively commercialized economies won out”. 
Eventually, the national state “set the terms of war” and other forms of state 
organisation gradually converged on that model (Tilly, 1990: 58).  
 
The initial mercenaries’ assignment comprised keeping the domestic population 
under control. Once this control was more or less achieved, however, 
mercenaries themselves posed a potential threat to the rulers, especially when 
irregular pay drove them to look for alternative income-generating methods, 
such as banditry and plundering (Tilly, 1990: 83). In this line of reasoning, a 
common problem with hired military units was that they placed a heavy burden 
on local populations since they regularly - and mostly in between contracts - 
“took to living off the land” (Singer, 2003: 29). Thus, the gains in fiscal costs to 
the rulers were outweighed by the higher social costs (Singer, 2003: 29). The 
fact that this marauding also undermined the tax bases of newly emerging 
states aggravated the problem (Singer, 2003: 29). The economic costs and 
political risks of enlisting, disbanding and re-enlisting mercenaries became 
excessive for rulers, who were reluctant to trust the costly and often unreliable 
mercenary entrepreneurs (Singer, 2003: 30). In addition, the mounting costs of 
large-scale warfare generated a search for cheaper labour, which could be foun 
in citizen armies (Tilly, 1990: 83). Changes on the supply side of mercenary 
activity contributed to this evolution:  
 
During the eighteenth century, the vast expansion of 
rural industry opened up alternative economic 
opportunities to the people of major regions, such as 
highland Switzerland, that had been exporting solders 
and domestic servants to the rest of Europe, and thus 
squeezed the supply of mercenaries. The French 
Revolution and Napoleon gave the coup de grâce to the 
mercenary system by raising huge, effective armies 
chiefly from France’s own expanding territory (Tilly 1990: 
83). 
 
A final factor is the economies of scale, that further drove changes in military 
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organization. Technological developments (most prominently firearms) reduced 
the length of training and proved advantageous for mass armies (Singer, 2003: 
29-30).  
 
Thus, in a struggle over political power and economic resources, mercenarism 
eventually gave way to a double pressure. On the one hand, states asserted a 
more systematic control over potentially rivalling mercenary groups to ensure 
their political survival (Cockayne, 2006: 467). On the other hand, the above-
mentioned technological innovations - such as firearms, tactical developments 
and more disciplined military drill - shifted the comparative advantage from 
mercenaries to locally recruited armed forces. They succeeded more easily in 
raising funds to defend a territory because those resources flowed back to the 
population itself, in the form of defence constructions and training of local forces 
(Cockayne, 2006: 467). Building upon this local anchorage, territorial states 
developed hierarchical administrations, which “allowed [public rulers] to offer a 
range of public infrastructures to commercial clients which military 
entrepreneurs could not” (Cockayne, 2006: 467).  Eventually, the European 
nation state, with its large standing army emerged as the paramount political 
and military organisation. Whereas rulers initially considered the raising of 
citizen armies to be costly and politically risky - due to potential rebellions - 
citizen armies later became the norm. After the French Revolution they replaced 
mercenary armies in this respect (Tilly, 1990: 82). The mounting economic 
costs and political risks associated with hiring increasingly higher numbers of 
mercenaries forced state rulers to turn to their own subjects to populate their 
armies (Tilly, 1990: 82-83); and a nationalist motivation, deliberately cultivated 
by states, helped in creating a more constant and reliable recruiting pool for 
mass armies (Posen 1993). Contrary to a more constructivist approach, 
nationalism is not the source of the disappearance of mercenaries, but the 
consequence of a search for a more reliable armed force. 
 
In line with a materialist orientation, Brauer and Van Tuyll (2008) resort to 
economics to broaden the field of military history and to explain military change. 
These authors focus on the bloom and decline of the mercenary system in the 
1300s and 1400s, exemplified by the condottieri in Italy (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 
2008: 85). While mercenaries did not disappear in subsequent centuries, they 
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did adopt another form and partly merged with more permanent, standing 
armies until their large-scale disappearance from the eighteenth century 
onwards. Brauer and Van Tuyll’s (2008: 118) account of the transformation of 
the Italian mercenary system draws upon economic principles such as 
‘opportunity costs’, ‘expected marginal costs and benefits’, ‘substitution’, 
’diminishing marginal returns’ and ‘asymmetric information’; applying to both 
hidden characteristics and hidden action. Within this framework, these authors 
identify several interdependent and mutually enforcing evolutions. They (Brauer 
and Van Tuyll, 2008: 103-104) offer an innovative insight when they note a 
convergence of interests of the demand and supply side of mercenary force, i.e. 
of city-states and condottieri respectively:  
 
So long as Italian condottieri were freely roaming from 
contract to contract, their interest lay in prolonged, or 
prolonging, conflict among their paymasters. Once they 
acquired landed wealth and cities of their own, their 
interest lay in reducing conflict to reduce the drain on tax 
revenue, at least on their own territories.  
 
This ‘settling down’ of mercenaries in the city-states can be conceptualised as a 
reaction to the specific problems posed by mercenary armies. First of all, as 
hinted at above, one of the common problems with these armies was that they 
often lived off the land - after their demobilization or when their payment came 
late. To resolve these problems, Italian city-states (often in alliance with each 
other) offered longer-term contracts and moved towards the erection of 
permanent standing armies (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 2008: 108-109). Longer term 
contracts also helped alleviate the financial burden of sustaining prolonged war 
efforts executed by condottieri, which became untenable for fifteenth-century 
Italian city-states (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 2008: 106). The interaction between 
mercenaries and local civilians led to the former’s integration in the local 
communities. Meanwhile, they also failed to keep up with technological 
innovations, new methods of warfare and the increased differentiation in 
technical skills (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 2008: 111). In addition to power politics 
and technological evolutions, the authors also point out problems with the 
contracts (condotte) to explain the eventual demise of condottieri. In this regard, 
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the political, legal and administrative factors were not decisive. Rather it were 
“the difficulties of holding parties to contractual promises, with contract 
enforcement in a word” (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 2008: 96). The asymmetry of 
information between the contracting parties (in the advantage of the condottieri) 
was paramount. It manifested itself in different forms such as the principal-agent 
problem, problems with subcontracting and contract-holdup or contract 
renegotiation in the face of a battle (Brauer and Van Tuyll, 2008: 84). 
Interestingly, similar criticisms return in the discussion on contemporary 
outsourcing to PMSCs. The combination of the above elements led Italian city-
states to raise and train their own armies composed of locally recruited staff. 
The eventual disappearance of condottieri, however, is not fully representative 
of the general  situation in Europe, where mercenaries survived as a more or 
less accepted actor at least until the French Revolution. Indeed, the large-scale 
transition from mercenary to citizen armies has to be situated in the nineteenth 
century. 
 
This nineteenth century transformation presents us with challenges the realist 
tradition is unable to counter. It is at least surprising that political entities so 
profoundly varying in size, population, geography and other aspects all opted 
for similar approach, i.e. citizen armies (Kinsey, 2006: 41). A realist, for 
instance, might expect small states with small populations to continue opting for 
mercenaries. Furthermore, as Avant (2000: 46) demonstrates, “[t]here is no 
conspicuous reason to believe that [small professional mercenary] armies would 
have proved internationally inefficient”. Additionally, a realist would also expect 
that later changes in the international security landscape would be conducive to 
the reappearance of mercenaries, especially in the event of (the creation of) 
new mechanisms allowing tighter state control. Nevertheless, mercenaries did 
not re-appear, apart from some isolated and much-criticised occurrences. What 
is more, the institutionalisation of anti-mercenary legislation illuminates that the 
use of mercenaries even became an a priori invalid option. The next sections 
will address these critiques.  
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2.2 Change in Mutual Expectations 
 
In line with the general evolution of international relations theory, realist 
arguments have come under pressure from rivalling explanations invoking 
ideational and normative changes. A sociological institutionalist argument, 
elaborated by Thomson (1990 and 1994) draws on the importance of new ideas 
to explain the demise of mercenarism. In this case, the newly developed notion 
of neutrality resulted in the “institutionalization of a new norm of state control 
over non-state violence in the international system” (Thomson, 1990: 24). To 
prepare for a comparison with rivalling constructivist accounts, it is revealing to 
shed some light on the origins of this norm. Thomson (1990: 24) traces back the 
origins of the norm to the French Revolutionary War, where it started off as a 
reflection of state practices. Subsequently, these practices assumed a more 
universal adherence among states, ending up as a “new standard for 
statesmanship”. To be considered and respected as a sovereign state, state 
leaders had to respect the norm of controlling their citizens’ actions in the 
international realm (Thomson, 1990: 24). A norm, for Thomson (1990: 43), is 
thus an expression of “mutual expectations among statesmen”.  
 
This sociological institutionalist account does not refute traditional political 
economic cost-benefit analyses of the decline of mercenarism but identifies 
some missing elements. Besides the fact that mercenaries are not a priori more 
expensive than conscripted soldiers – who not only need training, public 
provisions (housing, education, health services) and administration; but also 
imply a loss of economic manpower - Thomson (1990: 32-33) calls into 
question the role of nationalism in the economic argument. She asserts that this 
argument suffers from a conflation of the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ 
because “individuals and nations do not decide what wars to fight; states do”  
(Thomson, 1990: 32). As such, nationalism might not always be a sufficient 
motivator to fight wars decided by states (Thomson, 1990: 32). Admittedly, 
conscription could generate a larger and more loyal army (and can therefore 
not be depicted as irrational); but the obvious political advantages of 
mercenaries cannot be negated. They include  greater latitude for states in war-
making, because mercenary casualties are not as politically sensitive. On the 
basis of these arguments, the near elimination of mercenary activities strikes 
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Thomson (1990: 33) as somewhat premature.  
 
In fact, this is where a sociological institutionalist argument comes into the 
picture. To understand this argument, we must not conceptualise mercenaries 
as sellers of military labour (being a commodity on the international market). 
Rather, they should be seen as individuals “exercising violence in the 
international system” to militarily enforce a political cause (Thomson, 1990: 33-
34). This reconceptualization of mercenarism from an economic to a political 
phenomenon entails a refocus of attention from an economic cost-benefit 
analysis to an analysis of institutionalised governance practices steering the 
exercise of legitimate force in the international system (Thomson, 1990: 34).  In 
this regard, the central institution is state sovereignty. Its main tools are the 
authority claims of states on violence originating from within their borders and 
affecting external actors (Thomson, 1990: 34).   
 
Respect for state sovereignty requires other states’ neutrality in disputes that do 
not directly affect their national ‘survival.’ Neutrality is not objectively given, but 
consists, inherently, of an “intersubjective understanding, a set of expectations 
among statesmen about the proper behaviour of a neutral state” (Thomson, 
1990: 40-41). A neutral state is a state whose policies are in line with this 
intersubjective understanding of neutrality‚ or with the practices that have 
customarily come to characterise a neutral state (Thomson, 1990: 41). The 
emerging nation states came to be held responsible for the actions of their 
citizens on the international scene. As such the disappearance of mercenaries 
can be seen as an “unintended consequence of interstate politics” (Thomson, 
1994: 69). Only with the prior emergence and development of the nation state 
and its citizens did the conceptual difference between state violence and 
societal violence gain meaning (Thomson, 1990: 43) and did non-state violence 
become a problem. The emergence of the nation state required a double 
delineation of borders: the demarcation of state borders to differentiate insiders 
from outsiders, combined with the penetration of social life within those borders, 
the result of which was the “institutionalization of the boundary between the 
public political and the private nonpolitical spheres” (Thomson, 1990: 43). 
Regarding the demarcation of state borders, in a process of external exclusion, 
a sovereignty claim on a delineated territory is secured against claims of 
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external political rivals while the internal penetration of the nation state refers to 
the formulation of the relationship between a nation state and its citizens 
(Thomson, 1990: 43). Inherent in the development of citizenship is a 
delimitation of appropriate state involvement in the private life, viz. the 
differentiation of a private and a political sphere. Legitimate state involvement 
and its use of coercion is restricted to the public, political sphere and the state 
is barred from interfering in the private life of its citizens (Thomson, 1990: 43-
44). The initial development of the notion of citizenship brought along practical 
questions regarding the place of a national citizen in the international system 
and, more specifically, regarding state accountability for the actions of its 
citizens abroad (Thomson, 1990: 44). The concept of citizenship not only 
implied a relationship between the citizen and its home state, but also between 
the citizens of different nation states and between citizens of one nation state 
and public authorities of another (Thomson, 1990: 44). According to Thomson 
(1990: 44), the attribution of citizenship to mercenaries and the consequential 
politicising of mercenaries transformed the “private decision to sell military labor 
on the international market into a public decision to deploy violence in the 
international system”. Concomitantly, sovereignty was redefined and 
accountability of state leaders for the conduct of their citizens abroad was 
established. In other words, “[t]he nineteenth-century system excluded violence 
from the list of individual activities over which statesmen could legitimately 
disclaim authority, and therefore, responsibility. Violence was taken off the 
market” (Thomson, 1990: 44). The US have been a trendsetter in this regard, 
as they were the first liberal republican state to frame mercenaries’ enlistment 
in foreign armies as contradictory to US citizenship (Thomson, 1990: 42). Other 
states followed this lead.  
 
This sociological institutionalist account does not completely refute the previous 
arguments, since it might be argued that states benefited from the development 
of this norm and that increasing state reluctance to authorise non-state violence 
did not necessarily contradict state interests.15 While states undoubtedly 
benefited from the authorisation of mercenaries, privateers and mercantile 
companies, they also suffered numerous problems. However, while other 
                                                          
15
 In Percy’s (2007a) account, on the contrary, states act upon a norm even if they are 
aware that it is not in their direct interest. 
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options to reign in the excesses of non-state actors without completely 
eliminating them were on the table,16 state leaders’ “common interests in 
building state power vis-à-vis society produced an international norm against 
mercenarism” (Thomson, 1994: 88). The norm thus reflects state interests and 
facilitates interstate relations.  
 
2.3 Change in Morality 
 
A constructivist account accords even more importance to the role of norms in 
shaping the composition of national armed forces in the international system. 
This normative explanation acknowledges the development of the concept of a 
citizen and his duty towards the state, but prioritises the moral aspect of the 
decision to switch to citizen armies. In this argument, norms supersede the 
rational calculation of state behaviour. Percy (2007a) argues that the normative 
taboo on the use of mercenaries eventually became insurmountable for states 
that turned towards their own citizens as a replacement.17 The anti-mercenary 
norm consists of two components. On the one hand, the immorality of 
mercenaries lies in how they escape legitimate control on their use of force. On 
the other hand, it derives from their selfish, purely financial motivation, with 
which they replace morally higher valued motivations such as “the common 
good” (Percy, 2007a: 1). While the translation of this anti-mercenary norm into 
international law has incontestably been rather weak (Percy, 2007b), this has 
not obstructed the norm from shaping the contemporary organisation of military 
force. Percy (2007a: 122) traces the process of the disappearance of 
mercenaries in the cases of America, France, Prussia and Great-Britain. She 
concludes that it can only be attributed to the norm against mercenaries - going 
back to at least the twelfth century - in combination with emerging “normative 
beliefs about the nature of the state and of its military organization”. Connecting 
these cases is an underlying transformation of the relationship between a 
subject and the state. Echoing previous analyses, emerging concepts such as 
                                                          
16
 At the beginning of this process, a complete abolition of non-state violence did not 
stand out as the only option. Another option was to regulate certain forms of non-state 
violence more tightly (Thomson, 1994: 75, 82-83). 
17
 Percy (2007a: 24) follows a constructivist notion of a norm as “a rule or standard of 
appropriate behavior that an actor accepts as part of his identity and follows most of 
the time”. 
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the ‘citizen’, his duty to the state, and the accompanying patriotic and 
nationalistic motivations to fight for the state pushed away the traditional 
mercenary, with his “morally inappropriate and practically inferior” motivation 
(Percy, 2007a: 121). 
 
Percy (2007a: 121-123) argues that her norms-based approach remedies three 
gaps in the previously discussed stories. First of all, she argues that Thomson 
and Avant (to be discussed below) focus on the theoretical and practical 
transformations of the relationship between the citizen and the state, but 
disregard the moral element of this new relationship. For Percy (2007a: 121-
123) only the combination of this moral element, together with the variations in 
citizen-state relationships in different countries, can elucidate the variation in 
state practices and in the timing of this shift in different states. Secondly, 
building on this normative aspect, Percy (2007a: 122) asserts that practical 
obstacles surrounding mercenaries were not impassable, but that a citizen army 
was considered morally superior because it carried implications for the state: “if 
citizens were willing to die for their state, it suggested that the state was a 
powerful and glorious entity that took care of its people, who returned the 
favour”. This reciprocity was absent in the case of mercenaries but contributed 
to an internationally respected status, which is why citizen armies gradually 
developed into a feature of state identity. Thirdly, Percy addresses the question 
why the citizen army stayed the preferred military option, even when, after the 
revolutionary era, political leaders tried to re-instate pre-revolutionary military 
practices.  
 
Although the cases under review exhibit striking similarities in their 
reconfiguration of the state-citizen relationship, domestic political factors are 
indispensable to account for national singularities. In both the American and the 
French case, a revolution occupied centre stage in the manifestation of the anti-
mercenary norm. America and France are similar to the extent that they 
“adopted a citizen army as an organic part of a revolutionary ideology which 
precluded the use of foreigners and reinforced the existing intellectual tradition 
suggesting that mercenary use was problematic”. Since both countries were 
early adopters, they had no examples on which to base themselves, suggesting 
that this decision was not a cost-benefit analysis, but rather a leap of faith. The 
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republicanism carried out by the American revolutionaries affected and 
reconfigured the relationship between the citizen and the state. The emergence 
of this idea of citizenship came with its rights and duties for the citizen. What is 
more, in fighting for the state, the citizen not only fulfills his duty to the state, but 
also secures his own freedom - which is not the case when hiring mercenaries 
(Percy, 2007a: 124). The motivation of a citizen soldier was thus morally 
superior to that of a mercenary. However, as indicated above, citizen armies did 
not guarantee a practical advantage over traditional mercenary forces, on the 
contrary. Even if potentially more efficient, the normative dislike of mercenaries 
and the moral superiority of citizen soldiers were crucial causal factors for the 
demise of mercenary armies (Percy, 2007a: 126-128). The Republican 
normative underpinning of the American Revolution required the citizens to 
contribute to the war effort (Percy, 2007a: 126-127): 
 
American revolutionaries, having trumped the belief that in 
fighting for their nation citizens preserved their own liberty 
and the ultimate freedom of the country itself, could only 
associate the use of mercenaries with the barbarity of 
states clinging to old ways. If the Americans saw 
themselves as free and civilized not only because of their 
cause but because of the way they used citizens to fight 
for it, then it is not surprising that they saw the British as 
barbarians tightening the shackles of tyranny.  
 
Similarly, French Enlightenment thinkers provided the breeding ground for a 
reconfiguration of the relationship between the state and its subjects, who now 
became citizens. Rousseau’s promotion of “patriotism, civic virtue and 
republicanism” underlies the new French relationship between citizens and the 
state (Percy, 2007a: 128-129). Implicit in the citizen identity is the moral 
obligation to defend the state. The liberty of the people is endangered by 
leaders hiring mercenaries because, due to their lack of an appropriate 
relationship with the state, mercenaries serve state leaders instead of the polity 
itself (Percy, 2007a: 128-129). While mercenaries can be used by state leaders 
to oppress their citizens, a citizen army might be expected not to turn against its 
fellow citizens, making it a safeguard against tyranny (Percy, 2007a: 130). The 
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levée en masse, instigated in 1793, legally anchored this new relationship 
between the state and its citizens. Percy (2007a: 130-136) argues that this 
normative reconfiguration was so profound that, during the reactionary period 
after Napoleon - despite some material arguments in favour of a resort to 
mercenaries - the French stuck to their idea that a national citizen army was the 
best option. 
 
In contrast to the American and French cases, Prussia and Britain did not 
experience a revolution, but this did not prevent them from reformulating the 
citizen-state relationship. Also in the Prussian case, a new relationship between 
the citizen and the state came to redefine the composition of the armed forces. 
However, this case is somewhat deviant since the reforms were inspired by the 
catastrophic 1806 defeats at Auerstadt and Jena, against Napoleon, and by the 
American Revolution.  Both defeats proved to be turning points in Prussian 
public opinion towards mercenaries (Percy, 2007a: 139). Prior to them, 
mercenaries made up a significant proportion (one third to one half) of the 
armed forces. They were not generally disapproved of, as they allowed 
Prussian subjects to pursue their economic interests (Percy, 2007a: 136). The 
reformers framed the debate on the causes of the defeat of the Frederican army 
in ideological terms and concluded that the moral superiority of citizen soldiers 
would prove a practical advantage (Percy, 2007a: 139). Due to the strong links 
between the old army and old regime Prussia, the social reforms following those 
defeats are to be interpreted as preconditions for military reform (Percy, 2007a: 
139-140). This facilitating social reform viewed citizens as a valuable asset to 
the state, that was in turn ready to grant its citizens more liberal freedoms, with 
the idea that “[i]mproving society to improve citizens would create better 
soldiers, better aware of their duty to the state” (Percy, 2007a: 141). Percy 
(2007a: 142) stresses the moral component of the transformation from a subject 
to a citizen: contrary to a subject, a citizen has the moral, civic and patriotic duty 
to defend the community, which contrasts with a mercenary, who is primarily 
motivated financially. Conservative voices in Prussia argued that mercenaries 
could be trained and professionalised to such an extent that they could stand up 
to French standards; with the additional advantage that they would not form a 
revolutionary breeding ground against the ruling class (Percy, 2007a: 143). Add 
to this the nearly universal social opposition against the military transformation 
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and the “huge social costs” it predicted (Percy, 2007a: 145) and the 
abandonment of mercenaries might not have been the most cost-efficient and 
practical solution to draft an army. In spite of these objections, the redefined 
relationship between the citizen and the state became part of the Prussian 
identity. It explains the instigation of a citizen army, in spite of conservative  
opposition and seemingly huge material costs (Percy 2007a: 145-148). 
However, this reconceptualization was not modelled on the revolutionary and 
Enlightenment examples, but aimed at “social discipline: a levee en masse 
rendered safe for the consumption of liberals and conservatives alike” (Moran, 
2003: 5, cited in Percy, 2007a: 147).  
 
Britain proves the hardest case to explain from a constructivist orientation, since 
it was only after the Crimea (1853-1856) that it decided to turn to a citizen army. 
Percy explains this ‘delay’ by reference to the competition between two norms: 
the norm against mercenary use versus the norm against standing armies. 
Discussion on the morally appropriate motivation of the army certainly existed 
prior to the Crimea and the idea that citizen armies might have been morally 
preferable to mercenaries gained some popularity (Percy, 2007a: 150). 
However, the English civil war had demonstrated that “royal control of standing 
armies was associated with the denial of civil liberties” (Percy, 2007a: 150). In 
the late seventeenth century, the cultivation of this distaste resulted in a norm 
against standing armies, which led Britain to rely on temporary mercenary 
armies, resulting in ad hoc military arrangements and concomitant recruitment 
problems (Percy, 2007a: 151). Normative debates already surrounded the 
significant proportion of mercenaries in the British army to combat the American 
Revolution and resurfaced “more vehemently” in the build-up to the Crimean 
War in the form of three normative concerns (Percy, 2007a: 152, 156-163). First 
of all, foreign mercenaries were considered to lack the appropriate motivation to 
fight. Secondly, parliamentary debates brought up the issue that hiring 
mercenaries was trading in flesh, which was considered immoral (an argument 
reinforced by the anti-slavery movement). Thirdly, the splendour of the British 
nation was considered to be undermined by the hiring of foreigners, not in the 
least because the greater number of troops raised by the French (through 
conscription) reduced Britain to a “junior partner” (Conacher, 1987: 110, cited in 
Percy, 2007a: 161). Wellington’s victory at Waterloo (obtained with a largely 
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foreign army) and the relatively long subsequent period of European peace 
pushed this debate to the background, but the Crimean War proved to be the 
last war in which Britain relied on mercenaries (Percy, 2007a: 163). The British 
norm against standing armies forced Britain to rely upon ad hoc recruitment 
strategies until the Crimea. Afterwards, the    
 
moral outrage at the spectacle of using foreigners with no 
interest and therefore no natural motive to reinforce 
British troops helped contribute to the sense that the 
Crimea was a debacle, and that Britain could no longer 
claim to be a glorious state if patriotism could no longer 
earn her enough troops to fight. Continuing to use 
mercenaries was incompatible with the kind of state 
Britain was, and wanted to appear to be (Percy, 2007a: 
164). 
 
While Percy mentions domestic power struggles, she frames these struggles in 
normative terms. These norms undeniably form part of the power struggle, but 
Percy’s account tilts towards a normative bias and fails to take into account that 
actors can aim to manipulate norms to achieve deeper lying goals. In contrast, 
Avant investigates who wins and who loses in this struggle of ideas and norms. 
As such, she pays more attention to the norm entrepreneurs and their position 
in society. 
 
2.4 Change in the Power of Domestic Coalitions 
 
Against realist and sociological institutionalist accounts, Avant (2000: 42) 
objects that “[s]mall professional armies, with no restrictions on mercenaries, 
also won wars and fit with predominant ideas”. In Avant’s (2000: 42) view, 
material and ideational factors must be considered antecedent conditions, acted 
upon by domestic coalitions, who in turn make use of international models that 
seem successful in similar circumstances. This ‘mechanism’ accounts for some 
path dependency in the explanation of military change. Population growth 
required states to expand territorially, to look for technological innovations, and 
to organise their armies more efficiently (Avant, 2000: 44). Ideational changes 
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formed the antecedent conditions for military change. The emergence of 
Enlightenment ideas and the development of natural law, of the social contract 
and of the notion of the citizen implied in that contract, provided a model to 
frame material issues (Avant, 2000: 44). In and of themselves, these material 
conditions are insufficient to explain the popularity of citizen armies. 
Professional armies consisting of mercenaries would have fitted better with the 
technological circumstances of the time, and with the ideas of professionalism 
and rationalisation propagated by Enlightenment thinkers and many eighteenth 
century army officers even preferred this type of military organisation (Avant, 
2000: 45-48). What is more, ideas do not emerge spontaneously and need 
mediation to apply to a particular case. Enlightenment ideas could steer military 
reform in different directions because “these ideas were not a straightforward 
package. Professionalization and rationalization were often in tension with 
democratic processes” (Avant, 2000: 46). 
 
Avant (2000: 42) largely accepts the normative and ideological arguments 
presented above but moves beyond them to include the notion of power. Her 
theoretical framework consists of a combination of the realist and sociological 
accounts and considers military change as a two-step process. First, an 
external shock, often a military defeat or a revolution, provides political 
entrepreneurs with the opportunities to call into question established institutions. 
These shocks can cause power shifts and “open minds to new alternatives, 
affect the legitimacy of institutions, and shatter worldviews” (Avant, 2000: 48). 
They can undermine or delegitimise institutions, but seldom affect change as 
such. Change occurs in the second step, when actors make use of ideas to 
construct alternatives. This can lead to the construction of focal points if these 
ideas are shared by a significant number of people (Avant, 2000: 49). Although 
focal points might emerge spontaneously, they can also be constructed. It is 
here that power comes into play. Since a change in dominant ideas often entails 
a change in “distributional consequences” not all ideas are equally likely to 
reach dominant status. Instead, Avant (2000: 42) analyses that new ideas are 
most likely to break through when dominant domestic coalitions are divided on 
an issue, and when they don’t foresee a significant undermining of their 
dominant position. The more the ideas and interests of the dominant coalition 
are dispersed, the more they are likely to inspire the successful construction of 
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a coalition around new ideas (Avant, 2000: 48-49). The loss or gain of power by 
specific actors in the construction of certain solutions thus becomes a key 
explanatory variable. The reaction to an external shock will depend on the 
distribution of power in the dominant coalition. If perceived as a threat to the 
interest of the dominant coalition, the reaction will probably be conservative 
(Avant, 2000: 51). However, “[w]hen an external shock is joined by a disjuncture 
in the dominant coalition - either a split in how they see the world or few 
common interests - it is more likely that a constructed focal point based on new 
ideas will take hold” (Avant, 2000: 51). To explain the framing of new ideas after 
an external shock, Avant invokes path dependency. Material and cognitive sunk 
costs are often the reason why an initial outcome is frequently preferred over 
other potential options in later stages of the adoption process or by later 
adopters (Avant, 2000: 51). International models are instrumental in promoting 
reform in other states, since they provide experimental examples.  
 
Applied to the cases of France, Britain and Prussia, Avant considers the 
Napoleonic wars as a starting point for reform in other countries.18 She (Avant, 
2000: 52) asserts that Prussia opted for a citizen army following the lessons of 
the French Revolution, and that other countries in turn imitated the Prussian 
example. After an external shock - which was a military defeat in all of the cases 
mentioned - reactions depended on the solutions offered, but even more on 
how these solutions affected the interests of political elites (Avant, 2000: 52). 
The responses to those defeats depended on the domestic power coalition and 
were conservative if that coalition “shared a worldview and stood to benefit from 
the status quo” (Avant, 2000: 52). However, when these conditions were not 
fulfilled, an alternative solution could be constructed by actors who benefited 
from that new way of thinking (Avant, 2000: 52). Without elaborating on the 
empirical details of Avant’s research, the following quote illustrates her 
argument:  
 
We should not look to domestic conditions to explain only the 
margin of variance as realists and sociologists do. Without 
the Prussian interpretation of the battles of Jena and 
Auerstadt as demonstrations of the superior fighting capability 
                                                          
18
 In contrast, Thomson reserves this position for the American Revolution. 
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of citizens, the path toward small professional armies might 
not have been abandoned. […] If Prussia had not moved to a 
mass army, perhaps other countries would have learned 
different lessons from the Napoleonic Wars (Avant, 2000: 69). 
 
In Prussia itself, Old Regime rulers proved the critical ‘mass.’ Once they were 
convinced that a citizen army proved capable of winning wars without 
destabilizing and threatening their own dominant position, the road to the 
adoption of a citizen army in Prussia and in other countries was opened (Avant 
2000: 67).  
 
Domestic power struggles thus play a central role in Avant’s theoretical model 
and in all the cases reviewed. A key question now is: whose interpretation is 
accepted as the “official interpretation” because, frequently, there are multiple 
reasons for defeat in war and multiple ways to remedy them (Avant, 2000: 59). 
On its own, neither a realist, nor a constructivist argument suffices to account 
for the nature and timing of the shift towards citizen armies. Comparing these 
arguments makes clear that they all carry some part of the explanation; and that 
it is only in combining these arguments that we can make sense of the overall 
story. Avant takes a first step in combining these explanations. The antecedent 
conditions normative struggles are embedded in, she argues, cannot be 
overlooked, since they shape the domestic and international distribution of 
power. For an international norm or practice to gain a foothold, it must have 
been promoted by a domestic coalition (of norm entrepreneurs), who mostly 
have something to win by doing so. However, once a new practice becomes 
internalised and reaches the status of a norm, it becomes part of the state 
identity and a guiding principle of state behaviour. Nevertheless, there still 
remain some unanswered questions. First, in this domestic power struggle, why 
do some groups gain an advantage over others with alternative ideas? Can this 
purely be attributed to differences in material power? This would imply that 
norms are only a façade for the diffusion and naturalisation of the outcome of a 
power struggle. Norms, in this argument, are a method used by strong power 
coalitions to consolidate their rule. This fits uncomfortably with evidence of the 
fact that strong powers follow norms, even if this appears to contradict their self-
interest. This conception would also undermine the established constructivist 
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research tradition this text is embedded in. Therefore the challenge of the 
following chapters is to make explicit how normative change comes about and 
which actors most decisively impact it. 
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3. Constructivist Style of Reasoning 
 
In many studies on the private military and security industry, the absence of an 
explicit theoretical framework leaves open “space for important analysis” (Percy, 
2007a: 3). Such a framework can guide the researcher in descrying problematic 
aspects of rivalling accounts of a phenomenon under study. Conversely, 
empirical testing might uncover the shortcomings of a particular theory. This 
chapter therefore elaborates on the constructivist “style of reasoning” (Pouliot, 
2007) that underlies this study. If one accepts the claim of Price and Reus-Smit 
(1998: 264) - as I do, with the reservations discussed below - that 
constructivism is a new phase in the development of critical theory, the following 
step is to devise the conceptual apparatus necessary to deliver on this promise. 
Constructivist theorising has drawn up models to describe and analyse norm 
change. These models are unsuccessful in fully grasping the breakdown of the 
prohibition on non-state violence and the emergence of legitimate non-state 
wielders of coercion. The reason for this is twofold. First, these models still 
suffer from an inadequate recognition of the role of power in norm negotiations. 
Norm negotiations do not usually take place among equally powerful actors. 
This weakness in constructivist theory is the outcome of a fear to step across 
paradigmatic boundaries. At this stage, in line with the conclusions of the 
previous chapter, I will argue that only a purposive combination of realist and 
constructivist reasoning offers the theoretical refinement to make sense of the 
current period of normative turmoil. This argument finds its expression in the 
presentation of a heuristic tool that aims to disentangle cycles of norm change 
and individual contributions to the normative debates. This heuristic tool 
corresponds to an eclectic model of norm change. Its utility is illustrated in the 
last two chapters, where it will guide the empirical analysis of this research. 
Evidently, this is only a preliminary application of this analytic tool and its 
usefulness can only be substantiated through further research in other areas of 
international relations. In the following, section 3.1 develops the constructivist 
style of reasoning while the differences with competing styles will be highlighted 
in section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses existing models of norm change, after 
which the fourth section will present the eclectic model of norm change 
informing this study.  
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3.1 Constructivist Style of Reasoning 
 
Since the constructivist turn in international relations theory - at the end of the 
1980s, early 1990s (Checkel, 1998) - scholars have demonstrated the effect of 
norms on the behaviour of states. Studies undertaken from a constructivist point 
of view elucidate how state behaviour is governed by the identities of those 
states and by the norms in place at a given moment in time. By emphasising 
these elements, constructivist scholars address what they consider to be 
ignored by neorealist and neoliberal research, namely “the content and sources 
of state interests and the social fabric of world politics” (Checkel, 1998: 324). 
Although (neo)realism is not at all a single theory, different variations of this 
theoretical position do agree that humans are inherently egoistic (Wolforth, 
2010: 133). This egoism forms the basis of the self-interest underlying the 
(political) acts of individuals and groups (Wolforth, 2010: 133). In this view, 
egoism is the source of state interests and “the intersection of groupism and 
egoism in an environment of anarchy makes international relations […] largely a 
politics of powers and security” (Wolforth, 2010: 133). In reaction to these 
assumptions, constructivists assert that the interests of states are not given a 
priori, but change over time, due to the socialisation of those states, the 
acceptance of new norms and values, and the redefinition of interests following 
from that socialisation (Finnemore, 1996: 5). Constructivist research projects 
have demonstrated how, in the area of war and warfare, norms have proved 
relevant in constituting guiding rules and even limits on the use of certain forms 
of military force (e.g. Finnemore, 1996, Katzenstein, 1996, Price, 1997, Barnett 
and Finnemore, 2004 and Percy, 2007a). These studies have confirmed 
Finnemore’s (1996: 4) proposition that the neorealist description of war is 
incorrect: instead of a Hobbesian state of nature, “war is a highly regulated 
social institution whose rules have changed over time”. One of these regulations 
forbids the use of mercenaries in an armed conflict19 as part of a wider 
                                                          
19
 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa, dating from 1977, tried to eliminate mercenarism in the context 
of African decolonisation (Schreier and Caparini 2005: 147). A second Convention, 
equally dating from 1977 consists of Article 47 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions (of 1949). The main objective of this Protocol consists of a 
definition of the legal status of mercenaries in international law and their position in 
international humanitarian law (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 148). The more recent UN 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of 
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outlawing of the use of force for private gain.  
 
Although it has undoubtedly broadened the landscape of international relations 
(Checkel, 1998: 325), the variety of definitions to circumscribe constructivism 
indicate how scholars of international relations theory are still debating its place 
in this academic field. Adler (1997: 323) thinks of it as a “social theory on which 
constructivist theories of international politics are based” instead of as a 
narrowly defined theory of politics. This author (Adler, 1997: 322) sees 
constructivism as the middle ground between rationalist and relativist 
interpretative approaches. This claim is echoed by Checkel (1998: 325), who 
does not consider constructivism to be a theory of international relations an 
sich, but “an approach to social inquiry”. In this line of thought, Guzzini (2000) 
speaks of constructivism as a reflexive meta-theory. This text follows Pouliot’s 
(2007) vision on constructivism as a “style of reasoning” in social science. 
Pouliot (2007: 361) recalls the work of philosopher of science Ian Hacking, who 
coined the notion “style of reasoning” and uses it to describe constructivism as 
a “historically constituted episteme”. For Pouliot (2007: 361) constructivism 
brings with it a new ontology, a new epistemology and a new methodology and 
thus satisfies the three criteria of a style of reasoning proposed by Hacking. 
Taking these criteria into account, Pouliot (2007) considers constructivism a 
post-foundationalist style of reasoning. 
 
Although they are not undivided on the kind of theory social constructivism is, 
scholars working in this tradition agree on the basic principles forming the core 
of constructivist ‘reasoning.’ Usually, three ontological propositions are invoked 
(Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 266), inspired by the sociological and interpretive 
turns in the social sciences (Guzzini, 2000: 149). In light of these turns, Pouliot 
(2007: 362) problematizes the distinction between a constructivist epistemology 
and ontology, which, in his view, are only divided by a ‘slash’. First of all, 
constructivists maintain that “material facts acquire meaning only through 
human cognition and social interaction” (Finnemore, 1996: 6). They 
acknowledge the existence of a phenomenal world, independent of thought, but 
also deny 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mercenaries, dates from 1989 but only entered into force in 2001. 
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that phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of 
knowledge independently of discursive practices. In other 
words, phenomena can exist independent of thought, but 
they can not be observed independent of language. 
What counts as a socially meaningful object or event is 
always the result of an interpretive construction of the 
world out there (Guzzini, 2000: 159).  
 
Constructivists thus present a critique of the materialism and methodological 
individualism underlying much neorealist and neoliberal theorising (Checkel, 
1998: 325). Important to note is that the interpretive construction of the world is 
the result of a structure of shared knowledge (Wendt, 1995: 73). As such, an 
intersubjective social context is necessary to allow meaningful behaviour (Hopf, 
1998: 173).  
 
Secondly, not only the phenomenal world, but also social reality is “constructed 
instead of exogenously given” (Pouliot, 2007: 362). This entails that, according 
to constructivists, neorealists and neoliberals are wrong in consciously 
bracketing the interest of states, because interests and the actions flowing from 
those interests are constituted by the identities of states (Price and Reus-Smit, 
1998: 267). These identities - described by Wendt (1992: 397) as “relatively 
stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” - are inherently 
relational and are acquired by participating in collective meanings. In this way, 
identities are socially constructed through interactions with other actors and are 
ultimately determined by the intersubjective structure (Hopf, 1998: 175). They 
inject a sense of predictability in a society because they “tell you and others 
who you are and they tell you who others are” (Hopf, 1998: 175). State identities 
are multiple and are not fixed but can vary over time (Wendt, 1992, Hopf, 1998). 
Hopf’s (1998: 173) assertion that the relations between actors, and 
consequently their understandings of each other, are mediated by norms and 
practices will be discussed below. 
 
Thirdly, from a constructivist point of view, agents and structures are mutually 
constituted and mutually constitutive (Hopf, 1998, Wendt, 1992). Neither 
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ontologically precedes the other (Checkel, 1998: 326). While the 
conceptualization of structures is still debated in contemporary international 
relations theory, they can be understood as “a set of relatively unchangeable 
constraints on the behavior of states” (Hopf, 1998: 172). In the transformational 
model, structure is understood as “a set of materials that is ‘appropriated’ and 
‘instantiated’ in action” (Dessler, 1989: 452). These social forms pre-exist action 
but, at the same time, social structure presupposes social action (Dessler, 
1989: 452). 
 
Later constructivist research (Guzzini, 2005, Pouliot, 2007) has stressed the 
reflexivity “between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of 
social reality” in which both can affect the other and can thus create looping 
effects (on the micro-level) or self-fulfilling prophecies (on the macro level) 
(Guzzini, 2005: 498-499). In this regard, naming and classifying people also 
influences their self-conception (looping effects); and an idea can manifest itself 
prominently, if we collectively believe that idea is a good description of a certain 
issue. (Guzzini, 2005: 498-499). More explicitly, Pouliot (2007: 363) asserts that 
“[t]he world (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology) are mutually constitutive 
processes”. 
 
3.2 Links with other Styles of Reasoning 
 
Immediately after the constructivist turn, scholars tried to demonstrate the 
differences between constructivism and more traditional approaches to 
international relations theory. These theories were divided between rationalist 
and interpretive epistemologies - the former including (neo)realists and 
neoliberal institutionalists; the latter consisting of postmodernist and 
poststructuralist theories, critical theory and feminist theories (Adler, 1997: 319-
320). More recently, scholars have argued against this paradigmatic castle-
building (Barkin, 2011). Instead, they started offering suggestions to overcome 
the gaps between those paradigms by stressing their similarities. Earlier, Price 
and Reus-Smit (1998) had already argued that the division between critical 
theory and constructivism is not so deep as traditionally assumed. Their 
argument amounts to the claim that constructivism is not contradictory to key 
findings of Third Debate critical theory and that constructivism even has its roots 
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in that critical theory, using its conceptual and theoretical as well as its 
methodological findings to design a distinct approach to international relations 
(Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 260). Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 260) even go 
one step further, elucidating the contribution of constructivism to the 
development of critical international theory, in particular regarding the “sociology 
of moral community in world politics”. These authors (Price and Reus-Smit, 
1998: 264) argue that constructivism can be considered a new phase in the 
development of critical theory, taking up conceptual elaboration and empirical 
analysis often neglected in critical theory. Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 270-283) 
examine how constructivists cope with meta-theoretical insights of critical theory 
and how they translate these insights into empirical claims. The first insight 
concerns the use of evidence and the limits of interpretation. In this respect, the 
authors claim that constructivists are not violating the interpretive ethos of 
critical international theory more than those theorists themselves are doing. 
Given the fact that constructivists maintain it is impossible to escape the 
interpretive moment; they reject ‘Big-T’ Truth claims, while nevertheless making 
‘small-t’ truth claims, or “logical and empirically plausible interpretations of 
actions, events or processes” (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 272). In line with 
Pouliot’s conceptualisation of constructivism as a post-foundationalist style of 
reasoning, these interpretations are always partial and contingent and thus do 
not violate critical theory’s interpretive ethos (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 272). 
Regarding law-like generalisations, secondly, Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 275) 
make a similar point, claiming that a rejection of law-like generalisations does 
not prevent the formulation of more contingent generalisations. These are not 
contradictory to those made by critical theorists. Thirdly, Price and Reus-Smit 
(1998: 280) address the question of alternative explanations and interpretations. 
They assert that, independent of the theoretical framework underlying an 
account of the world, these accounts are all partial and can only clarify “aspects 
of an event or phenomena that are required for an adequate understanding of 
the explanandum in question”. In short, Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 288-289) 
do not fully accept the term ‘constructivist turn’, but instead argue for a 
conceptualization of constructivism that is a “logical continuation” of Third 
debate critical theory. By engaging the mainstream, and by addressing the four 
above-mentioned issues, constructivists have distanced themselves from their 
origins in critical international theory; but their epistemological, ontological and 
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methodological foundations are not inconsistent with that origin. 
 
Price and Reus-Smit have concentrated on the compatibility of constructivism 
with the meta-theoretical foundations of critical international theory. Sørensen 
(2008: 6), in turn, maps the debate between neorealism and social 
constructivism. He proposes an analytical eclecticism in which both material 
and ideational factors are included in the study of international relations. Doing 
this, Sørensen (2008: 10) responds to the assertion by Kowert and Legro 
(1996) that intersubjective knowledge and the norms resulting from that 
knowledge do not exist in a material vacuum. I agree with Sørensen (2008: 13) 
that, even in light of the foregoing debate, an account combining material and 
ideational factors should not necessarily be ontologically or epistemologically 
inconsistent. Several authors have taken up this challenge (Zacher and 
Matthew, 1995, Buzan, 2004). For his own proposal, Sørensen uses Cox’s 
(1996) NeoGramscian notion of historical structures as a conceptual starting 
point. To the neorealist notion of international structure (being the relative 
distribution of material and military capabilities) and to the constructivist notion 
of international structure (emphasizing ideas and shared knowledge); Sørensen 
(2008: 14) adds a third notion consisting of economic power, or “the capability 
to design, construct, finance, and distribute economic goods”. Taken together, 
these three structures represent an historical structure, as defined by Cox 
(1981: 135) as a “picture of a particular configuration of forces”. Similarly, the 
previous chapter clarified how the explanation of change in military practice 
depends on changes in the material environment as well as in the (inter)national 
division of power determining the interpretation of those changes. The final 
chapter will demonstrate that normative power is facilitated by the availability of 
economic power.  
 
However, in this text, I will not adopt the position of a Coxian critical theory 
analysis, but I will draw on Barkin’s (2003, 2011) conceptualisation of a realist 
constructivism. Let me first clarify the relation between realist constructivism 
and critical theory before discussing realist constructivism in depth. Realist 
constructivism does show significant similarities with critical theory, but differs 
from it in one aspect: it does not contain the “element of utopianism” (Cox, 
1981: 130) of critical theory. That is, it does not present an alternative to the 
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current world order. This fits my purpose since my aim is to uncover the power 
and interests distorting communication; but I do not take a “privileged” 
emancipatory position directed at the “removal or correction of these distortions” 
(Shapcott, 2008: 329-330). The major difference with a Coxian critical theory 
analysis is therefore meta-theoretical in that the claim of emancipation is absent 
in realist constructivism. Realist constructivism lacks the “commitment” to 
reconstruct the world and does not aim to use social theory as a “weapon for 
waging war on inequality and injustice in world politics” (Farrell, 2002: 59). For 
(realist) constructivists, the individual cannot be freed from the social structure, 
because only social interaction gives meaning to the world. The constructivist 
conception of social reality, in other words, “does not allow for the emancipation 
of the individual from social structures” (Barkin, 2011: 78-79). Emancipation is 
at the core of critical theory, but it also involves withdrawing the individual from 
the social structure, because to emancipate is to transcend power relationships 
inherent in social interaction - which is impossible for constructivists. 
Furthermore, there is no inherent predisposition in constructivism towards one 
particular social construction at the expense of another (Barkin, 2011: 79). 
 
Barkin (2003: 326, 337) goes one step further than Sørensen. Not only does he 
argue that constructivist research is not incompatible with a realist worldview, 
but also that political change can not be explained by drawing exclusively on 
realist or idealist factors. In Barkin’s (2003: 327-329) argument power is the 
central concept in classical realist theory and the other central concepts in this 
theory ultimately derive from this core. Realist constructivism is also concerned 
with this core since it scrutinises “the way in which power structures affect 
patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way 
in which a particular set of norms affect power structures” (Barkin, 2003: 337). 
Barkin’s proposal of a realist constructivism has instigated a debate on the 
compatibility of realism and constructivism. Most of Barkin’s critics agreed on 
the possibility of a realist constructivism, but contended that Barkin’s original 
proposal needed some refinement. Barkin (2011: 169) has taken these critiques 
into account in his refined version of realist constructivism but retains relational 
power politics as a central element. Realism offers a more comprehensive 
conceptualisation of power than is currently present in constructivism as well as 
another view on the relationship between empirical research and policy (Barkin, 
56  
2011: 169). Realist constructivism thus problematizes the relationship between 
political morality and power politics (Barkin, 2011: 170). More specifically, 
Barkin (2011: 171) states:  
 
[Realist constructivism] is well placed to see that not only 
do discursive and normative structures tend to be 
constantly recreated, but that they often must be 
recreated against opposition, and that to recreate them 
to reflect a particular political morality can require the 
application of power as well as reason. 
 
Realist constructivism differs from realism mainly because it considers self-
interest and public interest, not as given a priori, but as intersubjectively 
constituted phenomena and subject to empirical investigation (Barkin, 2011: 69-
70). Thus, contrary to realism, realist constructivism does not posit an egoistic 
human nature as the foundation of human behaviour. Realism and 
constructivism agree that human beings are a “social species” (Sterling-Folker, 
2004: 342). For the former, this is why we form groups; for the latter, this is why 
we can only make sense of the world through interaction (Sterling-Folker, 2004: 
342). Realist-constructivism, however, admits that, even if morality is socially 
constructed within a group, relative power relationships do shape ethical issues 
within and between groups (Sterling-Folker, 2004: 342). Power, in realist 
constructivism, can appear in a variety of ways. Economic power, for instance, 
differs from moral authority; as well as power “can be expressed in a multiplicity 
of fashions – for instance through material, symbolic, and linguistic means” 
(Mattern, 2004: 345). Depending on the “sociopolitical circumstances”, power 
can assume a different form and does not a priori structure reality (Jackson and 
Nexon, 2004: 340). Different forms of power exercise a different influence on 
international politics. As a result, the researcher should analyse how actors use 
these different forms of power to construct alternative social realities (Mattern, 
2004: 345). 
 
In general terms, social power is an actor’s ability to intentionally steer the 
conduct of other subjects in the social world, through the use of causal 
mechanisms he/she has at his/her disposal (cf. Scot, 2001: 1-2). For Lukes 
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(2005: 27) the “supreme exercise of power [is] to get another or others to have 
the desires you want them to have”. Likewise, I consider the potential to shape 
intersubjective understandings as the ultimate dimension of power. Power, in 
the realist-constructivist sense used in this text, refers to this ability to shape 
intersubjective meanings and understandings, including norms. Realist 
constructivist power corresponds to what Barnett and Duval (2005: 3) call 
“productive power”.20 Productive power is the “constitution of all social subjects 
with various social powers” and is exercised through the discursive production 
of meaning (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 20-21). This discursive production not 
only results in various identities, interests and capacities, but also defines what 
counts as possible or impossible, legitimate or illegitimate paths of action 
(Barnett and Duval, 2005: 20-21). Norms and discursive structures thus shape 
and generate “differential social capacities” (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 3), but 
are themselves (re)created by social agents. As part of a broader episteme, 
norms both constitute and are produced by agents and by their social 
interaction (Adler and Bernstein, 2005: 297-298). However, the exploration of 
this theme will be postponed to the last section of this chapter.  
 
3.3 Normative Change 
 
Meaningful behaviour presupposes an intersubjective social context, which in 
turn is constituted through the “media of norms and practices” (Hopf, 1998: 
173). In this text, norms will be understood as a collectively held standard of 
appropriate behaviour which actors follow most of the time because of reasons 
relating to their identity (Florini, 1996, Percy 2007a: 17). Despite it taking a 
central position in constructivist reasoning, the constructivist study of norm 
change is still rather limited. Constructivists frequently take norms for granted 
as an a priori condition steering the conduct of states. They focus on the 
continuity rather than on the change of existing norms. While studies on a 
potential change in the state monopoly on violence have been conducted 
(Krahmann, 2009, Percy, 2007a), there is room to complement these studies 
                                                          
20 For Barnett and Duval (2005: 3), productive power is one “expression” of power, next 
to three other expressions: compulsory, institutional and structural power. I will not 
contradict that each of these expressions functions in a distinctive way. However, I 
consider them to be different dimensions of constructivist power, that is, they facilitate 
the production of meaning and significance. 
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with a more formalised theoretical model of norm change. Such a model not 
only offers opportunities to advance the theoretical insight in international 
relations, but it can also act as a heuristic tool to trace the formation of state 
interests.  
 
This section presents three existing models of norm change. All three provide 
helpful insights into the mechanisms that underlie normative change, but 
overlook a crucial element, namely the role of power in calling into question old 
norms and constructing new ones. In this respect, the previous discussion 
made clear that  explicit attention to the material distribution of resources and to 
patterns of power in international relations can help forward constructivist 
scholarship. The incorporation of such a dimension of power can be seen as an 
addition to the existing frameworks. It is not a complete rejection of those 
proposals. 
 
As Sandholtz (2008) points out, normative structures do not and can not stand 
still. This is due to the fact that, no matter how meticulously elaborated a system 
of rules; there are always unforeseen circumstances that cause disagreements 
over existing rules or over which rules to apply in a given context. Sandholtz 
(2008: 105) refers to Hart’s (1994: 123) classical formulation of the problem that 
there inevitably is a “duality or a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt 
when we are engaged in bringing particular situations under general rules. This 
imparts to all rules a fringe of vagueness” open to interpretation. This movement 
in normative structures has been conceptualized differently by different authors. 
Three of these models will now be highlighted. 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have made several contributions to the debate 
on norm dynamics. These authors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888) propose 
a life-cycle model of norms in which the different stages are dominated by 
different behavioural logics.21 They argue that the division between rationality 
and norms is not as deep as traditionally assumed. Stubbornly holding on to 
that opposition even obstructs the explanation of “’strategic social construction’ 
in which actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or 
                                                          
21 The main characteristics of this model were already present in Finnemore’s (1996) 
study of national interests in international society. 
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social context” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). In other words, norms and 
rationality are inextricably linked. To separate them would hamper the 
explanatory power of a particular account (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). I 
will later return to this strategic social construction. The “life-cycle” Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998: 895), talk about is characterised by a three-stage process in 
which the “norm emergence”, if reaching a tipping point, is followed by a 
broader norm acceptance, (labelled the “norm cascade”); while the final stage 
involves the internalisation of the norm.  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896) assert that norms do not “appear out of thin 
air”, but are constructed by norm entrepreneurs “having strong notions about 
appropriate or desirable behavior in their community”. An important component 
of this norm emergence is the framing of issues in a language that attracts the 
attention of the broader public and that offers an interpretation of these issues 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). However, in later research, Payne (2001) 
argued against the importance of framing as the cause of norm change. Just 
like norms do not emerge out of thin air, they also do not enter “a normative 
vacuum” but a space of competition between already existing norms and 
interests (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). When Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 898) analyse the motives of the actors involved in the process of the 
norm cycle, they consequently consider “empathy, altruism, and ideational 
commitment” as a crucial motivations. They add that these entrepreneurs 
usually do not act against their own interests, rather they redefine their 
perception of interests accordingly. To promote their norms, furthermore, 
entrepreneurs need an organisational platform - often found in the form of an 
international organization - which provides the expertise and information 
needed to give credibility to the norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 899). 
 
The second stage of the life-cycle, the norm cascade, commences when a 
tipping point is reached, viz. when a significant number of states have adopted 
the new norm, including some critical states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 
901). The authors argue that, after the initial tipping point, states are convinced 
to adopt the new norm by an active process of international socialization. In this 
process, states, networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organisations 
“act as agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new 
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policies and laws to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with 
international standards” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). Important in the 
argument of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902) is that, in this stage of norm 
cascade, state behaviour is guided by their identity in international society. As 
we have seen, this identity is given form by the intersubjective, cultural and 
institutional environment. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 902-903) invoke 
insights of psychological and sociological research to back their claim that peer 
pressure among countries is what leads to the adoption of a new norm due to 
psychological mechanisms of legitimation, conformity and esteem. The third 
and final stage of the emergence of a new norm consists of the internalisation of 
that norm by actors who consider conformity with that norm as an almost 
automatic behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). In this respect, Finnemore 
and Sikkink ask themselves which norms are most likely to become established 
and under which circumstances this takes place. They conclude that the most 
important factors determining the success of a new norm are: the need for 
international legitimation on the part of states, its prominence in terms of its 
quality or the quality of the states promoting it, and its intrinsic characteristics 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 906). The authors add that adjacency claims or 
path dependency as well as the specific world-time context (e.g. significant 
historic events) can influence the likeliness of norm emergence (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 908-909). 
 
Sandholtz (2008) and Sandholtz and Stiles (2009)22 have proposed their own 
version of a cycle-theory to conceptualise norm dynamics. Working in the 
constructivist tradition, Sandholtz complements this tradition in four ways, of 
which the second and the fourth are most relevant for the present study. Firstly, 
Sandholtz (2008: 103-104) maintains that even rational agents are embedded in 
an environment of social rules and thus have to rely on normative reasoning. 
The ‘rational maximizer’ operates in a system of normative rule-structures that 
he or she has to take into account when making decisions. This does not mean 
that the maximizer can not break these normative rules, but, in doing so, he or 
she must provide normative reasons and arguments to justify those actions. 
Secondly, Sandholtz (2008: 103) tries to incorporate a more explicit notion of 
                                                          
22 The contributors to Sandholtz and Stiles (2009) provide the reader with historical 
examples of norm change. 
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power in the dynamics of norm change, albeit with little success. Furthermore, 
he (Sandholtz, 2008: 103) asserts that norm change is not generated by 
abstract reasoning, but arises out of practical disputes on specific actions. 
Finally, he shows that the cycles of norm change do not stand alone, but are 
linked in a longer, historical dynamic of normative change (Sandholtz, 2008: 
103). 
 
Reminding the model of Finnemore and Sikkink, Sandholtz (2008: 104) 
conceptualises the historical and geographical constellation of a normative 
environment as the first stage in a dialectical cycle of norm change. Hart (1994) 
has been cited above to indicate that “all normative structures generate 
disputes” (Sandholtz, 2008: 105), due to the incompleteness of those structures 
and their internal contradictions. This possibility of normative disputes is the 
second phase in Sandholtz’s cycle-theory of norm change. It is only in the third 
phase that disputes actually take place and that actors have to provide 
arguments to justify their actions. In such disputes, the rational maximizer has 
to convince other actors of the validity of his conduct. In other words, he must 
offer arguments to persuade the other relevant actors not to sanction him for 
this specific line of conduct (Sandholtz, 2008: 106). Sandholtz (2008: 106-107) 
maintains that the arguments provided for this justification benefit from 
consistency and analogy with past rules, from precedents and from the support 
of powerful states. Later in this section, these three mechanisms will be 
considered more profoundly. Sandholtz (2008: 108-109) briefly examines the 
role of power and correctly maintains that rule-breaking does not equate to rule-
making. Even in the case of powerful states, the justification given for norm 
transgression as well as the reaction of other states are crucial to determine the 
continued relevance of the norm. He concludes that even powerful states need 
to persuade other states in order to arrive at a change of the existing norms 
(Sandholtz, 2008: 109). Nevertheless, in the argumentative stage, power does 
facilitate the communication. Powerful states are more widely present on a 
diplomatic level and better represented in international institutions; and they 
have more direct access to mass media (Sandholtz and Stiles, 2009: 13-15). In 
the final stage of the cycle-theory, the actual rule change takes place and the 
cycle has completed (Sandholtz, 2008: 110). The arguments and justifications 
offered by different sides now lead to normative change, which can happen in 
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many ways. The content of a rule might be altered, or the modification might 
also be limited to the strength, clarity or specificity of a rule (Sandholtz, 2008: 
110). 
 
A final model is that of Florini (1996), who presents an innovative evolutionary 
model of international norms. Rooted in the constructivist tradition, she applies 
insights from evolutionary biology to the area of international relations theory by 
drawing analogies between genes and norms. She argues that the existing 
norms and ideas, at any given moment in time, are not merely produced by 
materially powerful actors to serve their own interests (Florini, 1996: 367). Her 
evolutionary model thus downplays the role of power as the driver of norm 
change. To do so, the author draws a three-level analogy between norms and 
genes. On the first level, she argues that norms and genes perform similar 
functions as “the instructional units directing the behavior of their respective 
organisms” (Florini, 1996: 367). On the second level, she asserts that a similar 
process of inheritance accounts for the transmittance of norms and genes from 
one individual to another. Thirdly, both norms and genes are contested, 
meaning norms have to compete with rivalling norms carrying incompatible 
instructions (Florini, 1996: 367). Florini ‘s (1996: 369) analogy with natural 
selection means that change in the characteristics of states results from 
“competition among norms that are reproduced at different rates and that thus 
come to have different frequencies in the population of states”. Due to the 
variation in competing norms, different levels of reproductive advantage, and 
different likelihoods of being transmitted; some norms may become more 
prominent than others at a given moment in time, for instance because they are 
more compatible with surrounding norms and environmental conditions (Florini, 
1996: 369). Noteworthy, in this respect, is that natural selection is cumulative 
but not teleological. Respectively this signifies that an addition of small changes 
can lead to substantial change over time and that this evolution has no final 
goal (Florini, 1996: 369). 
 
In the evolutionary model of norm change, the role of material power of the ‘host 
organism’ is pushed to the background. It is only the norm’s evolutionary 
advantage for itself that explains the evolution of that norm, viz. there is no need 
to account for the evolutionary advantage of the norm to its host organism 
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(Florini, 1996: 373). Rather, the factors determining the reproductive success or 
failure of contested norms are “(1) whether a norm becomes prominent enough 
in the norm pool to gain a foothold; (2) how well it interacts with other prevailing 
norms with which it is not in competition, that is, the ‘normative environment’; 
and (3) what external environmental conditions confront the norm pool” (Florini, 
1996: 374). To explain the evolution of a norm, each of these factors must 
occur.  
 
Florini (1996: 377) correctly asserts that the occurrence of the above mentioned 
factors explains which norms will spread, but not how those norms will spread. 
In fact, this question leads us to consider the role of thinking. For a fundamental 
assumption in Florini’s (1996: 378) evolutionary argument is that rational choice 
theory is not the best model to explain the spread of a norm. This is why  
 
[H]uman “choices” about behavior are based far more on 
simple imitation, encoded in the form of a norm, than on 
deliberate weighing of well-considered and well-understood 
options. […] Even norms that originate and begin to spread 
through rational processes are subject to selection 
pressures that are inherently nonrational. 
 
Florini (1996: 378) adds that norm reproduction can take the vertical form of a 
continuation of norms or the horizontal form of emulation or norm change.  
 
To understand the evolution of a specific norm, the above-mentioned factors of 
prominence, coherence and normative environment must be traced 
domestically and internationally (Florini, 1996: 379). A new norm thus emerges 
domestically, but, for Florini (1996: 379) this domestic origin is disconnected 
from the later evolution of that norm. While Florini (1996: 379) is right in 
asserting that the origin of a mutant norm or new idea is not crucial to the 
evolutionary story, and while the reproductive mechanism she proposes has 
been confirmed in more recent research; it is nevertheless true that the 
evolutionary model is not completely convincing in explaining which norms arise 
in the first place. By focusing on the non-teleological nature of normative 
evolution, Florini loses sight of the power structures and the organisational 
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platforms norm entrepreneurs use to ‘back’ new norms.  
 
Eminently, these issues are also inadequately considered in the other models 
presented in this section. In reaction to this, and in preparation for the empirical 
analysis later on, the following section will present a modified model of norm 
change that incorporates a notion of power that captures the dynamics of norm 
change more accurately. This model can serve as a heuristic tool to direct the 
attention of the empirical analysis. 
 
3.4 The Return of Power 
 
The model of norm change used in this study will not divert fundamentally from 
Sandholtz’s proposal. However, it will add two elements. First, it will incorporate 
a realist constructivist notion of power. According to Adler (1997: 336), power 
exceeds the availability of resources used for spreading one’s ideas:  
 
[It is] the authority to determine the shared meanings that 
constitute the identities, interests and practices of states, as 
well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to 
‘goods’ and benefits. Because social reality is a matter of 
imposing meanings and functions on physical objects that 
do not already have those meanings and functions, the 
ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define 
what constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get 
other actors to commit themselves to those rules because 
they are now part of their self-understandings is perhaps 
the most subtle and most effective form of power. 
 
I concur with Adler that this authority is the ultimate form of power.23 It is worth 
mentioning that, although Adler and Bernstein’s (2005: 298) definition of power 
is very similar to Adler’s (1997: 336) the former’s stresses the role of 
knowledge. Power, for Adler and Bernstein (2005: 298) is the “the authority to 
                                                          
23 It corresponds to what Barnett and Duvall (2005: 3) have termed “productive power” 
or the “production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification”. If patterns of 
action are internalised as ‘appropriate behaviour’, this attributes great power to 
whoever can shape these shared meanings. 
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validate the knowledge on which an episteme is based (and is therefore akin to 
both institutional power and compulsory power) and the authority, of which 
epistemes are productive, to construct subjectivity and social facts”. Knowledge, 
it is important to note, is not value-neutral since in the creation of a particular 
social order, some are included and others are excluded (Adler, 1997: 336). 
The question then becomes: where does this authority arise from? Which 
knowledge is authoritative and which is not? Who possesses the authority to 
construct reality? 
 
My reply to these questions is that there are different dimensions to realist 
constructivist power. Power is not one-dimensional but takes on different forms 
that open up different opportunities to create the social world. With regard to 
this research project, it is not because an economic or military powerful 
international actor uses PMSCs, that this has become acceptable. Rather, the 
use of PMSCs becomes acceptable if discursively agreed upon. From this point 
of view, it is the ability to influence the “negotiated consensus” (Steffek, 2003: 
267) that determines an actor’s normative power. The empirical analysis of this 
research project will contribute to a deeper understanding of this discursive and 
normative power through an analysis of three instances of legitimation. 
Legitimacy, as understood in this text, is an intersubjectively shared “normative 
belief” (Hurd, 1999: 381) of the worthiness of an order or rule to be recognised 
or obeyed (cf. Habermas, 1979). Habermas (1984) stresses the contestability of 
each particular validity claim. In this respect, legitimation refers to the dynamics 
of legitimacy or to the “acts and processes that (aim to) establish the general 
view that a political order is (not) acceptable” (Gaus, 2011: 3). Steffek (2003: 
267) thinks of legitimacy as the result of a two-step process, in which 
negotiators first arrive at a consensus on the “scope, principles and procedures 
of the regime” and subsequently try to justify the regime with the aim of 
achieving “rational assent”. Taking discursive power in the military domain as an 
example, this text will build upon the epistemic communities model to show that 
epistemic power and more specifically ‘being recognised as’ an epistemic 
community is crucial in generating the authority to (re)shape a normative 
structure. 
 
Negotiations do not happen in an “ideal-speech situation” (where truth amounts 
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to the rationally agreed upon consensus reached after an exchange of 
arguments) in which speakers do not experience any constraint on their 
participation (Habermas, 1970, Owen, 2002: 49). What is more, Mouffe (1999: 
751) argues that an ideal-speech situation is ontologically impossible. Speech 
situations are inevitably distorted by power. First, because only the voices of 
those negotiators will be heard, that have the resources to contribute. Second, 
and more fundamentally, because the condition of a secure environment is a 
prerequisite to create a speech situation. Foreshadowing the arguments in later 
chapters, the ability to set the terms of the (norm) negotiation is one dimension 
of power. This is facilitated by the material resources available to an actor, 
underlying his ability to participate in the discursive negotiation. If a participant 
is not able to attend meetings, to issue briefings, to lobby, and so on, his 
influence will most likely be limited. Furthermore, this ability to participate in the 
debate depends on the distance to the centre of the debate, i.e. on the number 
of ‘filters’ or ‘gates’ a discursive contribution has to pass. Proximity to the centre 
of the debate facilitates influence. The ability to create the conditions for a 
discursive exchange is at the core of this negotiation power. Importantly, a 
secure environment is a precondition for norm negotiations, because outside a 
secure environment, no sincere exchange of arguments can take place - a 
secure environment therefore precedes peaceful speech. As we will see, 
PMSCs cultivate their ability to create a secure environment in which a debate 
can take place. They possess the resources to enhance the security of their 
clients and this security, the empirical research clarifies, is still a major concern 
for state and non-state clients alike. Most NGOs, on the other hand, lack this 
capacity. The alternative proposed by NGOs is less likely to generate security 
and, therefore, less usable.  
 
Another dimension of realist constructivist power is the epistemic power to offer 
a valid model of what the world looks like. Communities that can make credible 
claims to knowledge production have an advantage in any negotiation. This 
advantage is enhanced if this knowledge is also perceived as ‘usable’ by central 
policymakers. The ability to offer ‘usable knowledge’, conducive to the 
furtherance of the participants’ interests, brings with it an opportunity to steer 
the negotiation. “Usable knowledge”, Haas (2004: 574-575) argues, is “accurate 
information that is of use to politicians and policymakers” in their effort to 
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achieve collective goals. If policymakers have to choose between usable and 
less usable knowledge, they are likely to opt for the first. Usable knowledge is 
credible, legitimate and salient (Haas, 2004: 574). Later chapters will show that 
PMSCs, as an epistemic community, were able to offer credible, practically 
legitimate and politically salient knowledge and solutions to policy challenges. 
 
More subtle dimensions of power include persuasion. Payne (2001), for 
instance, makes explicit some mechanisms through which norm construction 
takes place. This author contends that persuasion is a central mechanism in the 
construction of new norms. To explain this persuasion by successful norm 
entrepreneurs, authors working in the constructivist tradition often invoke the 
mechanism of framing as a central element (Payne, 2001: 39-40). New 
normative claims gain a foothold when they are framed in such a way that they 
appeal to a relevant public by coinciding with established ideas, practices and 
normative structures (Payne, 2001: 39, 43). This happens when a norm 
entrepreneur can offer relevant knowledge or when norms are framed in a 
‘promising’ way. However, Payne (2001) contends that there are serious 
problems with this reliance on framing to explain normative change. Payne’s 
central claim borrows from Habermasian critical theory and maintains that 
constructivist accounts of norm change focusing on persuasive frames are 
overlooking social process:  
 
Regardless of the alleged appeal of specific claims, 
outcomes of ‘highly contested’ normative struggles cannot 
adequately be interpreted without also examining social 
process. The communicative environment, in fact, almost 
certainly matters more than the content or framing of 
specific messages (Payne, 2001: 39).  
 
This observation is confirmed by the research of Lee and Strang (2006) 
discussed below. For now, Payne (2001) points out two main weaknesses of 
attributing too much importance to the role of framing. On the one hand, he 
mentions the potential distortion of frames by coercion by materially powerful 
actors, who have at their disposal resources to influence and shape the 
communicative situation (Payne, 2001: 45). On the other hand, Payne (2001: 
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43) contends that the final outcome of a norm change is not always the same as 
intended by its advocate, due to social process and the relational qualities of 
discursive exchanges. They force both norm advocates and their targets to “be 
prepared to have their understanding of a situation challenged”, since the 
eventual mutual meanings always need to be intersubjectively shared. The 
former claim corresponds to what I have referred to earlier as the impossibility 
of an ideal-speech situation. For example, in discussions on the future 
regulatory framework of the private military and security industry, PMSCs where 
able to offer ‘usable knowledge’ to state decision-makers, while the 
contributions by civil society were deemed less usable.  
 
The second element to be inserted in the cycle-theory of norm change is drawn 
from the network emulation research by Lee and Strang (2006). These authors 
have analysed the evolution of the size of the public sector between 1980 and 
1997 in twenty-six OECD member states. The results of this research can 
inform the present study in two ways. First of all, the period in which these 
authors observe the downsizing of the public sector coincides with the period in 
which PMSCs made their appearance on the international scene. Secondly, the 
empirical findings of their research anchor the proposed model of norm change 
in a more empirically informed background. After three decades of growth in 
government size after the Second World War, the 1980s and 1990s showed a 
tendency to downsize the public sector in the majority of the OECD member 
states. Leading the way in privatising and outsourcing traditional public sector 
responsibilities were US president Reagan and UK prime minister Thatcher 
(Lee and Strang, 2006: 883). While this tendency was by no means universal, 
“a net shrinking of the state was an explicit goal of many in the 1980s and 
1990s” (Lee and Strang, 2006: 885). The focus of Lee and Strang in all this is 
on the international diffusion of the downsizing strategy. The authors wonder 
whether this downsizing policy is contagious, viz. whether downsizing in one 
country affects the policy of other countries. According to the economic 
orthodoxy of the 1980s and 1990s, economic growth was hampered by an 
oversized public sector and this idea was mirrored in political as well as 
academic discourse. Leading organisational theories promoted decentralisation 
and downsizing for both public and private enterprises. Lee and Strang (2006: 
886) argue that these discourses are closely related to international policy 
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diffusion. They (Lee and Strang, 2006: 904) further note how emulation, 
competition and vicarious learning lead governments to adopt new policies that 
cannot fully be explained by rational choice models. Emulation manifests itself 
in in the form of peer-based emulation or of asymmetric emulation of community 
leaders, both centred around “the social construction of appropriate behavior, 
where actors model their behavior on the examples provided by others” (Lee 
and Strang, 2006: 889). Rivalry between competitors can lead to copying the 
behaviour of rivals of, when it is expected to attract economic success. 
Vicarious learning means that countries consider other countries as examples 
which must or must not be copied, depending on the outcomes of the ‘policy-
experiment’ in that country (Lee and Strang, 2006: 890). Legitimate practices 
diffuse more easily than illegitimate ones because the latter will probably be 
covered up, while normatively approved behaviour is more likely to be aired 
more widely. Lee and Strang (2006: 890-891) add that “practices spread more 
rapidly and less relationally when they are theorized in terms of general models 
of behavior and cause-effect schemes”. All of these factors were present in the 
discourse on public-sector downsizing which was propagated by politicians and 
academics alike. Emulation, competition and learning presupposes a model to 
learn from. New policies do not appear out of thin air, but require the agency of 
key political actors, primarily on the domestic level (Lee and Strang, 2006: 888). 
Specifically for public-sector downsizing, internal factors play a role in the 
diffusion mechanism: fiscal stress, economic performance, the strength of key 
interest groups within a country and some cultural underpinnings (Lee and 
Strang, 2006: 892). Kogut and McPherson (2008) furthermore stress the role of 
epistemic communities in the diffusion process and more specifically of 
American (Chicago-School) trained economists. 
 
Lee and Strang (2006: 900) conclude that “downsizing appears to be 
contagious, while upsizing does not”. As mentioned above, the regression 
analyses used in their research project indicate how international policy 
diffusion is indispensable in explaining the evolution of the public sector size, in 
addition to elements such as domestic economic and political factors. This 
influence is weaker or stronger depending on the relationship between 
countries. In this respect, Lee and Strang (2006: 903) suggest that information 
flows and cultural links influence the emulation process, observing that 
70  
neighbouring countries and extensive trading partners influence each other 
more readily, while this is less the case for trade rivals. Moreover, this influence 
seems to be heading in the direction of downsizing, since downsizing is 
promoted by proximity to downsizers and by evidence of the economic benefits 
of downsizing; whereas no upsizing effects are observed for proximity to 
upsizers or for evidence of the economic benefit of upsizing (Lee and Strang 
2006: 903). The authors explain this difference by referring to the status of 
upsizing and downsizing and the dominance of neoliberalism in policy discourse 
and academic theory. Whereas downsizing was propagated as the way to 
success, upsizing was considered a step back (Lee and Strang 2006: 903). 
Thus the rational choice models to explain the diffusion of policies are 
challenged by theory-driven learning: “if only evidence that confirms beliefs is 
believed, learning is neither rational nor adaptive!” (Lee and Strang 2006: 904). 
 
The style of reasoning and the models of norm change discussed above - in 
particular the model provided by Sandholtz - will inform the following study of 
norm change in the privatisation of military activities. These theories will be 
supplemented with modifications from the different perspectives (also discussed 
above). Although norm change eludes precise measurement, I will mainly use 
two measures to determine whether a norm change has taken place.24 First, I 
will consider international law as a reflection of existing norms (cf. Thomas, 
2001). This means that changes in the legal stipulations may be an indicator of 
norm change (Krahmann 2013: 57). Second, I will analyse how participants in 
the debate on a new regulatory environment discursively use norms “to 
legitimize particular actions or behavior” (Krahmann, (2013: 57). A combination 
of the above model of norm change and a general theory of change in military 
practice, as reviewed in the second chapter, will provide us with the theoretical 
tools needed to comprehend the contemporary rise and regulation of PMSCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 These two measures figure among four measures identified by Krahmann (2013: 
57). 
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4. PMSC Power in the 
New Security Environment 
 
This chapter situates PMSCs in the contemporary security environment and 
identifies the nature and sources of their power. To start understanding the 
contemporary security environment, it is important to see how the neoliberal 
critique in the late 1970s stimulated a search for a new model of the state. 
Later, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union also caused uncertainty in the 
practice of international relations and in international relations theory. 
Eminently, this sense of confusion corresponds to the first stage in a cycle of 
norm change. The implosion of the Soviet Union was an exogenous shock - in 
the terms of Avant (2000) - that delegitimised not only the academic theories on 
the nature of the international system, but also the practical wisdom on how to 
cope with the challenges of the fluid security landscape. The familiar lens of 
state-centred conceptualisations of security fell to pieces. In its place came a 
feverish quest for the identification of new risks and threats and a scramble for 
appropriate responses. This shock, according with Avant’s model, obscured and 
diffused power relations and undermined existing knowledge and worldviews. 
Initially, new security actors, such as PMSCs contributed to this uncertainty. As 
protean, shape-shifting actors they defied existing conceptualisation and 
categorisation (Carmola, 2010). Over time, however, PMSCs formed a 
community of practice and achieved the status of security professionals. Later, 
they were even recognised, although implicitly, as an epistemic community 
offering ‘usable knowledge’ to their clients. This usable knowledge forms the 
key to their influence on norm construction. The recognition as an epistemic 
community allowed PMSCs to ‘speak security’ and to contribute to policymaking 
instead of merely implementing it. Both the uncertainty after the end of the Cold 
War and the epistemic power of PMSCs were prerequisites for successfully 
challenging the norm of the state monopoly on violence. This chapter does the 
groundwork for the following chapter, that will trace the contribution of individual 
entrepreneurs to the legitimation of PMSCs. Following Basu and Pallazo (2008: 
126), it upholds that it is under “conditions of extreme uncertainty, brought about 
by fundamental social changes, [that] organizations might strive to achieve 
legitimacy by cocreating acceptable norms of behavior with relevant 
stakeholders”. The last quarter of the twentieth century knew such conditions. 
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In the following, the first section sketches the confusion in international relations 
and in the domains of international relations theory and security studies, after 
the Cold War. The second section illustrates this confusion by reviewing the 
discussion on the classification of PMSCs in international law while section 4.3 
argues that PMSCs have successfully reframed themselves from mercenaries 
into security professionals. The fourth section will then show how PMSCs, as 
new actors after the end of the Cold War, came close to constituting an 
epistemic community. This status gave them legitimacy and allowed them to act 
as norm entrepreneurs.  
 
4.1 Confusion after the Cold War 
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw a double delegitimation of the 
dominant conception of the state. In both instances, this delegitimation was 
made possible by the discontent generated by the seeming incapacity of the 
state to provide for human well-being. The disagreement, uncertainty and 
confusion (about which political organisation was most suitable for achieving 
well-being) created the opportunity for political entrepreneurs to propose an 
alternative model.  
The economic crisis of the 1970s mystified conventional mechanisms of welfare 
creation. Therefore, the first of two delegitimation processes involved, concerns 
a neoliberal inspired set of ideas (Kjær and Pedersen, 2001: 221) that 
undermined the legitimacy of the Keynesian welfare state. More specifically, the 
Yom Kippur War (1973), resulting in the OPEC oil cap, produced a global 
economic recession that dealt the death blow to Keynesian economics (Hay, 
2001: 207). By the second half of the 1970s, Keynesian inspired policy (as 
practiced by the UK Labour Party) was unable to counter the rising inflation and 
unemployment because of the incompatibility of its “overarching (indeed 
paradigmatic) policy commitment to full employment, mixed economy and a 
comprehensive welfare state” with its monetary policy (Hay, 2001: 208-209). 
The Keynesian welfare state’s inability to adequately respond to the long-lasting 
stagflation opened up a venue for neoliberal inspired policies to successfully 
promote market solutions to sectors previously under government control. The 
economic component of neoliberalism favoured marketisation over the undue 
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government constraints on economic behaviour (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 
2008: 2). The undercurrent connecting the diverse neoliberal practices 
maintains the following:  
[H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong property 
rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state 
is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices (Harvey, 2007:2).  
Of course, the state was not dissolved altogether. On the contrary, the optimal 
functioning of the market requires a strong state to guarantee individual liberty 
and respect for the rule of law (Thatcher, 1979). Therefore, the state should 
always possess sufficient resources or techniques to guarantee individual 
freedom and property rights. Tin this way, the first process of delegitimation 
opened up space for the “regulatory state” to take the place of the “dirigiste 
state” (Majone, 1994).  
A second process of delegitimation centred on the state’s perceived inability to 
protect its citizens, at least on the international scene after the Cold War. The 
state’s ‘output legitimacy’ in the domain of security provision - that hinged upon 
its ability to secure a safe environment for its citizens - was not only 
compromised in weak third world states (cf. McIntyre and Weiss, 2009); but also 
in former superpowers, where 9/11 added a sense of urgency to the search for 
a “new balance between security concerns, which have taken primacy, and 
governance/values concerns, which risk being compromised” (Hänggi, 2003: 4). 
This confusion transcended the practical policy domain and penetrated the 
academic field. After the abrupt and unforeseen end of the Cold War, 
practitioners in the political domain were in a state of “Babel-like confusion” on 
the nature of the international relations system (Roberts, 2008: 343). Likewise, 
this complete surprise shook the domain of international relations theory to its 
core and has been the impetus to profound academic “soul-searching” resulting 
in new approaches to the field (Sørensen, 1998: 83, Roberts, 2008: 339). The 
confusion and uncertainty also extended into the field of security studies. It 
might even be claimed that traditional security studies lost their “raison d’être”, 
since the Cold War was “the progenitor of the field and its central focus from 
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1955 on” (Baldwin, 1995: 132). New threats (Krahmann, 2005b), the 
transformation from “old” to “new” wars (Kaldor, 2001), and the emergence of 
new actors were symptomatic of the changing international environment and of 
the reconceptualization of security. The appropriate role of the state in these 
new wars and, more generally, in the provision of security, became the object of 
debate. Thus, the state’s monopoly on violence came to be called into question. 
Bypassing the ‘new wars’ discussion on whether or not the nature or character 
of contemporary warfare is qualitatively distinct from conflict in previous eras; it 
is safe to conclude that in post-Cold War armed conflict, non-state actors were 
perceived to (re-)emerge on a scale unprecedented in the previous three 
quarters of the twentieth century. In contrast to the bipolar world where security 
was mainly understood in terms of existential (nuclear) threats to national 
security and sovereignty; the post-Cold War era has seen a pluralisation of 
security (Caparini, 2006) or a widening and deepening of the Cold War concept 
of security (Hänggi, 2003). States are no longer the sole referent object of 
security. Instead, the deepening of the Cold War concept of security means that 
“individuals and collectivities other than the state” have manifested themselves 
as referent objects (Hänggi, 2003: 5). Its widening implies that military threats 
have been subsumed by economic, social and environmental threats (Hänggi, 
2003: 5). In addition to this widening and deepening, the internationalisation of 
security can be considered a third axis along which the traditional notion of 
security has been reconfigured (Krause, 1998: 127-129). After 1990, various 
international, regional and multilateral organisations have authorised the use of 
force (Hänggi, 2004: 3, Ku and Jacobson, 2002: 17). In such a context, the 
decision-making authority of states is not always clear. In line with this, a 
reconfiguration of the classic components of civil-military relations is called for. 
Flexibility, adaptability and rapid deployment of armed forces are keywords in a 
modern security and defense policy (Heidenkamp, 2012: 1). On the one hand, 
“postmodern” armed forces draw upon more than just the military, and include 
intelligence services, special police forces and border control forces (Moskos, 
Williams and Segal, 2000, Forster, 2002: 77-79). Increasingly, they also include 
PMSCs to carry out a variety of new missions. On the other hand, national 
governments have given way to regional, international and multilateral 
organisations, but also to non-state actors as auspices of the use of force. So, 
non-state actors have taken their place on the demand side as well as on the 
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supply side of security provision. 
Notably, these observations indicate that Cold War categorisations of security 
actors have become outdated. Illustrative in this regard is the conceptualisation 
of PMSCs that seem to defy both academic and legal categorisation. Carmola’s 
(2010: 9) characterisation of PMSCs as “protean shape-shifters” should be 
interpreted in this light. PMSCs appeared to be hybrid entities or quasi-
organisations, which is public policy analysis jargon for organisations that 
display characteristics of both the public and the private sector (Carmola, 2010: 
10-11). Carmola (2010: 27) argues that PMSCs are protean because they 
“combine organizational cultures that in many cases have defined themselves in 
opposition to one another”.25 They simultaneously display the significantly 
different and even opposing aims, ethics and cultures of government 
bureaucracies (among others the military), corporate business players and 
humanitarian, non-governmental organisations (Carmola, 2010: 27). What is 
more, PMSCs deliberately and simultaneously cultivate the images of all these 
categories (cf. Kruck and Spencer, 2013: 332). Moreover, the conceptual 
confusion resulting from their protean character and their combination of 
different organisational cultures also feeds back into discussions on the status 
of PMSC employees in international law (Carmola, 2010: 37). PMSCs thus 
challenge the mental models that have framed the formulation of current 
international law. Their alternating identity obstructs a clear judgment on the 
acceptability and even comprehensibility of PMSC actions (Carmola, 2010: 38). 
As Carmola (2010: 38) indicates: “For a while, we push ambiguous entities into 
some non-ambiguous category (mercenary or soldier, for instance), but 
eventually the cognitive dissonance builds and we are forced to invent new 
social categories, and ultimately new legal identities”. The discussion on the 
legal qualification of PMSCs in international law is illustrative in this regard.  
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Carmola (2010: 29) understands organisational culture as “historical and cultural 
attitudes and ‘ways of life’ of an organization that guide action and judgment”. 
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4.2 PMSCs in International Law 
 
Initially, the image was widespread that PMSCs were operating in a legal 
vacuum. (cf. Singer, 2004, Walker and Whyte, 2005). Even if this evaluation has 
been largely refuted by later research, the debate on their proper place in 
international law continues. The legal framework regulating these companies is 
composed of international humanitarian law, human rights law and mercenary 
conventions; complemented with the more encompassing regulations on 
business and human rights and corporate social responsibility (MacLeod, 2011). 
More recent initiatives - such as the Montreux document, promoting good 
practices in dealing with PMSCs, and voluntary codes of conduct - have been 
promoted by PMSCs themselves to counter the negative industry image. We 
will return to the latter two mechanisms later, since they constitute a new way of 
governing the security sector.  
 
Despite the absence of a regulatory deficit, this legal framework is undeniably 
“disjointed and, in some respects at least, contradictory” (Fallah, 2006: 601). 
Due to its relative novelty, the term ‘private military and security company’ is not 
a term of law. In other words, it is not defined in legal conventions or legal 
instruments (Fallah, 2006: 602). Thus, PMSCs do not have a status nor 
obligations under international humanitarian law, diverting the focus of attention 
to their employees who, as individuals, do have such a status. This status has 
to be determined on a case by case basis, depending on the relationship of the 
employees with the state they are contracted by and on the operations they 
perform (Gillard, 2006: 530). By the nature of their activities, PMSC employees 
have frequently been termed mercenaries. The offering of military services for 
financial gain, often in situations of armed conflict, is indeed a common 
denominator of both mercenaries and PMSCs. Nevertheless, academic, political 
and judicial opinions on the classification of PMSCs diverge. Classifying PMSCs 
does not remain an informal terminological exercise, but has implications for the 
status of PMSC employees in international law - not in the least because 
mercenarism has been made a criminal offense. 
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4.2.1 PMSCs as Mercenaries 
 
The term ‘mercenary’ is an essentially contested concept. Attempting to 
formulate a universal definition falls outside the scope of this text. It can even be 
argued that such a final definition is pointless, since what is and what is not a 
mercenary has varied throughout history. A commonly accepted definition sees 
a mercenary as a professional, foreign soldier offering military services on a 
freelance, contractual basis for a financial reward (Musah and Fayemi, 2000: 5). 
It has been a particularly delicate task to differentiate mercenaries from related 
foreign fighters who are nevertheless not intuitively labelled mercenaries. 
Examples of these foreign servicemen include the French Foreign Legion, the 
Swiss Guard, Ghurkas in the British and Indian armies, and the International 
Brigade in the Spanish civil war (Mockler, 1970: 17). Despite being enlisted and 
financially rewarded by a foreign government, these fighters are generally not 
considered mercenaries. In other words, the mere fact that a soldier is a 
financially rewarded foreigner does not make him a mercenary. An additional 
criterion is needed. Mockler (1970: 17, 21) has found this in the moral aspect 
constituting a legitimate fighter: it is this moral judgment - the morally 
disapproved of “devotion to war for its own sake” - that marks the difference 
between a mercenary and a legitimate, uniformed soldier. However, this moral 
disapproval is equally dependent on the cultural environment actors are 
embedded in. For instance, in Christian times and places, a “devotion to duty” 
has indeed come to replace the love of war; while in ancient Greece, 
Scandinavia or feudal Japan devotion to war was admired (Mockler, 1969: 21). 
Mockler (1969: 14) recognises these definitional obstacles and therefore 
defines a mercenary as a soldier who is neither “a tribesman fighting for his 
tribe nor a conscript fighting for his country”. In other words, this fighter lacks 
the durable bond with his employer, that can provide him with a nonfinancial 
motivation. In this respect – and in line with previous observations - Mockler 
sees the normative implications of the French Revolution as a turning point. 
After the revolution a twofold belief gained momentum that citizens should fight 
for their own country, and that fighting for another country in return for financial 
gain was dishonourable (Mockler, 1969: 15). However, as repeated by later 
authors, a man could only fight for his country when he “had a country that was 
more than a geographical expression to fight for” (Mockler, 1969: 15). The 
78  
transformation from a ruler-subject to a state-citizen relationship, and the 
concomitant emergence of notions of nationalism, patriotism and civic duty 
predated the shift from mercenaries to citizen armies. Through the concept of 
civic duty, the nation provided the commonsensical justification of military 
service. Even if commonsensical, Steinhoff (2008: 20-23) has correctly argued 
that the nation is not the only community that can legitimately inspire a person 
to take part in a military campaign. Therefore, Steinhoff (2008: 28) defines a 
mercenary as someone who, on a contractual basis, provides military services 
“to groups other than his own (in terms of nation, ethnic group, class, etc.) and 
is ready to deliver this service even if this involves taking part in hostilities. 
Which groups are relevant depends on the nature of the conflict”.26 In other 
words, a mercenary is foreign to the group to which he offers his services. His 
motivation derives not from pertaining to the group, but from a financial reward. 
 
More generally, from her constructivist point of view, Percy (2007a) presents us 
with two more critical elements separating mercenaries from regular soldiers 
and other foreign servicemen. Taken together, both elements constitute the 
norm against mercenaries. Mercenaries, quite simply, cannot be defined without 
reference to the cause of their motivation: they engage in armed combat 
because of financial gain and arrive at this decision independently, irrespective 
of the cause for which the violence is instigated (Percy, 2007a: 54-56). The lack 
of a plausible justification for killing, apart from financial gain, is what makes a 
mercenary morally problematic. Even though the interpretation of a just cause 
for the decision to resort to violence has evolved over time, it has invariably 
included ideological or political goals (Percy, 2007a: 54). The second element 
concerns the degree of legitimate control on fighters. Percy (2007a: 57) 
distinguishes mercenaries from regular personnel based on the degree of 
legitimate control by an entity “understood to have the legitimate right to wage 
war” - this entity being the sovereign state, inter- or supranational organisations, 
or, more historically, the legitimate authority at the time, (e.g. the prince, the 
king or the pope). Mercenaries in foreign armies are not subject to two types of 
control that apply to soldiers who are more or less permanently assigned to a 
foreign army. The first is the control of the home state, which can impose 
                                                          
26
 So, a mercenary can also be contracted by a group of the same nationality as his, 
but to which he himself does not belong (Steinhoff, 2008: 21). 
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sanctions in case of misbehaviour. The second is the immediate control of the 
hiring state for units permanently attached to foreign armies (Percy 2007a: 58). 
For Percy (2007a: 58) this accountability deficit “is the tacit standard that 
underlies the international antipathy for mercenary activity and truly determines 
mercenary status”. These normative considerations leave us with the following 
definition of a mercenary. A mercenary is someone foreign to the cause of the 
conflict, who is prepared to take part in hostilities. He has enlisted temporarily, 
based on a financial motivation, and is not fully under the control of a legitimate 
authority. In this definition, it is understood that someone foreign to the cause of 
a conflict cannot justify his taking part in hostilities. So the normative element of 
a justifiable cause provided by a legitimate authority proves indispensable in 
translating the intuitive concept ‘mercenary’ into a more universally applicable 
definition. 
 
However, translating a normative definition into a legally binding and 
enforceable document did not prove to be without difficulties. In the end, it 
resulted in two almost inapplicable international conventions against 
mercenaries. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, dating from 1977, tried to eliminate 
mercenarism in the context of decolonisation in Africa (Schreier and Caparini, 
2005: 147). Equally dating from 1977, Article 47 of the 1977 Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 defines the legal status of 
mercenaries in international law as well as their position in international 
humanitarian law (Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 148). The more recent UN 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training 
of Mercenaries dates from 1989, but only entered into force in 2001. This 
Convention criminalises mercenaries, as well as recruiting, using, training and 
financing mercenaries; since these activities violate “sovereign equality, political 
independence, territorial integrity of States and self-determination of peoples” 
(UN, 1989: 1). To do so, it provides a recent and widespread definition of the 
term mercenary, which runs as follows: 
 
[A]ny person who (a) Is specially recruited locally or 
abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) Is 
motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
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desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on 
behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation 
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed 
forces of that party; (c) Is neither a national of a party to 
the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a 
party to the conflict; (d) Is not a member of the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict; and (e) Has not been 
sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
 
Mercenarism does not stay limited to armed conflict, since a mercenary can 
also be anyone who: 
 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose 
of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: 
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a State; or (ii) 
Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; (b) Is 
motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire 
for significant private gain and is prompted by the 
promise or payment of material compensation; (c) Is 
neither a national nor a resident of the State against 
which such an act is directed; (d) Has not been sent by a 
State on official duty; and (e) Is not a member of the 
armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is 
undertaken. 
 
A strict reading of the above definition would include certain categories of 
foreign soldiers, as described above, which traditionally escape the mercenary 
label. This ambiguity is due to the difficulty of translating the normative aspects 
of the definition into a binding international treaty. Nevertheless, this convention 
is the most recent and most widespread treaty against mercenarism, as it is 
currently ratified by thirty three countries. We will not delve deeper in the 
discussion of the difficulties of drawing up such a convention, but we will focus 
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on the classification of PMSC employees under the mentioned conventions.  
 
Cameron (2006: 578) correctly asserts that neither the mercenary conventions, 
nor international humanitarian law allow for general conclusions on the 
classification of PMSC employees as mercenaries.  Rather, these bodies of law 
urge us to determine the status of individual PMSC employees on a case-by-
case basis. After such an analysis some (admittedly very few) employees do 
qualify as mercenaries while others do not. Furthermore, the requirement of the 
cumulative satisfaction of the above-mentioned criteria render the conventions 
inadequate to regulate the PMSC industry (Cameron, 2006: 578), since a case-
by-case determination does not promote transparency in international law. 
 
Conditions 1 (a) and 1 (b) of the UN Convention continue to generate debate 
among commentators of international law as they try to clarify the implications 
of snippets like “to fight in an armed conflict” and “taking direct part in 
hostilities”. The thin line between ‘taking direct part in hostilities’ and ‘assisting 
the armed forces’ has not yet fully been clarified. While some emerging PMCs 
in the 1990s definitely performed combat activities (Faite, 2008: 1), PMSCs 
currently put forward that such practices are in the part. Still, it is not fully clear 
whether, for instance, protecting a convoy or an army base qualifies as taking 
part in hostilities.27 Regarding condition 1 (a), it has further been argued that it 
implies that employees permanently employed by a PMSC do not qualify as 
mercenaries, while employees temporarily employed for a specific operation do 
(Faite, 2008: 4), if they satisfy the remaining conditions. While arguably 
uncommon, PMSC personnel formally incorporated in the armed forces of a 
party do not fall under the mercenary label (Faite, 2008: 4). It is predominantly 
condition 1 (c), however, that prevents labelling PMSCs as mercenaries in 
international law, because PMSC employees are regularly nationals of a party 
to the conflict. This can lead to confusing situations in which “a German working 
for a US PMSC during the international conflict in Iraq would fall within Article 
47 [of the 1977 Protocol I], whereas his American and British co-workers would 
not” (Doswald-Beck, 2007: 123). 
 
                                                          
27
 On this issue, the ICRC (2008) has recently issued the “Interpretive guidance on the 
notion of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law”. 
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Paramount in the discussions on conditions 1(d) and (e) is the question whether 
PMSCs are part of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Since international 
humanitarian law does not prescribe a uniform method to determine whether 
people are included in the armed forces, this process is left to domestic law 
(Cameron, 2006: 583). Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that PMSC 
employees are included in the armed forces only in rare cases (Cameron, 2006: 
583). PMSCs might perform official duties for a party to the conflict (cf. 1 (e)), 
but it is less clear whether this implies that they become part of the armed 
forces. 
 
From the point of view of international humanitarian law, the dividing line 
between mercenaries and PMSC employees is therefore hard to draw and boils 
down to a case-by-case analysis. Nevertheless, PMSC employees have 
consistently not been considered mercenaries in armed conflicts.  
 
4.2.2 PMSCs as Combatants or Civilians 
 
If they are not mercenaries, then what status is attributed to PMSC employees 
in armed conflict? Two options remain. They can either be combatants or 
civilians. The precise determination of this status has far-reaching 
consequences. On the one hand, combatants have the right to take direct part 
in hostilities and cannot be prosecuted for this/ As a result, however, they can 
be targeted at all times (Gillard, 2006: 531). If captured, furthermore, 
combatants are entitled to prisoner-of-war status (Gillard, 2006: 531). Civilians, 
on the other hand, may not be attacked and cannot take direct part in hostilities. 
If they do so, they lose their immunity from attack and will be considered 
“unprivileged belligerents” or “unlawful combatants”, implying that they can not 
claim prisoner-of-war status and that they can even be prosecuted for their 
participation (Gillard, 2006: 531).  
 
Applied to PMSC personnel, the status as combatants or civilians determines 
whether these employees may directly participate in hostilities, whether they 
can be prosecuted for this, and whether they can be considered legitimate 
targets (Cameron, 2006: 582). Participants in an armed conflict gain combatant 
status when they are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, or 
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when they are members of a militia group or volunteer corps belonging to a 
party to the conflict and fulfilling certain conditions (Cameron, 2006: 582-584).28 
Cameron (2006: 583) contends that only in rare cases PMSCs are incorporated 
in the armed forces, because the aim of privatisation (viz., “to devolve on the 
private sector what was previously the preserve of government authorities”), 
runs counter to the logic of incorporation. It is also contended by governments 
that they consider PMSC employees as civilian contractors and not as 
combatants (Cameron, 2006: 573). However, sometimes PMSCs themselves 
point out that they are part of the military forces of a party to the conflict, and 
that they have concluded official contracts for their actions. Thus, for example, 
employees of certain PMSCs try to gain combatant status as a strategy in 
holding off civil lawsuits for their involvement in prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib 
(Cameron, 2006: 575). This observation points to severe difficulties in 
determining the status of PMSCs, driven in part by conflicting underlying 
interests of the actors in play. Most commentators also assert that civilian 
contractors only rarely fulfill all four requirements of the relevant article (Article 
4A (2)) of the Third Geneva Convention (determining membership of armed 
forces). This means that most PMSC employees would not qualify as 
combatants, nor as members of a militia (cf. Schmitt, 2005). Cameron (2006: 
586) also mentions a teleological interpretation of article 4(A)2 as a further 
argument against subsuming PMSCs in the combatant category: “use of the 
said provision to justify their categorization as combatants runs counter to its 
historical purpose, which was to allow for partisans in the Second World War to 
have prisoner-of-war status”.  
 
We can safely conclude that few PMSC employees will be considered 
combatants under international humanitarian law. Logically, they should 
consequently be considered civilians, who do not have a right to take part in 
hostilities. However, notorious incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan did question the 
viability of this qualification. They transform the discussion into an exegesis of 
international law and most notably of the concept of ‘taking part in hostilities.’ In 
the 1987 International Committee of the Red Cross commentary to the 1977 
                                                          
28
 Membership of the armed forces or of a militia or volunteer corps can be evaluated 
by means of Article 4(A) 1 of the Third Geneva Convention or by Article 43 of Protocol I 
(concerning armed forces) and Article 4(A) 2 of the same Convention (Cameron, 2006: 
582-583, Faite, 2008: 6-7). 
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additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, direct participation means 
“acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to 
the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces”.29 But this 
commentary does not end the discussions on the classification of the activities 
of PMSCs. Some of the PMSC activities listed in the first chapter - such as 
cooking, cleaning and translating - certainly do not fall under this interpretation 
of direct participation. On the contrary, deliveries and transportations of 
weapons and military material, strategic planning, intelligence and 
reconnaissance, might be considered direct participation (Faite, 2008: 7). 
Civilians taking part in these activities lose protection under international 
humanitarian law for as long as they are engaged in them. With regard to 
guarding activities, it must furthermore be taken into account whether or not 
PMSCs are protecting potential military objectives, and how their employees 
react in case of an attack. While PMSC employees are entitled to use force in 
self-defence or to protect civilian objects without losing their protection as 
civilians under international humanitarian law; the situation is different when 
they are guarding military objectives. Faite (2008: 8) argues that “[i]n situations 
of armed conflict, it is arguable that guarding infrastructures such as army 
bases, barracks or ammunition dumps constitutes in itself a direct participation 
in the hostilities”. This leads to the situation that PMSC employees constitute 
legitimate targets of attack when they are on duty, losing their protection as 
civilians under international humanitarian law, but regaining this protection when 
off-duty (Faite, 2008: 8). The situation again changes when PMSC employees 
are guarding non-military infrastructure that can be legitimately targeted in an 
armed conflict, such as critical infrastructure (e.g. power plants), or 
transportation facilities (e.g. main roads and airports).30 When they are guarding 
these legitimate targets, PMSCs remain civilians as long as they do not return 
fire besides in self-defence. If they return fire in any other circumstance, their 
                                                          
29
 The International Committee of the Red Cross 1987 commentary to article 51 of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
<http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=LookUpCOMART
&articleUNID=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
30
 Non-military infrastructures become a legitimate military target under Article 52 (2) of 
the Additional Protocol I when “their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage”. 
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status one again needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis (Faite, 2008: 
9). 
 
The obvious conclusion of this discussion on legal terminology is that the 
classification of PMSC employees as combatants, civilians or mercenaries ends 
up in a case-by-case and company-by-company analysis. This time-consuming 
process does not promote compliance with international humanitarian law - a 
situation that is even aggravated by the protean character of PMSCs, who defy 
the boundaries between concepts of international law. Several current initiatives 
aim to remedy these obstacles by means of a comprehensive regulatory 
framework of PMSCs. The common ground of these initiatives is that they do 
not try to ban PMSCs. Instead they try to legitimise a respectable PMSC 
industry. Remarkable in the drafting of these regulatory initiatives is that they 
call upon the PMSCs themselves to help shape the regulatory contours of the 
future PMSC industry.  
 
The confusion in the post-Cold War security environment demonstrated that 
prevailing keys to international relations (theory) and security provision had 
become outdated. Once confronted with unconventional security providers, the 
institutionalised legal framework governing the exercise of armed force proved 
inconclusive and non-transparent. In this respect, the vagueness of the anti-
mercenary norm, at least in its contemporary codification, leaves open 
significant room for interpretation and for a stricter formulation. The discussions 
above show striking similarities with what Sandholtz’s model describes as the 
first phase of norm change. It shows the incompatibility of new phenomena with 
existing normative structures. In the following chapter, I will discuss the 
normative debate that follows this initial situation. In the remaining two sections 
of the present chapter, I will now first focus on why PMSCs were most 
successful in moulding the debate. 
 
4.3 Epistemic Communities 
 
The foregoing debates on the applicability of international humanitarian and 
human rights law and related bodies of law serve to illustrate that prototypical 
constructs invariably need interpretation to cover real-life situations. In response 
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to changes in the material environment, such as technological innovations, an 
actor has to apply and interpret existing concepts, or devise new ones. This 
raises the questions who can legitimately engage in this discursive contest and 
who has the major impact on the resulting regulatory design. PMSCs have built 
up a considerable expertise in the security domain. Due to their extensive 
contribution to the gathering and, more importantly, the analysing of intelligence 
(Chesterman, 2008), PMSCs have contributed to clarifying some of the 
conceptual confusion after the Cold War by identifying the new threats. The 
were allowed to “speak security” (cf. Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998). 
Furthermore, they have also resolved some of the functional confusion by 
offering solutions on how best to respond to these threats.  
 
This section will do the groundwork for the argument that PMSCs have 
successfully used their expertise as a leverage to exert a decisive influence on 
the discourse on the outsourcing and privatisation of defence activities. 
Consequently, this argument continues, they were able to shape the 
governance initiatives on the private military industry and to co-create a 
modified normative framework on the state monopoly on violence, in which the 
private use of violence is accepted under certain conditions. To this end, I will 
now build upon the work of Leander (2005) and Jones (2006), who have 
compared the private military and security industry to an epistemic community. 
The epistemic community approach fits the theoretical framework outlined in the 
first chapter due to its link with constructivism (cf. Cross, 2013: 149, Ruggie, 
1998: 69). In constructivist terminology, epistemic communities are concerned 
with the production of “consensual knowledge”, which, as I must stress from the 
outset, does not necessarily equate to “truth” (Haas, 1992: 23). Since 
consensual intersubjective agreement is the basis of the constructivist ontology, 
epistemic communities are attributed a central role in the construction of reality. 
They acquire a significant amount of influence on the policy process because, 
as Haas (1992: 23) states: “[t]he epistemological impossibility of confirming 
access to reality means that the group responsible for articulating the 
dimensions of reality has great social and political influence”. Antoniades (2003: 
21) makes this link even more explicit and attributes significant power to 
epistemic communities in global political interactions. As we will discuss below, 
it is the authoritative claim to knowledge that puts epistemic communities at the 
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centre of the construction of reality. For, if we dismiss the notion of truth external 
to human interaction, it is “each and every spacio-temporal-specific knowledge 
structure that defines what is knowledge” (Antoniades, 2003: 27). However, 
epistemic communities do not monopolise policy truth (Kogut and Macpherson, 
2008: 113) and may even compete with one another. Many elements in the 
literature on epistemic communities reflect (the practices of) PMSCs as a 
professional group strikingly well. After highlighting the central elements that 
build epistemic communities, the concept will be applied to PMSCs in the next 
section. 
 
In one of the earliest contributions to this topic, Haas (1992: 3) identified an 
epistemic community as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. The members of the 
network share normative, principled and causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a 
policy enterprise (Haas, 1992: 3). In periods of uncertainty, states may require 
information on what social reality looks like or on the possible outcomes of 
actions. This information might be provided by epistemic communities and is 
“the product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena” (Haas, 
1992: 4). 
 
Epistemic communities may share characteristics with other social groups such 
as interest and lobby groups, advocacy networks and communities of practice, 
but are distinguished from them by their “recognized expertise” (Haas, 1992: 
16) and “expert knowledge” (Cross, 2013: 142), even if they also seek to 
translate their policy-relevant knowledge into policy influence (Meyer and 
Molyneux-Hodgson, 2010). Epistemic communities need not necessarily be 
limited to scientific groups. The shared ‘professionalism’ acts as the primary 
cement between members of the group because, as Cross (2013: 158) has 
argued, “[t]he main point is not whether the knowledge has definitely been 
proven or not, but rather whether it is socially recognized”. Next to recognised 
expertise, internal cohesion is another defining characteristics of an epistemic 
community. An internally coherent group more easily gains influence (Cross, 
2013: 148-149). This internal cohesion is facilitated by the professionalism of 
the members of the epistemic community and is more important in determining 
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their influence than is the nature of their knowledge, whether scientific or non-
scientific (Cross, 2013: 149-150). Major variables of this professionalism are 
“(1) selection and training; (2) meeting frequency and quality; (3) shared 
professional norms; and (4) common culture” (Cross, 2013: 150). In this 
respect, epistemic communities are not unlike communities of practice (cf. 
Wenger, 1998). 
 
Under conditions of uncertainty, when adequate information to assess a 
situation is scarce and when an evaluation of the consequences of policy 
choices is not straightforward (George, 1980: 26-27), epistemic communities 
are a source of information policymakers can turn to for advice. The epistemic 
community literature aims to explain the genesis of state interests, state 
behaviour and international institutions in an uncertain international environment 
(Adler and Haas, 1992: 367). Under conditions of uncertainty (Cross, 2013) - 
and especially when technical complexities hamper its understanding by 
decision makers - epistemic communities can exert considerable influence on 
the policymaking process. In this respect, Adler and Haas (1992: 367) see 
‘interpretation’ as the missing link between international structures and human 
volition. Under conditions of uncertainty, state interests and the ways to promote 
them are not necessarily clear. In addition, in times of crises, shocks and 
turbulence, the location of power may be obscured and existing procedures and 
institutions may become outdated (Haas, 1992: 14). Notably, power is not 
absent in this model of policy coordination, but instead of referring to the 
availability of material resources, it is reconfigured to include “control over 
knowledge and information”, viz. a form of social power (Haas, 1992: 2, 17). 
This is very similar to what Barnet and Duval (2005: 3-4) call “productive 
power”. Still, Haas (1992: 2) accords a central role to decision makers, who 
‘identify’ state interests and consequently decide on the actions to satisfy those 
interests. This ’identification’, however, is itself based on the representation of 
the issues by experts; and of the understanding of these representations by 
policy makers. In this view, epistemic communities are an option policymakers 
can turn to in the course of a decision-making procedure. We must note that 
technical issues frequently become objects of political debate, as even those 
issues involve the distribution of limited resources and thus evolve into 
“complex and nontechnical issues centering around who is to get what in 
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society and at what cost?” (Haas, 1992: 11). Elsewhere, Haas (2004: 572) also 
argues that no scientific theory is above suspicion as scientific findings might be 
guided by the opportunities of funding31 and, more fundamentally, because 
scientists are embedded in a “cultural discourse”. Furthermore, Haas (2004: 
573) complains that science does not escape politicisation, but is 
instrumentalised and possibly infiltrated by its users. He (Haas, 2004: 573) 
invokes the concept of “usable knowledge”, at the core of which is an element 
that makes this knowledge “usable for policymakers”. Usable knowledge, I 
maintain, does not necessarily originate from scientific communities. Edelenbos 
et al. (2011: 676), for instance, show how, faced with complex decision-making 
situations, policymakers, experts and stakeholders “co-produce” knowledge. In 
these situations, “suppliers” of knowledge compete with each other “to prove the 
significance and authority of their knowledge” (Edelenbos et al., 2011: 676).  
King’s (2005) analysis of the role of epistemic communities in central bank 
reform in the UK shows that the role of epistemic communities is crucial for 
understanding the road to operational independence of the Bank of England. 
Neither the pressure of lobby groups, nor the desire for cabinet stability within 
the government can explain this policy. However, King (2005: 115) adds that the 
mere existence of an epistemic community in uncertain times is insufficient to 
explain policy change and that only in combination with perceived electoral 
gains for the ruling party the ideas of an epistemic community are picked up by 
the government. This suggests that power listens to truth (cf. Haas, 2004), 
when truth is in the interest of power. Usable knowledge, in the sense used 
here, and somewhat different from Haas’ use of the term, is knowledge that 
offers perceived net benefits for political decision-makers. Unusable knowledge 
is knowledge that makes rival claims to truth, but that offers less promises for 
policymakers. When, as for instance in normative discussions, two communities 
make rival and equally plausible claims to knowledge, it is frequently the option 
that is most usable that will win out. The negotiation on the future regulatory 
framework of the PMSC industry can be conceptualised as an instance of 
coproduced knowledge between experts, bureaucrats and civil society. An 
important component of the domination of the experts’ (PMSCs) proposal is the 
benefits it offers to policymakers. 
 
                                                          
31 Funding agencies have a considerable leverage on the production of knowledge. 
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If the decisions in one state spill over to other states, this can lead to 
international policy coordination and even institutionalisation. Since many 
communities are of a transnational nature, the epistemic community approach 
transcends the strict separation between domestic and international politics 
(Adler and Haas, 1992: 367). Even though the international distribution of power 
as well as domestic power relations still surround their functioning and impact; 
epistemic communities suggest a “nonsystemic origin for state interests” and 
offer possibilities for cooperation outside established power relations (Haas, 
1992: 4). Adler and Haas (1992: 373-374) use the metaphor of evolution to 
provide insight into the policy impact of epistemic communities, which leads 
them to a four-step model of policy evolution, starting with policy innovation, 
over diffusion, to selection and eventually persistence. Adding to this metaphor 
Putnam’s conceptualisation of international politics as a “two-level game”,32 they 
arrive at a framework for international policy diffusion in which epistemic 
communities play a double role as both the source and the distributors of policy 
innovations (Adler and Haas, 1992: 373-374).33 After the diffusion process, in 
which members of the epistemic community directly and indirectly present their 
ideas to key players on the (inter)national scene through various channels of 
communication; new ideas arrive at the policy selection stage (Adler and Haas, 
1992: 378-382). It is at this stage that Adler and Haas (1992: 381) accord most 
importance to the input of policymakers. When policymakers are confronted 
with new phenomena, epistemic communities’ capacity to frame issues and 
identify interests is greatest. When policymakers are familiar with an issue, they 
can fall back on existing procedures and institutions and might give preference 
to epistemic communities who further their political project (Adler and Haas, 
1992: 381). In other words, the more familiar decision makers are with an issue, 
the more epistemic communities risk being instrumentalised by those decision 
makers to gain political advantage. In the last step of the policy evolution model, 
                                                          
32 Putnam (1988: 434) sees international politics as composed of two levels: at the 
domestic level, diverse groups compete for influence while at the international level 
governments seek to safeguard their sovereignty. 
33 Drawing on insights from cognitive psychology, Haas (1992: 28-29) stresses the 
“conditioning role [of] prior beliefs and established operating procedures” in determining 
the interpretation of and reaction to new situations. This grants epistemic communities 
considerable room for manoeuvring to frame new issues in certain ways and thus to 
shape subsequent actions. 
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“[n]ew ideas and policies, once institutionalized, can gain the status of 
orthodoxy”, depending on the authority of the epistemic community in case, 
which, in turn, is partly a function of the internal consensus and cohesion of the 
epistemic community (Adler and Haas, 1992: 384). 
 
The epistemic communities model sheds light on the dissemination of ideas and 
tries to explain why some ideas more successfully inform policymaking than 
others. Ideas do not originate in a social vacuum, nor do they reproduce 
themselves. Central in the dissemination of ideas are epistemic communities as 
carriers of ideas or as “cognitive baggage handlers as well as gatekeepers 
governing the entry of new ideas into institutions” (Haas, 1992: 27).  Epistemic 
communities can thus be the source as well as the medium of policy diffusion. If 
members of an epistemic community simultaneously possess policymaking 
authority they can directly implement their ideas. If not, they can resort to 
socialisation to influence policy makers (Adler and Haas, 1992: 374). 
 
On some of the above issues, the literature on epistemic communities shows 
resemblance with, and can be supplemented by the literature on the life cycle of 
norms. The next chapter will show how PMSCs have used their epistemic 
power to contribute to the shaping of new international regulatory instruments, 
and have concomitantly and deliberately constructed both a new image and a 
modification of the normative environment. 
 
4.4 Epistemic PMSCs 
 
This section shows how PMSCs come close to the model of an epistemic 
community sketched above. Building upon the notion of epistemic power, it calls 
into question the prevailing model of states as the central decision-making 
institutions in the domain of security provision. While some authors have tried to 
preserve this decision-making capacity of states by making appeal to the 
analogy of “steering” and “rowing” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, Crawford 
2006),34 the epistemic communities literature problematizes this strict boundary. 
                                                          
34 Crawford (2006: 453) compares regulatory activities to steering. By “setting the 
course, monitoring the direction and correcting deviations from the course set” 
governments can steer the provision of security. Rowing then becomes that aspect of 
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Epistemic communities can work on two levels of actions, either cognitive or 
practical (Antoniades, 2003: 28). I will argue that PMSCs have succeeded in 
using their practical knowledge as leverage to produce cognitive knowledge. 
Being thought communities, epistemic communities 
 
have the power to impose particular discourses and 
particular worldviews on societies. This power goes 
beyond the ability of A to get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do. Additionally, it goes beyond the 
ability to set the rules of the game and the agenda. The 
ability to impose a discourse includes the ability to 
influence people’s and collectivities’ self-understanding 
(identity formation) and therefore their understanding 
about their wants and interests; this includes the ability to 
influence the knowledge and ideas comprised within 
social structures […] They have the power, in other 
words, to create new understandings, and influence the 
evolution of the existing intersubjective understandings 
of which reality, and thus world politics, consist 
(Antoniades 2003: 28-30). 
 
In situations of complex decision-making, epistemic communities can influence 
policy outcomes in an indirect way, through three mechanisms: by advising or 
providing information to the eventual decision-makers, through agenda-setting 
or through working out the practical details or implementation of a policy 
(Antoniades, 2003: 33). The intimate interlock of power and knowledge means 
that power and knowledge are two sides of the same coin. In the 
power/knowledge framework of Antoniades (2003: 37), power underlies the 
different manifestations of the epistemic, but also “draws its substance from” the 
epistemic. Social reality, as a social construct, depends on the availability of 
social knowledge and “[c]onsequently, the production of socially legitimate 
knowledge is politics, and politics is the legitimisation of (some) knowledge” 
(Antoniades, 2003: 37). PMSCs, in a coalition with government decision-makers 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“service provision […] concerned with policy implementation and on-the-ground 
delivery of services” (Loader, 2000: 341). 
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were more successful in this enterprise than civil society. Opposing a narrow 
view on power that still views PMSCs as “tools” at the disposal of states (that 
are seen as paramount decision-makers), Leander (2005: 804-806) makes a 
case for a comprehensive conception of power in which PMSCs are actively 
shaping those policies, rather than merely implementing state security policies. 
In the tradition of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), PMSCs might be 
considered securitisation actors. As such, they have not only shaped security 
discourses, but also (and more fundamentally), “security understandings” 
(Leander, 2005: 804). As securitisation actors, PMSCs not only contribute to 
securitisation, or to the identification of existential threats; they also shape the 
most appropriate solutions to these threats, contributing to a process in which 
“security is not only privatized but also re-militarised” (Leander 2005: 804). 
 
While the formal decision-making power on the use of force and on the 
formulation of contractual stipulations might remain in state hands, PMSCs 
have informally challenged that power (Leander, 2005: 807). States not only 
have to share their control powers over PMSCs with other market actors, most 
notably shareholders; they are also closely intertwined with major PMSCs, so 
that PMSCs sometimes have a voice in state policymaking (Leander 2005: 
808). The latter is the result of active lobbying and of the revolving door 
between government and PMSCs’ boards of directors (Schreier and Caparini, 
2005: 90). Leander (2005: 809-810) further moves beyond a formalistic view of 
power in two ways. First of all, PMSCs possess a significant leeway in 
implementing contractual provisions as “street bureaucrats”. Implementing 
contractual stipulations inevitably implies interpreting those stipulations and 
translating them into actual outcomes (Leander, 2005: 809-810). This function 
of street bureaucrats is illustrated by Berndtsson’s (2012: 314) analysis of 
private security contractors employed by the Swedish government to protect its 
embassies. Contractors are selected on the basis of their knowledge of the local 
political and cultural situation and language and the contractor, as a security 
expert, has “a substantial and direct impact on decisions and security 
governance at the Swedish embassies” (Berndtsson, 2012: 12-13). This 
dependence of states upon private contractors invariably implies an element of 
good faith in the ability or willingness of the contractor to fulfill his obligations 
(Berndtsson, 2012). Secondly, Leander (2005: 811) proposes a more epistemic 
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or constructivist notion of power, understood as the power to shape security 
discourses and the “knowledge of actors”. In addition, a constructivist analysis 
of contemporary security practices can elucidate “to what extent PMCs are 
(dis)empowered by the evolving ‘logic’ (sens for Bourdieu) of the field of 
legitimate security expertise” and how this expertise grants them the authority 
“to speak” in the security field (Leander, 2005: 811-812).  As security experts35 
(Huysmans, 2006: 9), PMSCs might directly influence decision makers by 
providing information and by setting the agenda, or they might exert influence 
more indirectly by shaping security actors’ preferences and identities (Leander, 
2005: 812- 819). Private contractors increasingly provide consultancy and 
intelligence services to government agencies (Chesterman, 2008). More than 
just offering raw intelligence data, PMSCs also analyse those data and are thus 
paramount in sketching the security environment. In other words, they are 
central producers of security discourses (Leander, 2005: 813). The information 
advantage of PMSCs makes states depend on them for the provision and 
analysis of intelligence and for structuring the information based on which they 
decide on their security strategy (Leander, 2005: 813-814). When more than 
two thirds of the US intelligence budget flows to PMSCs and an equal 
proportion of the Counterintelligence Field Activity staff and more than 50 per 
cent of Defence Intelligence Agency personnel are actually contractors 
(Chesterman, 2008: 1056); it might be argued that states depend upon PMSCs 
for the major part of their intelligence analysis. This has indeed led a senior 
executive from the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence to observe 
that “we can’t spy if we can’t buy” (Chesterman, 2008: 1055). Furthermore, 
private contractors are engaged in the training of military personnel in various 
service branches, although admittedly to a different extent. In the UK, private 
companies train pilots for diverse divisions of the Royal Air Force and, in 
Germany, part of the training of Eurofighter pilots has been outsourced 
(Krahmann, 2005b: 280, 283). In the US, pilot training has been partly 
outsourced since the Second World War; but since the 1990s and continuing in 
the early 2000s, the US also experiments with outsourcing parts of the Army 
Reserve Officer Training Corps, first to MPRI, later to COMTek (Avant, 2005: 
                                                          
35 Huysmans (2006: 9) sees security experts as “professionals, that gain their 
legitimacy of and power to define policy problems from trained skills and knowledge 
and from continuously using these in their work”. 
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116-120). Although the instructors provided by these private firms go through a 
more or less standardised socialisation process36 (due to the legal requirement 
that they should not be retired for more than two years); this may nevertheless 
reduce functional, political and social control by governments on its armed 
forces (Avant, 2005: 138-142).   
 
For all of the above, I will concur with Jones’ (2006) conceptualisation of 
PMSCs as an epistemic community. Going beyond his prescriptive argument 
and in light of the above, this text also argues that the concept of an epistemic 
community is helpful in a descriptive analysis of PMSCs. We have seen how the 
complexity of the new security environment has opened up opportunities for a 
redefinition or re-articulation of security threats. In identifying what counts as a 
security threat, and especially in formulating an appropriate response, epistemic 
communities can free states from the “bureaucratic constraints of 
intergovernmental competition”, leading to what are perceived as objectively 
optimal solutions (Jones, 2006: 358). PMSCs’ success in gaining a military 
advantage for their clients⁠37 credited them with a “pragmatic legitimacy” that 
demonstrated their functional usefulness (Elms and Philips, 2009: 411) to be 
preferred over incapable national armed forces. In this respect, it is worth 
dwelling for a moment upon the different types of legitimacy. Suchman’s (1995) 
distinction between pragmatic, cognitive and moral legitimacy helps explain why 
some norm entrepreneurs enjoy greater success in their effort to reconstruct 
existing norms. Pragmatic legitimacy, for Suchman (1995: 578), bases the 
support for a policy on its expected utility for a specific audience. Moral 
legitimacy denotes that an action or institution is normatively acceptable.38 This 
                                                          
36
 For instance, COMTek’s website states that “COMTek provides highly qualified 
contract employees to train these future leaders at over 277 colleges and universities 
across the country.  We place Army Retired, Reserve, National Guard, IRR Officers and 
NCOs into ROTC units and headquarters as Military Science Instructors, Administrative 
Technicians and Staff Specialist (SS)”. <http://www.comtechnologies.com/comtek-
services/training-support-services/arotc.html>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
37
 E.g. Executive Outcomes for the government of Sierra Leone in the civil war of the 
1990s; and MPRI for the Croatian governments in the final stages of its war for 
independence in the mid 1990s (Avant, 2005). 
38
 Normative judgments “usually reflect beliefs about whether the activity effectively 
promotes societal welfare, as defined by the audience's socially constructed value 
system. Of course, this altruistic grounding does not necessarily render moral 
legitimacy entirely "interest-free" (Suchman, 1995: 579). 
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moral legitimacy can hinge upon consequentialist, procedural or structural 
elements (Suchman, 1995: 579-581). Legitimacy for consequentialist reasons 
arises when the output of an action or institution promotes some kind of social 
welfare, while procedural legitimacy derives from reaching those outcomes 
through “socially accepted techniques and procedures” (Suchman, 1995: 580). 
Structural legitimacy results from the compatibility of the practices with existing 
normative structures (Suchman, 1995: 581). Cognitive legitimacy does not imply 
a normative judgment, but the obviousness and comprehensibility of the 
institutions. For organisational activity to be “predictable; meaningful and 
inviting”, it should be compatible with existing cultural models, viz. the new 
institutions should become thinkable and understandable. Suchman (1995: 584-
585) adds that pragmatic and moral legitimacy depend on discursive evaluation 
because the cost-benefit analyses at the heart of pragmatic legitimacy and the 
ethical analyses at the base of moral legitimacy are arrived at through “explicit 
public discussions”. 
 
The claim of PMSCs to pragmatically legitimate security expertise is accepted 
and reproduced by their clients, who otherwise would not want to buy (Leander, 
2010: 473-474). Initially, PM(S)Cs gained pragmatic legitimacy mainly for two 
audiences, multinational corporations working in unstable environments and 
elites of African conflict-ridden states (Baum and McGahan, 2013: 6). This 
pragmatic legitimacy is intimately connected to cognitive legitimacy. As private 
companies working in a neoliberal ideological environment, PMSCs have an 
advantage over public agencies. By default, market actors are considered more 
efficient, and this assumption pre-empts critique because existing accounting 
criteria favour PMSCs (Leander, 2010: 476-477). Of course, PMSCs are aware 
that their corporate image is crucial for their perceived legitimacy and 
consequently for their business opportunities (Jones, 2006: 360-361). In a quest 
for “moral legitimacy” (Elms and Phillips, 2009), they have succeeded in 
creating an image of security professionals. Furthermore, they have deliberately 
cultivated the ideal of a scientific community. A good example is the 
International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). While it is hard to 
analytically pin down ISOA, (formerly known as the International Peace 
Operations Association), the Association promotes the industry as “the 
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bellwether of change in the stability operations community, ushering in the latest 
ideas and innovations” (ISOA website, 2014).39 ISOA brings together PMSCs 
and non-governmental organisations from over the world and, as such, it offers 
network opportunities to its members. It further publishes a “Stability Operations 
Magazine” in which experts and practitioners of government, civil society and 
the private sector as well as academics discuss relevant security-related issues. 
In addition, the ISOA Annual Summit brings together academics, industry and 
government representatives to discuss developments in the security domain.40 
In 2006, moreover, IPOA staff established the non-profit Peace Operations 
Institute (POI) that aimed at “educating the public about peace and stability 
operations, and to promoting practical solutions to peacekeeping operations” 
(POI Website, 2014).41 The POI’s educational activities include research on 
peacekeeping practices, creating networks among stakeholders in the security 
industry and publishing reviews of the industry. For the British case, we can 
observe that Andy Bearpark (director-general of the British Association of 
Private Security Companies (BAPSC)) and Sabrina Schulz (its director of 
policy) have contributed an article entitled “The Future of the Market” to 
Chesterman and Lehnardt (2007). In an attempt to gain further credibility, 
PMSCs have also tried to ‘bridge’ the gap between themselves and national 
armed forces by hiring ex-military personnel trained by Western armies (Baum 
                                                          
39
 The International Stability Operations Association comes closest to this ideal-type of 
an epistemic community. ISOA aims, among others, to “[p]romote high operational and 
ethical standards of firms active in the peace and stability operations industry; [and t]o 
engage in a constructive dialogue and advocacy with policy-makers about the growing 
and positive contribution of these firms to the enhancement of international peace, 
development and human security”. (ISOA website, 2014) <http://www.stability-
operations.org/?page=Advocacy>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
ISOA claims to represent "the expertise” of the private military and security community 
and wants to speak for the industry. (<http://www.stability-
operations.org/?page=History>). However, ISOA is hard to pin down analytically and 
does not facilitate such an analysis since it offers no unambiguous picture of what kind 
of organization it is. It merely characterizes itself as “a global partnership of private 
sector and nongovernmental organizations” (<http://www.stability-
operations.org/?page=About>). 
40
 Last year’s program can be found on <http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.stability-
operations.org/resource/resmgr/AnnualSummit/AS13_Agenda_FINAL.pdf>, (accessed 
01/07/2014). 
41 Cf. 
<http://peaceops.org/poi/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid= 
26>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
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and McGahan, 2013: 15). For Jones (2006: 363), the military provider firms 
identified by Singer (2003) are essentially an epistemic community since they 
are the “depository of military expertise from a variety of states”. The use of 
PMSCs by the UN and other international organisations, and the authority 
PMSCs gain from this can lead to an agreement on “shared causal beliefs” and 
can grant PMSCs a normative influence on “policy formulation and 
implementation”. In turn, this can stimulate human security and the prevention 
of conflict (Jones, 2006: 363-365). By limiting the analogy between epistemic 
communities and the PMSC community to a normative level, Jones 
underestimates the potential of the epistemic community of the private military 
and security industry as an explanatory factor for the rise, regulation and 
institutionalisation PMSCs. Epistemic communities can indeed decisively shape 
the institutional, regulatory and normative framework of an economic sector. 
Therefore, Kogut and MacPherson (2008), for instance, resort to epistemic 
communities as the independent variable in explaining the diffusion of 
privatisation as an economic policy.  
 
PMSC power thus goes beyond formal lobbying and negotiating the terms of a 
specific contract and also happens on a more ‘epistemic’ level, since PMSCs 
offer very attractive ‘usable knowledge’ to state decision-makers. This might 
even happen to such an extent that PMSCs can set the agenda and shape the 
identity and preferences of actors in the security field, for instance through the 
presentation of the threat environment, state interests and the appropriate state 
policy. This is true, even if the underlying intention is to sell their own products 
and services (Leander, 2005: 817-819). Moving to a more structural level of 
power analysis, Leander (2005: 820) furthermore argues how PMSCs 
contribute to a more and more technical and military framing of security 
expertise and that the debates on security are 
 
moving out of the public realm into a restricted sphere 
where the executive, the military, the secret services 
and PMCs can decide how issues should be defined 
and handled. Correspondingly, it diminishes the 
presence of governmental (legislative assemblies, 
diplomats and foreign affairs/state departments) and 
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civil society (media, NGOs, think thanks) voices that 
would be expected to contest the consequent 
militarization of security issues. 
 
4.5 Reframing PMSCs 
 
PMSCs have deliberately cultivated an identity of security experts and security 
professionals, of “technical and military experts”, alongside identities of 
“professional businessmen, noble humanitarians and proud patriots” (Kruck and 
Spencer, 2013: 332). For instance, Higate’s (2012) symbolic interactionist 
analysis of the memoirs of British security contractors in Iraq shows that these 
contractors consistently emphasise their professionalism, thus positively 
contributing to the legitimacy of the overall industry. Indeed, their identity 
impacts their public perception and, consequently, their perceived legitimacy 
(Krahmann, 2012). In the world risk society, security experts help people to 
make sense of their security environment and devise the appropriate responses 
to a multitude of risks and threats (Berndtsson, 2012: 303-304).  To secure a 
contract, PMSCs must therefore convince their employer of their superior 
“specialised competence” with regard to public sector security providers 
(Berndtsson, 2012: 307).  As security experts, PMSCs are thus not only co-
framing and co-staging security issues (Berndtsson, 2012: 304), they have also 
become increasingly indispensable for states to achieve their security 
objectives. This particular combination on PMSC expertise and state reliance of 
PMSCs, explains why PMSCs have become widely  accepted as security 
professionals. 
 
What is more, their status as security professionals also helps to explain the 
inapplicability of mercenary conventions to PMSCs, as discussed above. Not 
only have the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries discursively reconstructed 
private security providers to differentiate PMSCs from mercenaries; this 
reconstruction has also created a “discursive opportunity for the development of 
new international regulations that endorse the legality and legitimacy” of PMSCs 
(Krahmann, 2012: 345). From a discourse-historical point of view, Krahmann 
(2012: 344) thus recounts how PMSCs have cast off their mercenary reputation 
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and have become legal and legitimate. Legal concepts are social constructs par 
excellence and their interpretation at a given moment in time depends on the 
outcome of a discursive struggle (Krahmann, 2012: 347). Due to the discursive 
reconstruction and reinterpretation of the definition of a mercenary, PMSCs did 
not subsume under this category and new legal categories needed to be 
designed. A strict reading of the First Additional Protocol might have subsumed 
PMSCs in recent conflicts, most notably Iraq and Afghanistan, under the 
mercenary label. However, to avoid this, Krahmann (2012: 352) argues, “the 
ICRC modified its construction of mercenaries”. The historical context of the 
drafting of the First Protocol in the 1970s, most notably the postcolonial wars for 
independence, significantly differed from the wars fought by multinational 
coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only did the historical circumstances 
change, also the ICRC changed its discourse. To differentiate PMSCs from 
mercenaries, the now focused on PMSCs’ “responsible command” and their 
delivery of services “with a positive connotation such as defence and protection” 
(Krahmann, 2012: 354-355). The changing ICRC discourse prevented the 
application of the existing mercenary definitions of Additional Protocol I 
(Krahmann, 2012: 355). Since the discourse of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Mercenaries and its successor, the Working Group on Mercenaries (established 
in 2005) showed a similar evolution, the application of existing mercenary 
conventions was compromised, and a new regulatory framework was called for 
(Krahmann 2012: 355-356). The ‘coup de grâce’ to the applicability of the 
mercenary conventions to PMSCs was given by the Draft UN International 
Convention on the Regulation, Oversight, and Monitoring of Private Military and 
Security Companies, which dropped any reference to the term ‘mercenary’ 
(Krahmann, 2012: 361). 
 
The next chapter will delve deeper into the recent and current discursive 
struggles on the future regulation of PMSCs. It will review how PMSCs have 
used their status as security professional to gain a decisive voice in the 
formulation of the newly developing regulatory framework.  
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5. Road to Regulation 
 
In 1997, the international community, through UN Secretary-General Annan, 
expressed its reluctance to engage with private military companies (which were 
still more or less consistently referred to as ‘mercenaries’), in the crises in Sierra 
Leone and the Great Lakes Region. At that time, Annan was not able to make 
“a distinction between respectable mercenaries and non-respectable 
mercenaries” (UN, 1997),42 hence the firm rejection of mercenaries and PMCs 
altogether. A decade and a half later, the UN makes “widespread” use of 
PMSCs (Østensen, 2011: 40). For some countries, the PMSC industry has 
evolved into an “essential, inevitable and international” industrial sector 
(Miliband, 2009: 5). What explains this shift from a reluctant and even 
“abolitionist” (Chesterman and Lehnardt, 2009: 1), normative attitude towards 
PMSCs to a receptive and positive stance? That is one of the questions in the 
debate on the appropriate organisation of military force spurred by the 
incongruousness of the existing normative dislike of mercenaries with the 
emergence of very similar PMCs. In the last decade, this debate revolved 
around multifarious initiatives on the future governance of the private military 
services industry. However, if the anti-mercenary norm is as strong as 
sometimes propagated (cf. Percy, 2007b), then why did these recent regulatory 
initiatives not arrive at a strengthening of existing anti-mercenary conventions 
rather than at the de facto legitimation of the industry? In other words, why did 
PMSCs become legitimate private providers of security?  
 
This chapter will apply insights from the cycle-theory of normative change to 
explain the process of legitimation of the private military industry. It corresponds 
to the argumentative stage in the cycle of norm change, where participants to 
the debate or the norm negotiators offer arguments in defence of a particular 
normative stance. We can compare it to a legitimation process, as a deliberate 
effort to convert the “existing” into the “acceptable” (Baum and McGahan, 2013: 
7). The previous chapters have shown that only a combination of material and 
normative factors can account for the scope and timing of the disappearance of 
                                                          
42
 The transcript of the press conference (on 12 June 1997) by the Secretary-General 
can be found at <http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/1997/19970612.sgsm6255.html>, 
(accessed 01/07/2014). 
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mercenary armies in the nineteenth century. Without taking into account the 
relevant normative framework, the historical manifestation of the organisation of 
military force is difficult to understand. Existing accounts of the emergence of 
contemporary PMSCs, however, seem to ignore this normative dimension. 
Despite acknowledging the decisive role of the neoliberal ideological 
environment, they predominantly focus on material factors, to the extent that 
supply and demand of military force becomes the main explanatory variable 
(Singer, 2003, Avant, 2005). Should we then dismiss the moral reluctance 
towards mercenaries as irrelevant in the case of PMSCs? In recapitulation, 
mercenaries were morally disapproved of because they use force outside 
legitimate control and because they are motivated primarily by selfish, financial 
reasons to resort to the use of force, instead of by the common good (Percy, 
2007a). It is difficult to see how this moral disapproval would not apply to 
PMSCs as private, for-profit enterprises that offer military and security services 
and that are driven by a “market oriented logic of action” (Branovič, 2011: 5).  
 
The state has successfully subsumed the above two requirements under its 
monopoly on legitimate violence. State sovereignty implies that within 
territorially demarcated borders, the state holds “supreme authority” (Barkin and 
Cronin, 1994: 111) and is the only institution that can legitimately use violence. 
This concept of state sovereignty, essentially a social construct (Biersteker and 
Weber, 1996), has pervaded international politics to such an extent that only 
sovereign states possess the “proper legitimate authority to wage war”, both in 
a moral as in a legal sense (Reitberger, 2013: 64). Even in the case of the use 
of force by an international organisation such as the UN (with the veto-right of 
the permanent members of the security council and the voluntary nature of 
national contributions to peacekeeping missions) and by a supranational 
organisation as the EU (with its formally intergovernmental foreign and security 
policy (Sjursen, 2011: 1082-1083)); decisions to act militarily can be traced back 
to the national decision-making level. Similarly, while mechanisms of 
appropriate control of armed forces might be imagined at a supra-state level, 
traditionally the responsibility to control armed forces falls to the state.  
 
However, as we saw, PMSCs and other non-state actors have launched a 
challenge to the state monopoly on legitimate violence, which led to the 
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reformulation of that monopoly. Now, the aim of the current British policy 
towards PMSCs is to reach a state of “effective voluntary regulation” of the 
industry (Simmonds, 2012). Self-regulation can be understood, following De 
Nevers (2010: 220), as the voluntary governance of an economic sector in 
which private actors develop binding guidelines “outside the governmental 
decision-making arena”, that exceed existing regulation. So the UK government 
will basically ‘anchor’ the self-regulation of the industry. This implies that the 
state retreats to a position of meta-governance (Kooiman, 2003, Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2009). Within the limits set by civil and criminal law, non-state actors 
are thus free to hire PMSCs and to authorise the potential use of force. When 
non-state clients hire PMSCs, the state leaves both the rowing and the steering 
to non-state actors (in the metaphor of Osborne and Gaebler (1992)).  
 
In addition to this self-regulation, the regulatory framework consists of the 
Montreux Document (that recalls existing state obligations), and the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. This chapter will 
demonstrate that the development of the new regulatory framework for PMSCs 
was not the result of the deliberate construction of a new norm. Instead, it 
emanated from an attempt to safeguard the outsourcing and privatisation 
practices of states and other PMSC clients against the criticisms generated by 
the notorious abuses that were delegitimising the industry. Following functional 
and political economic reasons, states were thus driven to outsource and 
privatise parts of their security and defence functions (Kruck, 2014). From a 
functionalist point of view, states use PMSCs as security experts “for the 
effective and cost-efficient pursuit” of their security goals in a highly 
technological and changing security environment (Kruck, 2014: 115). To 
entrench these practices against the objections of mostly NGOs and academics 
who uncovered the “culture of impunity” of the industry (Human Rights First, 
2008), states consequently had to balance the functional usefulness of the 
industry with these legitimate concerns. On the one hand, a perceived lack of 
legitimacy and accountability of the private military industry did not only provoke 
NGO criticism, but more directly undermined the effectiveness of military 
operations in Iraq. The US-led counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq (between 2003 
and 2007) were seriously hampered by the lack of support from the local 
population that resulted in part from irresponsible behaviour by PMSC 
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personnel43 (Thurnher, 2008). On the other hand, this lack of legitimacy also 
denies PMSCs market opportunities. Blackwater provides an illustration of this 
last observation as it currently performs under the name Academi, after having 
been renamed Xe Services only in 2009. Both name changes were due to the 
negative image that hampered attracting new contracts.44 The above shows that 
both governments and PMSCs were united in a strive towards the legitimation 
of the industry. In the UK, this coalition of interests forms the core of the 
influence of PMSCs and their authority in the debate on the future regulation of 
PMSCs. While civil society participants may have brought valid arguments to 
the table, these were less ‘usable’ for state decision-makers. That is, the 
promises they made were less certain to produce beneficial outcomes. 
 
This chapter traces the process towards the new regulation, and de facto 
legitimation, of PMSCs. It shows how the norms against private violence and on 
the state monopoly on violence have shaped, and were themselves reshaped 
by, the interaction of diverse norm entrepreneurs. The processes described in 
this analysis resemble a cycle of norm change: a period of uncertainty (cf. 
chapter four) opened up an opportunity for diverse political and norm 
entrepreneurs to create a new governance framework. This is the stage this 
chapter focuses on. If we accept legal stipulations as the reflection (Thomas, 
2001) and formal codification (Sandholtz and Stiles, 2009: 1) of norms, or as 
“efforts to harness the independent regulatory power of social norms” (Posner, 
2002: 8); a closer look into the formal process of drafting the new regulatory 
framework should reveal which norm entrepreneurs have decisively influenced 
the regulatory outcome. Following this reasoning, I will conceptualise the recent 
governance initiatives as the result of a discursive negotiation between diverse 
political and norm entrepreneurs. This conceptualisation resembles Steffek’s 
(2003) discursive approach to the legitimation of international governance. 
Steffek (2003: 267) sees international governance as a “negotiated consensus 
on the scope, the principles and the procedure of the regime” which is 
subsequently legitimised through a process of legal-rational (cf. Weber, 1978) 
justification. Steffek (2003: 263) adds that legitimate governance 
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 Most notably the Falluhja killings by Blackwater employees in 2007. 
44
 Ukman (2011) ‘Ex-Blackwater firm gets name change, again.’ <http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ex-blackwater-firm-gets-a-
name-change-again/2011/12/12/gIQAXf4YpO_blog.html>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
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characteristically involves a “rational exchange of arguments” that will lead 
rational participants in the debate to reach an agreement. This model shows 
similarities to the process through which the private military industry has 
recently been governed. However, Steffek’s (2003: 251) view on legal-rational 
governance as the “institutionalization of rational communication about means, 
ends and values” might overstate the rationality of the exchange of arguments 
and ignore the material resources that underlie every successful attempt to 
participate in the debate. Steffek’s account heavily draws on Habermas’ (1988: 
105) notion of “communicative rationality”, which designates how norms are 
rationally agreed upon after argumentation and deliberation. While recognizing 
the validity of the negotiation approach, Elgström (2000: 458) argues that this 
logic of communicative action is only one of two analytical logics to make sense 
of norm spread. A second logic is the “logic of instrumentality rationality”, in 
which “calculations about utility maximization” guide behaviour (Elgström, 2000: 
450). Indeed, the remainder of this chapter shows that indeed this instrumental 
rationality has guided norm negotiations on the PMSC industry. In this respect, 
the coinciding interests of PMSCs and state decision-makers proved decisive 
for further norm negotiations. In other words, norm negotiations do not take 
place in an ideal-speech situation, where the arguments are considered 
rationally and where the most convincing argument eventually prevails. 
 
Section 5.1 traces the process of the British approach of self-governance of the 
industry. In the patchwork of international humanitarian law, human rights law, 
mercenary conventions, contract law and self-regulation, national approaches 
cannot be seen in separation from international initiatives. Therefore, section 
5.2 delves deeper into the development of the Montreux Document, while 
section 5.3 analyses the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers, an industry initiative. Let us briefly recall that these initiatives 
emerged against a similar international background. The first PMSCs, (then 
called PMCs), emerged in an uncertain international environment, closely after 
the collapse of the bipolar world order in which traditional power relations were 
obscured. What is more, the most notable instances of PMC operations, - such 
as Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone and Sandline in Sierra 
Leone and Papua New Guinea -took place in the global periphery in all but 
lawless societies. On a global scale, it was exactly this state of “global 
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ungovernance” (Leander, 2002: 1), or at least the governance in flux, that 
provided a fertile breeding ground for PMSCs. Yet, their unregulated behaviour 
posed negative corollaries for diverse actors involved.  
 
5.1 British Road to Regulation 
 
Paramount in every UK defence review in the last two decades is the uncertain 
political and security environment of the post-Cold War era. Another constant 
element is the British ambition to remain a prominent actor on the world stage. 
In his foreword to the 1998 ‘Strategic Defence Review’, George Robertson, then 
Secretary of State for Defence, expressed Britain’s ambition to be a leading 
“force for good” on the world stage where it would take up its responsibilities 
inspired by an internationalist “instinct” (UK MOD, 1998: §19). More than a 
decade later, in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, this ambition 
has not changed fundamentally. British responsibilities and ambitions remain 
“global”. To support them, the UK will continue to stand out as “one of very few 
countries able to deploy a self-sustaining, properly equipped brigade-sized force 
anywhere around the world and sustain it indefinitely” (Cameron and Clegg, 
2010: 4). Consecutive cuts in troop levels in the 1990s and 2000s (Taylor, 2012: 
227-228) and in the defence budget45 of the 1990s were thus not followed by a 
cut in ambition. Part of the solution to cure a nascent capabilities gap was to 
free up resources to spend on weapon systems by reducing the number of 
personnel directly employed (Walker and Whyte, 2005: 652). To remedy a 
capabilities deficit, a matching policy was to turn to PMSCs for support 
activities, in the form of outsourcing or public-private-partnerships (Ortiz, 2009: 
39), among which the private finance initiatives (Parker and Hartley, 2003). To 
translate the British ambitions into actual policy outcomes, the support of 
contractors is now an “essential component of the ability to both deploy and 
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 In constant prices the 1990s saw a reduction of the UK Defence budget. Cf Ministry 
of Defence (2002): <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140116142443 
/http://www.dasa.mod.uk/publications/UK-defence-statistics-
compendium/2002/2002.pdf>, NATO (2014): 
<http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-
Defence-exp.pdf> and NATO (2012): <http://www.nato.int/ 
nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.pdf>, 
(websites accessed 01/07/2014).  
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sustain the UK’s military instrument” (Heidenkamp, 2012: 1). What is more, 
private sector investments are the quintessential development strategy 
propagated by the British Government to rebuild post war economies. This 
technique involves the privatisation (instead of the mere outsourcing) of military 
force. Enduring security threats in Iraq, for instance, drive an “ongoing 
requirement for private security support” (Maskell, 2013: 13). The Iraq British 
Business Council (IBBC), which assembles diverse trade, industry and 
investment sectors, has as part of its aim to “build Iraq” (IBBC, 2014) a project 
to which PMSCs, as “commerce facilitators” (Ortiz, 2010: 103-104) are 
indispensable. 
 
Although outsourcing and privatisation in the British armed forces is not 
unprecedented,46 its growing speed and impact (Walker and Whyte, 2005: 653) 
forced the government, under public pressure, to consider questions on the 
legality and legitimacy of PMSCs. The clarification of these issues became an 
urgent need since, in the mid-1990s the near-entanglement of the UK in the civil 
war of Sierra Leone had shown that an unregulated industry might prove 
harmful for British national interests. This debate can be summarized in the 
discussion on the UK Green Paper entitled Private Military Companies: Options 
for Regulation.  
 
Throughout the Cold War, and until at least the 1980s, the British government 
maintained close relations with what most aptly can be labelled mercenaries 
(Kinsey, 2006: 43). Building upon a common history in the service of the British 
Army during the Second World War and on personal ties and “shared political 
views” between British government elites and mercenaries; an “informal 
network” emerged which opened up the opportunity for the British Government 
to covertly promote its policy interests abroad (Kinsey, 2006: 44). This informal 
network, combined with MI6 supervision ensured that this mercenary activity 
was in line with national interests (Kinsey, 2006: 44). From the middle of the 
1970s onwards, a new wave of globalisation and international terrorist attacks 
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 The protection of domestic military bases has already been devolved to private 
guards since the 1980s. In the middle of the 1980s, the Royal Ordnance Factories 
were also privatised, followed, at the beginning of the 1990s by the Royal Dockyards at 
Devonport and Rosyth (Walker and Whyte, 2005: 653). 
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created the environment for companies to frame their private military services 
as a “legitimate commercial activity” and simultaneously to retreat from the 
clandestine mercenary activities (Kinsey, 2006: 50-51). In addition, the mid-
1980s saw private military entities assume a more or less formalised corporate 
structure that came to replace their previous ad hoc organisation (Kinsey, 2006: 
64). In an effort to shake off their mercenary reputation, emerging PMCs took on 
a legal identity, stressed their commercial business profit objectives, and limited 
their dealings with governments to commercial relations (Whyte, 2003, Kinsey, 
2006: 64). Although the changing security environment after the end of the Cold 
War forced governments to rethink their foreign policy and defence strategies, 
the British government did not perceive the activities of PMCs as problematic or 
in conflict with its own foreign policy and in the 1980s and 1990s, the interaction 
between PMCs and government officials still happened on a largely informal 
basis, without written procedural rules (Kinsey, 2006: 59-64). Since then, 
however, the interests of the private companies began to alienate from those of 
government: “while the companies sought an open relationship with the 
commercial world, leaving behind the secret world, government officials had not 
yet realized that such a shift had occurred” (Kinsey, 2006: 69). This alienation of 
interests explains the friction between these two partners. 
 
5.1.1 Green Paper on Private Military Companies 
 
The Green Paper ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ published 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in February 2002 finds its 
origins in a recommendation of the Foreign Affairs Committee in its second 
report on British involvement in Sierra Leone.47 It was the lack of formally 
clarified procedural rules that led to the dubious British involvement in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state (the so-called ‘Sandline’ or ‘Arms to Africa’ 
affair). This arms to Africa affair further involved the UK in the circumvention of a 
UN arms embargo to the embarrassment of the New Labour Government and 
its “’ethical’ foreign policy” (Walker and Whyte, 2005: 658). The British case 
demonstrates that the tacit approval of private involvement in the internal affairs 
                                                          
47 In this report, the Foreign Affairs Committee (1998: § 96) recommends the 
publication of “a Green Paper outlining legislative options for the control of private 
military companies which operate out of the United Kingdom, its dependencies and the 
British Islands”. 
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of another state backfired against the UK’s interests. Existing legislation, such 
as the 1870 Foreign Enlistment Act, was unable to prevent the ‘Arms to Africa’ 
affair and the 2001 Private Security Act and the 2002 Export Control Act were 
ill-designed to apply to PMCs (Joachim, 2010: 13-14). Rather than a deliberate 
strategy for the facilitation of state-corporate crime, as proposed by Whyte 
(2003), the impetus behind the new regulatory initiative was, in my view, the 
discrepancy between on the one hand the functional and political economic 
incentives towards hiring PMSCs and on the other hand, the existing normative 
framework on state sovereignty and the state monopoly on force. Not in the 
least, the tacit approval of PMC intervention in a sovereign state and the 
disrespect for the arms embargo compromised the ‘neutrality’ of the UK. Let us 
recall that it was exactly this neutrality that was the main explanatory factor in 
the disappearance of mercenaries (Thomson, 1994).  
 
To avoid a repeat, the aim of the paper was to formulate options for regulating 
PMCs outside UK territory after a “constructive debate” (FCO, 2002: 5) with 
contributions from a variety of stakeholders interested in this matter, including 
NGOs, corporations, members of parliament and interested individuals (FCO, 
2002: 27). Jack Straw (2002a: 4), then Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, acknowledges the need to rethink the role and 
composition of the armed forces after the end of the Cold War and especially for 
what is concerned the contribution of the private sector. In his foreword to the 
Green Paper, he confirms the previously mentioned uncertainty: “The post Cold 
War world has given rise both to new problems and new opportunities. In many 
areas, we need to test the received wisdom against an evolving post Cold War 
reality”. The Green Paper thus sets out the contours of the debate. Underlying 
the paper is the recognition that reliable data on the PMC industry are difficult to 
obtain, which induces the FCO to base its report on estimations and secondary 
sources. Another leitmotif is the discourse on the comparative advantage of 
PMCs vis-à-vis the state’s armed services. In his foreword, Straw (FCO, 2002: 
4) consistently stresses that PMCs have a potential of realizing significant cost 
reductions and might allow the UN to respond “more rapidly and more 
effectively in crises”. 
 
In the Green Paper, the FCO (2002: 14-15) draws a sketch of the early twenty 
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first century private military industry and highlights some topics structuring the 
debate on PMCs: PMCs might hamper transparency of the use of military force 
and thus obscure mechanisms of accountability, particularly in comparison with 
the use of force by the national armed forces. The FCO (2002: 15) furthermore 
acknowledges that PMCs might be a threat to sovereignty, although it does not 
take the “extreme point of view” of then UN Special Rapporteur on the Use of 
Mercenaries, Ballesteros, who, based on an equation of mercenaries and 
PMCs, considers the latter a threat to national sovereignty, regardless of the 
authority that employs them. In comparison, the FCO (2002: 15) takes a more 
reluctant approach and attributes more importance to whether PMCs are under 
the control of a legitimate authority. This being said, the Green Paper also cites 
some examples of PMC involvement in the extraction of mineral resources to 
indicate that PMCs might contribute to economic exploitation and might have a 
“vested interest in conflict”, which might cause them to offer their services to 
different actors in a conflict (FCO, 2002: 16-17). On this last issue, the drafters 
of the Green Paper argue that reputation is a central incentive for PMCs not to 
switch sides or to unnecessarily prolong conflict (FCO, 2002: 17). The same 
argument applies to the concern on the human rights abuses of which PMCs 
are frequently accused. The Green Paper (FCO, 2002: 17) asks whether these 
abuses are “inherent in the nature of PMCs” (in which case they would be 
difficult to prevent), and in response repeats that reputation and future business 
opportunities might, on the contrary, encourage PMCs to abide by human rights 
law. Later in the document, the FCO (2002: 19) partly repeats this line of 
argument when it argues against the use of “double standards” in judging 
national armed forces versus PMCs, since misconduct, abuses and problems 
with accountability are not inherent in PMCs, but have also been documented in 
the case of uniformed personnel. 
 
Against the accusation that governments frequently hire PMCs to act as 
proxies, the FCO (2002: 18) objects that these allegations, while sometimes 
true, are very hard to prove and do not constitute an argument against PMCs, 
but rather in favour of more transparency. The moral repugnance against 
fighting for financial gain is also cited as a substantial argument against the use 
of PMCs. However, the FCO (2002: 18) adds that these moral objections do not 
as such render the complete private military industry illegal, as such: 
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For a state under threat from armed insurgents or from 
criminal gangs with a military capability, the first 
requirement is to re-establish its monopoly on violence. 
The temporary use of a PMC to do this may occasionally 
be the only realistic option available. It may be cheaper 
and will certainly be quicker than attempting to train 
national forces (who may bring with them a risk of coup 
d’état). 
 
A final consideration concerns the use of PMCs in international operations. On 
this issue, the FCO (2002: 20) takes into account the reluctance of the UN, but 
nevertheless argues for a wider debate. It concludes that, if political support 
could be found, the use of PMCs in international operations might circumvent 
two common difficulties. Firstly, it might alleviate recruitment problems for UN 
missions, frequently staffed with poorly trained and badly equipped forces. 
Secondly, contracting by the UN might circumvent some of the problems 
encountered by sovereign states in their contracts with PMCs.  
 
The Green Paper subsequently proceeds into its core matter, namely an outline 
of the “scope for government action” (FCO, 2002: 20). Two general 
considerations are taken into account to make the case for regulation. First, 
historical experience has shown that the establishment of state control over 
non-state violence from the eighteenth century onwards has considerably 
reigned in “risks of misunderstanding, exploitation and conflict”. Second, private 
military services do not equal ordinary commercial transactions, but carry with 
them significant risks for the integrity of people and for the stability in the region 
(FCO, 2002: 20). Apart from these observations, the case for regulation is 
framed in terms of direct British interests abroad. Keeping in mind the impetus 
to this report, namely the obscure involvement of British officials in the Sierra 
Leone civil war, the Green Paper argues that PMC activity abroad might 
interfere with British foreign policy, undermine Britain’s reputation, endanger 
lives of British citizens and lead to a situation in which British forces might 
confront a British company (FCO, 2002: 21). By drawing up guidelines, a 
regulatory initiative “could help establish a respectable and therefore more 
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employable industry” (FCO, 2002: 21). The ineffectiveness of the existing 
international regulatory regime leads the drafters of the Green Paper (FCO, 
2002: 21-22) to make a case for a regulatory system on a national basis, for 
which three broad options are subsequently presented.  
 
The first option consists of a complete ban on the delivery of military services 
outside UK territory or, in a derived form, of banning recruitment for that activity 
(FCO, 2002: 22-23). This option seems the most straightforward way of dealing 
with these problems, but encounters a number of problems. Most notably, they 
concern enforcement (because British courts have to prosecute crimes taking 
place abroad) and the definition of the military activities concerned (FCO, 2002: 
22-23). More substantially, such a ban would restrict the individual liberty of 
people wanting to work for PMCs and would hamper legitimate governments in 
hiring PMCs (FCO, 2002: 23). Last but not least, “a blanket ban would deprive 
British defence exporters of legitimate business” (FCO, 2002: 23). An 
alternative might consist in a licensing or registration regime, which would allow 
for the government the opportunity to prohibit certain services if contrary to its 
policy objectives. The third option amounts to self-regulation in the form of a 
voluntary code of conduct by an industry association (FCO, 2002: 26). 
Adherence to the code would then be seen as a sign of respectability and would 
enhance the reputation of the company. In this regard, self-regulation relieves 
the government of devising burdensome and “unenforceable” regulatory 
mechanisms and transfers responsibility to the industry itself, which undeniably 
has an information advantage (FCO, 2002: 27). However, the difficulties of self-
regulation are substantial as it would fail to meet an important regulatory 
objective, namely to avoid that British companies damage British interests: “The 
lack of legal backing would mean that the Government might be compelled to 
watch while a company pursued a course that was plainly contrary to the public 
interest”. Another risk of self-regulation is that the industry association might 
lack sufficient resources to monitor and investigate compliance, causing 
difficulties if it should step up to a major member (FCO, 2002: 27). 
 
The cost-benefit analysis of potential regulation of the private military services 
industry added in an annex to the Green Paper not only indicates that the 
proposed regulatory schemes entail various costs and benefits. It also, and 
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more fundamentally, characterises the tone of the Green Paper. Underlying the 
entire Green Paper is a consideration for the protection and promotion of British 
interests, both commercial and political. In this light, regulation would mean an 
“administrative and financial burden on both government and the private sector” 
(FCO, 2002: 44). Although regulation might prevent PMCs harming British 
foreign policy, too strict a regulation would itself undermine British commercial 
export interests (FCO, 2002: 45-46). The leeway for stringent regulation is 
therefore significantly reduced.  
 
In reaction to the Green Paper, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
Commons (FAC) published a report based on oral and written evidence from a 
variety of organisations and individuals, from the governmental as well as the 
non-governmental and corporate sector. The FAC thus draws upon external 
sources of information and hereby acknowledges that reliable information on 
the PMC sector is hard to obtain (FAC, 2002: 6, §6). The FAC (2002: 7, §13) 
underwrites most of the suggestions of the FCO, not in the least that PMC 
regulation might be a tool to promote a “reputable” private military industry. On 
the topic of accountability of PMCs, the FAC (2002: 15-16, §41, §44) observes 
that PMC employees, in contrast to defence forces, are not held to an “oath of 
allegiance”, a “military legal code” or a transparent command structure or any 
other international legal instruments such as the International Criminal Court. In 
contrast, the testimony by Tim Spicer, former CEO of Sandline International and 
of Aegis Defense Services, indicated that “sufficient checks and balances could 
be established”, most notably by coupling national and international regulatory 
mechanisms, supplemented with media coverage and contractual enforcement 
(FAC, 2002: 15, §43). In disagreement with the UN Special Rapporteur’s 1999 
report to the Human Rights Council - in which Ballesteros argued that PMCs 
can offer services at a high cost-efficiency because they fail to take appropriate 
measures to respect international humanitarian law and human rights law - 
PMCs themselves “argue that the vetting procedures carried out by reputable 
companies ought to reduce the likelihood that employees might commit human 
rights abuses” (FAC, 2002: 18, §58). The favourable reputation and the 
concomitant commercial business opportunities would, according to this logic, 
serve as an incentive to respect relevant legal stipulations. However, the FAC 
(2002: 19 §62) does not share this optimism and is “not convinced that the 
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checks and balances that apply to national armed forces can ever be applied 
with equal strength to the employees of PMCs”, partly for the reason that PMC 
abuse might escape public scrutiny. Still, PMCs can have a favourable impact 
upon an unstable situation and the FAC shares the view that a professional and 
properly regulated industry might stabilise a situation by creating the conditions 
for a more fundamental solution; although it also agrees with the Campaign 
Against Arms Trade (CAAT) that PMCs are incapable of fully solving the 
underlying political, social and economic sources of conflict (FAC, 2002: 19-20, 
§§63-67). The FAC (2002: 20, §§69-71) further shares the concern of the CAAT 
that PMCs might serve as proxies for governments to avoid public criticism and 
argue for transparent links with legitimate companies. The FAC thus takes the 
position that legitimate clients might indeed have legitimate security needs that 
can be resolved by PMCs. 
 
The relation between PMCs’ actions abroad and British foreign policy objectives 
informs much of the discussions in the FAC report and a regulatory framework 
should prevent British PMCs to carry out operations in contradiction with British 
defence and foreign policy (FAC, 2002: 22, §§76-78). Related to this, to prevent 
British forces being drawn into high-risk rescue operations, the FAC (2002: 22-
23, §82) proposes a “though, contract specific licencing regime, combined with 
a mechanism that vetted companies for competence” to drive unprofessional 
PMCs out of the market. The section on the consideration of the benefits of 
PMCs shows some friction and uneasiness with the UN Special Rapporteur, 
who takes the view that the protection of national sovereignty, territory and 
human rights is the “inalienable responsibility of the state” (FAC, 2002: 24, §83). 
The FAC takes a more pragmatic stance on this issue, although it has been 
informed by a similar motivation, namely guaranteeing the security of the 
citizens. In recognition of that task, the FAC (2002: 24, §84) sees an opportunity 
for PMCs to come into the picture, in the absence of foreign assistance from 
other states, international organisations, or the UN. Furthermore, the FAC 
(2002: 24-26, §§85-93) concedes that some services already provided by PMCs 
to international organisations are legitimate, for instance “security guarding, 
logistic support and de-mining”; and that the operational lethargy and 
inefficiency of the UN might be remedied by a more extensive use of PMCs, 
although this would probably generate negative reactions by some UN member 
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states. The same reasoning might apply to PMCs supporting the operations of 
humanitarian organisations (FAC, 2002: 26, §96). The following excerpt 
illustrates the frame of reference:  
 
If regulation of the private military sector resulted in the 
development of a transparent, trusted industry in the 
United Kingdom, further commercial involvement at the 
low intensity end of UN peace operations might become 
increasingly acceptable to member states. If this helped to 
increase the speed and efficiency of UN reactions, to 
ensure the enforcement of UN Security Council 
resolutions, and to prevent further atrocities such as those 
committed in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, then 
such regulations should be welcomed (FAC, 2002: 26, 
§95). 
 
Characteristically for the British case, PMCs might alleviate the overstretch of 
the British armed forces. At this point, the argument is heard that PMCs might 
perform some services more cost-effectively in comparison to the armed forces. 
Therefore, they might be suited to reduce the overstretch of the armed forces by 
taking over non-combat roles (FAC, 2002: 27-28, §101).  
 
The FAC’s reflection on the propositions of the FCO is shaped by their belief 
“that a properly regulated private military sector can make a positive 
contribution to international security” (FAC, 2002: 29, §102). With this in mind, 
the FAC is opposed to a complete ban on private military services, not only 
because PMCs might positively affect international security, but also because 
such a ban would be “counterproductive” and urge these companies to relocate 
overseas (FAC, 2002: 29, §102). However, partial bans on private military 
services, (e.g. on combat operations), might prevent PMCs from committing 
human rights abuses (FAC, 2002: 29, §§103-105). The option of an export 
license regime for military and security services on a case-by-case basis is 
supported as the preferred option provided it takes into account legitimate 
concerns of the PMC industry to decide quickly and effectively on export 
applications - a concern that has frequently been aired by the industry (FAC, 
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2002: 32, §§119-124). Consequently, it falls to the government to decide which 
operations and services would require a license and to issue guidelines on the 
permissibility of PMC operations (FAC, 2002: 31, §§117-118). On self-
regulation, an option that is supported by some PMCs, the report argues that a 
voluntary code of conduct can help establish a company’s reputation, but in and 
of itself is “insufficient” for the same reason mentioned previously, namely that 
the government would have no leverage to prevent companies from acting 
against British interests (FAC, 2002: 35, §137). To its discussion of the Green 
Paper proposals, the Report adds an alternative in the form of the creation of a 
“publicly funded cadre of former service personnel”, who might offer non-
combat services under government supervision (FAC, 2002: 35, §140). 
 
The consequences of taking no regulatory action, in terms of damage to British 
political and economic interests seem so pressing that the drafters of this report 
argue for a “strong regulatory regime” including a general licence for PMCs, 
complemented with government permission for each individual contract (FAC, 
2002: 40, §162). The fundamental consideration to be made by the government 
remains that “a strong regulatory regime would need a substantial enforcement 
mechanism to ensure its credibility” and this, in turn, requires significant 
governmental and private sector investments (FAC, 2002: 40, §163). The FAC 
concludes its report with a recommendation that the government should 
”consider very carefully how to ensure that the benefits of permitting a regulated 
private military sector operating from the United Kingdom are not outweighed by 
the costs of establishing and maintaining a regime for their regulation” (FAC, 
2002: 40, §163). At its core, this is an economic consideration.  
 
In his response to the FAC’s report, Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Straw (2002: 1) welcomes the FAC’s positive judgment 
of PMCs, that are considered to “have the potential to make a legitimate and 
valuable contribution to international security”. Straw therefore identifies a 
double aim of regulation; first, to prevent abuses and second to allow the 
government to “maximize the benefits that a properly regulated private military 
sector can bring” (Straw, 2002: 1). The FAC and the Government thus broadly 
endorse the same policy objective: regulation to maximize benefits. Neither the 
FAC nor the Government opts for a confrontational policy, but both want to 
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minimize the risks of employing PMCs while maximizing the benefits. In this line 
of thought, the Government argues against a complete ban of private military 
services abroad. When considering a licensing and regulatory regime, the 
Secretary of State repeatedly stresses the delicate task of finding a balance 
between ensuring effective regulation on the one hand, and avoiding an undue 
administrative burden for the PMCs concerned, on the other hand (Straw, 2002: 
5). A similar balance must be struck between “the need for informed decision-
making and client confidentiality” (Straw, 2002: 5). With regard to a voluntary 
regulatory code, opinions between the FAC and the government appear to 
diverge. The FAC holds the opinion that a voluntary code of conduct would not 
offer the government sufficient measures to prohibit PMC activities from 
damaging UK interests abroad (Straw, 2002: 6). The reaction of the government 
is more inclined to the position of the industry that has suggested a voluntary 
code of conduct. The Government therefore “notes” the conclusion of the FAC 
and “considers that it would in any case be in the interests of reputable private 
military companies to draw up a voluntary code of conduct. Adherence to this 
code could become a factor in any decisions taken under a regulatory regime” 
(Straw, 2002: 6). At the heart of not only this Government response, but also the 
FAC recommendations lies in the recognition that PMCs might offer legitimate 
services (which have yet to be clearly defined), and that a regulatory regime 
should balance administrative costs with the “costs and benefits of the activities 
of PMCs” (Straw, 2002: 7). 
 
Notably, the outbreak of the Iraq war, closely after this debate on the Green 
Paper did not only stall the regulatory process, but also tipped the balance in 
favour of the self-regulation of the industry. The UK war effort in Iraq would have 
proved untenable without private sector support and PMSCs have 
demonstrated their pragmatic legitimacy in Iraq (Kruck, 2014: 124-125). More 
generally, contractor support enhances the policy options in both financial and 
foreign policy, which may positively reflect on British society more generally, as 
it is the ultimate beneficiary of an effective, but financially less burdensome 
British defence policy (Heidenkamp, 2012: 16). Heidenkamp (2012: 27) 
analyses that contractor support to operations is essential in the UK because, 
on the one hand, public demand for a “light military footprint” and on the other 
hand, “the operational need for specialist technological capabilities and niche 
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skills”. In addition to this “audience-specific” pragmatic legitimacy, Elms and 
Phillips (2009: 411-412) note that the readiness of prospective employees to 
work for these companies and of financiers to invest in them strengthen the 
pragmatic legitimacy vis-à-vis other audiences. However, when the industry 
grew in size and attracted more media attention, pragmatic legitimacy seemed 
insufficient to gain acceptance in the broader public domain (Elms and Phillips, 
2009: 412).  
 
Both defensive and reputational factors have stimulated efforts of self-regulation 
in the private military and security industry. On the defensive side, companies 
have adopted self-regulation to escape top-down state regulation (De Nevers, 
2009: 493). Following Donald (2006) the urge to avoid government regulation is 
an explanatory factor for the industry’s proactive attitude towards self-
regulation. The “first-mover advantage” may offer companies the opportunity to 
arrive at less demanding standards than would be the case if instigated by state 
regulation (De Nevers, 2009: 493-494). The reputational stimulus is driven by 
the assumption that a favourable, high-standard reputation might provide new 
market opportunities and generate greater public trust (De Nevers, 2009: 494, 
De Nevers, 2010: 222-223). Indeed, both factors can be discerned in the British 
case. The British Association of Private Security Companies was established as 
a trade association in 2006 and aimed to “promote the interests and regulate 
the activities of UK linked firms that provide armed defensive security services 
in countries outside the UK” (BAPSC, 2013). The BAPSC has propagated self-
regulation as the most appropriate way to ensure compliance with international 
humanitarian and human rights law. A good reputation was considered a 
sufficient informal sanction mechanism to secure a responsible industry via 
“peer pressure and shaming” (De Nevers, 2010: 224). The relation between the 
UK government and the BAPSC is based on trust, since the charter of the 
BAPSC stipulated that members would have to decline contracts endangering 
UK interests and values (Ranganathan, 2010: 324). Additionally, Bearpark and 
Schulz (2009), members of the BAPSC, point out the informational advantage 
of PMSCs, over external observers. Thirdly, in 2008 the Montreux Document 
had already alleviated the most pressing concerns on human rights and 
international humanitarian law abuses, which granted the UK government some 
room to manoeuvre.   
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5.1.2 Consultation on Promoting High Standards of Conduct by Private Military 
and Security Companies 
 
In the context sketched above, the government repeated its consultation 
exercise, although from a different perspective. The aim was not longer to 
consult the public on the most appropriate policy towards PMSCs, but to collect 
information on how best to achieve the predetermined policy of promoting high 
standards of PMSC conduct (FCO, 2009a: 1). Again, this shows that the 
executive still pulls the strings when it comes to setting the terms of the 
negotiations. This consultation, launched by the Conflict Group of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office in February 2009, invited interested stakeholders to 
share their views on the following government proposal in order to strengthen it: 
“to promote high standards in the industry by working with the relevant trade 
association, using our status as a key buyer, and increasing international 
standards through international cooperation” (FCO, 2009a: 2). The delineation 
of the scope of the consultation indicates that a national licensing regime is no 
longer on the table as a viable option (FCO, 2009a: 3, 12-13).  Keeping in mind 
the key role for PMSCs in the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, then 
Foreign Affairs Secretary David Miliband (FCO 2009a: 5) clearly sets out the 
basic outlines of this consultation and of any future policy on PMSCs: 
 
The PMSC industry is essential, inevitable and 
international. It is essential, because people need 
protecting in dangerous countries; inevitable, because 
governments cannot deploy protection in all theatres; 
and international, because the market and suppliers are 
global. Any proposal by the British Government needs to 
recognise both this industry’s positive and legitimate role 
globally, as well as the geographic extent of arenas in 
which PMSCs operate. 
 
Milliband adds that any regulation should be based on international cooperation 
since the PMSC industry operates globally (FCO, 2009a: 5). Reminiscent of 
previous observations, the 2009 consultation hinges on a double consideration. 
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First, both the government and NGOs fundamentally depend on PMSCs to 
secure their operations in the hostile environments of for instance Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Second, PMSCs may nevertheless compromise human rights or 
humanitarian law and “assist internal repression, or provoke or prolong internal 
or regional tension” (FCO, 2009a: 6). But even this second consideration is 
framed in terms of the risk of disgracing the industry.  
 
Even more than the Green Paper, this consultation reveals the role of agenda-
setting power in guiding the policy outcome. A 2005 review of regulatory options 
by Whitehall officials had already revealed that a licensing regime would fail to 
meet the objectives of promoting high standards of conduct and that this aim 
would more likely be met by self-regulation via an industry association in 
international cooperation. This consultation therefore prompts stakeholders to 
share their views on the measures proposed to strengthen the high standards of 
the industry (FCO, 2009a: 6). The common theme of the propositions is the 
cooperation between the government and the industry. The policy proposal 
open for consultation consists of three interrelated objectives:  
 
a) Working with the UK industry to promote high 
standards through a code of conduct agreed with and 
monitored by the Government. b) Using our status as a 
key buyer to contract only those companies that 
demonstrate that they operate to high standards. c) An 
international approach to promote higher global 
standards, based on key elements of the UK approach 
(FCO 2009a: 8). 
 
The summary of responses, published by the FCO (2009b), does not show any 
major modification of these objectives and methods in the UK’s policy. This 
implies that the meetings between Lord Malloch Brown, PMSC and NGO 
representatives and the BAPSC did not lead to a questioning of the overarching 
objectives. Nor did the individual meetings between stakeholders and FCO 
officials. Nor did the twenty five responses received during the consultation 
(FCO, 2009b: 5). Of these responses, seven came from NGOs, seven from 
PMSCs, three from trade associations, four from academics, two from the 
121  
general public, one from an international organisation and one from a security 
auditor (FCO, 2009b: 5).  
 
Somewhat more surprisingly, the FCO also saw “no conclusive evidence” being 
offered to call into question the composite package of the Consultation 
Document as the best option to reach the objective of high industry standards 
(FCO, 2009b: 6). Despite the fact that more than one third of the respondents 
having suggested a legislative initiative for the regulation of PMSCs (e.g. a 
licensing or registration regime), the government dismissed this option because 
it identified severe difficulties to its enforcement and because it did not receive 
“convincing evidence during the consultation period to suggest that a legislative 
approach would successfully meet its objectives” (FCO 2009b: 7). Furthermore, 
the government considers legislation to be too costly for small companies as 
well as it implies the risk of the industry’s relocation offshore (FCO, 2009b: 17). 
With regard to a code of conduct for PMSCs, government involvement would be 
limited to monitoring the implementation of the code (FCO, 2009b: 11). PMSCs 
that fulfil the “minimum requirement of standards” may be members of the 
association, but EU law forbids the government to make membership of the UK 
trade or monitoring association a requirement for bidding for government 
contracts (FCO, 2009b: 11). Since the latter would be a violation of EU law, it is 
sufficient that companies fulfill “equivalent standards” (FCO, 2009b: 11). The 
government sees the code of conduct as a mechanism to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian and human rights law (FCO, 2009b: 12). To prevent 
states using a PMSC as a straw man to circumvent their obligations under 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, the code “would provide 
guidance on what functions PMSCs should or should not perform” and would 
restrict PMSC services to defensive tasks (FCO, 2009b: 12). The use of force 
by PMSCs will not be prohibited, but depends on client needs and the particular 
security environment. It will be based upon the relevant stipulations in 
international humanitarian law and human rights law (FCO, 2009b: 12). 
 
Ultimately, the government aims to use the code of conduct as a mechanism to 
promote a transparent industry (FCO, 2009b: 12). The industry will be involved 
in the drafting of the code to give their opinion on client confidentiality and 
similar issues (FCO, 2009b: 12). The government would demand two kinds of 
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reports from the trade association or the monitoring body. The first assesses 
PMSCs’ “compliance” with the above-mentioned standards, while a second kind 
of report would recounts the incidents involving an association member (FCO, 
2009b: 14). In reaction to the responses of the consultation, the government 
concedes that conflicts of interest might arise if the auditing is to be performed 
by the trade association itself, since the latter might be dependent on the 
membership fees of the member in case. As such, it might be hesitant to 
impose sanctions (FCO, 2009b: 14). To counter this critique, the government 
will evaluate which existing public or private compliance or auditing 
organisations are most able to assume this function and considers the 
secondment of government experts (FCO, 2009b: 14). The government refers 
responsibility for the implementation and monitoring of the code of conduct to 
the trade association or monitoring body (FCO, 2009b: 16). This implies that the 
trade association or monitoring body should annually report to the government 
on its audit and compliance findings (FCO, 2009b: 16). Consultation between 
government officials and NGO representatives might enhance the availability of 
information, but “Government officials would remain the official point of contact” 
(FCO, 2009b: 16).  
 
The government relies heavily on the reputational consequences for companies 
transgressing the stipulations of eventual codes of conduct and does not 
consider prohibiting disreputable companies from bidding for future contracts as 
a viable policy option. Rather, its proposed policy amounts to the following: 
“PMSCs would voluntary sign up to an agreed code in order to enhance their 
commercial reputation. By signing up to the code they would have to accept the 
terms and conditions of membership which would include disciplinary 
procedures” - but no criminal sanctions (FCO, 2009b: 19). This commercial 
reputation is the central incentive for companies to sign up to the code. 
However, the government concedes that EU law prohibits that only members of 
the British trade association would be allowed to compete for contracts and 
considers using contractual stipulations as a mechanism to include the code’s 
(or equivalent) requirements (FCO, 2009b: 20). The government’s unwillingness 
to propose legislation implies that it does not make membership of the trade 
association compulsory. However, the government also believes that 
reputational considerations would stimulate companies to sign up, as 
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membership signals the adherence to high standards to prospective clients 
(FCO, 2009b: 23-24). This reasoning is predicated upon the belief that “ethical 
corporate employers would prefer to employ PMSCs who comply with the 
domestic code/international standard rather than seek alternative, cheaper 
service providers” (FCO, 2009b: 28).  
 
The above intentions are currently being put into practice. The government has 
opted for the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), a special 
interest group of Aerospace Defence and Security, to develop national 
standards for PMSCs (Bellingham, 2011). This is because the consultation 
raised some doubts on BAPSC’s capacity to effectively instigate self-regulation. 
Upon strong recommendation of the SCEG, the government advised on PSC 1 
as the applicable accreditation standard. PSC 1, the ‘Management System for 
Quality of Private Security Company Operations’, is developed by the American 
Society for Industrial Security (ASIS). The UK does not directly provide 
certification under PSC 1, but the UK Accreditation Service licenses third-party 
private accreditation bodies that, in turn, issue certification for PMSCs 
respecting PSC 1. 
 
The reaction of NGOs was mixed. Rights and Accountability in Development 
(RAID) (2009) criticised the short time frame of three months in which the 
contributors to the FCO consultation may formulate their response, especially in 
the light of the six years of inaction since the Green Paper. It further raised 
doubts on the undue influence of the BAPSC on the final FCO proposals and 
does not consider self-regulation to be sufficient in controlling PMSC activities. 
More fundamentally, RAID (2009) questions one of the basic premises of the 
government’s approach:  
 
In RAID’s experience it is often not possible to draw a 
distinction between reputable and disreputable PMSCs. 
As BAPSC acknowledges ‘Most tenders and bidding 
processes on the private market happen under severe 
time constraints’; how therefore, would it be possible for 
PMSCs to vet staff thoroughly or assess the likely impact 
upon human rights of the contract in question? 
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Nevertheless, calls from NGOs did contribute to the delegitimation of part of the 
private military and security industry, namely the direct combat operation 
services. The controversy on Executive Outcomes’ combat operations in Angola 
and Sierra Leone, and Sandline’s in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea 
helped push both companies out of the market (Percy, 2012: 943), although a 
decisive factor for this was also the backfiring of these operations for home 
states. Subsequently, most private providers of military and security services 
refrained from direct combat operations and started calling themselves PSCs 
(Percy, 2012: 943). 
 
However, NGOs did not take an unambiguous position towards PMSCs. 
Despite the principled opposition of some NGOs against PMSCs on the basis 
that they are nothing more than “corporate mercenaries” (Mathieu and Dearden, 
2006), other humanitarian NGOs frequently make use of private security 
services (Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico 2008).48 This reflects the straddle 
many humanitarian NGOs, and UN agencies for that matter (Spearin, 2008), 
have to overcome between their moral repugnance of PMSCs and the 
pragmatic legitimacy of PMSCs, which are often the sole actors that can 
effectively secure their operations. In precarious security situations, where ‘new’ 
threats have hampered state capacity to effectively provide security, a “lack of 
organizational capacity and in-house expertise” combined with considerations of 
cost, flexibility and local knowledge drives NGOs to hire PMSCs (Stoddard, 
Harmer and DiDomenico, 2008: 21-23). The other option, retreating from 
unstable environments, is considered even less desirable by NGOs. The market 
situation furthermore hinders NGO influence on the governance of the industry. 
Since states are more important PMSC clients than NGOs, the former 
undeniably have more “market power” than the latter (Spearin, 2008). 
Additionally, PMSCs enjoy a certain amount of “humanitarian legitimacy” 
conferred upon them by being employed by humanitarian NGOs, which is 
however not their sole source of legitimacy, since the legitimacy they derive 
from being employed by states is more significant (Spearin, 2008: 8-10). 
                                                          
48 Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2008: 19-20) note that “[o]f the humanitarian 
field and regional offices surveyed around the world, 61% reported using one or more 
services from local PSPs over the past year, while 35% had used the services of 
international PSPs”. 
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In both of the above consultation processes, a more mundane source of 
influence is the “revolving door” between PMSCs, the military and the 
government, and the lobbying opportunities this brings with it.49 When former 
UK defence minister Taylor joined the French arms producer Thales as an 
adviser, this debate gained new impetus. Other examples include former Major-
General Graham Binns becoming chief executive of Aegis Defence Services 
and former Admiral Sir John Slater becoming director and adviser to the British 
division of Lockheed Martin (Syal and Hughes, 2010). Paul Boateng served as 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury and British High Commissioner to South Africa, 
before taking up a position as non-executive director in Aegis Defence Services 
(CAAT, 2014). Close relations between government and the defence industry 
are cultivated by both sides. For the defence industry, direct access to civil 
servants opens up market opportunities. It gives the industry some leverage to 
influence policy decisions in their favour. The UK government, on their part, in 
its ‘Business Appointment Rules for Civil Servants’, acknowledges that “it is in 
the public interest that people with experience of public administration should be 
able to move into business or other bodies outside central Government” (UK 
Civil Service, 2013: 25). To address public criticisms of unwarranted links 
between government and industry, the Advisory Committee on Business 
Appointments (ACOBA) reviews applications of civil servants wanting to move 
to the private sector, within two years after the end of their civil service 
employment. The applications made for the ACOBA reveal that in 2012, an 
Army Lieutenant-General, an Airchief Marshall, an admiral, a former UK 
ambassador, a former chief executive of UK Trade and Investment and the 
former head of the Downing Street policy unit, took up positions in the defence 
industry (CAAT, 2014).  
 
                                                          
49
 The War on Want Report ‘Corporate Mercenaries’ (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006) 
charts this revolving door for the UK and US case. What concerns the BAPSC, 
director-general Andy Bearpark has worked for the CPA in Iraq, served as “Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) in charge of the EU Pillar of 
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)”, held posts in the Overseas 
Development Administration and served as private secretary to prime minister 
Thatcher. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede150311
audcvbearpark_/sede150311audcvbearpark_en.pdf>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
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In addition, several forums facilitate an institutionalised dialogue between 
government and the defence industry. The ‘Defence Suppliers Forum’, for 
instance, as the “major conduit for MOD-industry relationships”, brings together 
representatives from the government and from the defence industry, both 
international companies and small and medium enterprises, under 
chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Defence (UK MOD, 2014). The 
Defence Growth Partnership (DGP) furthermore promotes cooperation between 
government and the defence industry. Under the objective of “securing 
prosperity”, this strategy should enhance national security and stimulate 
economic growth through the export of military goods and services (DGP, 2013: 
2-3). The strategy and focus of this partnership have been based on “joint 
analysis completed by the Government and Industry” (DGP, 2013: 2). The 
Department of Business Innovation and Skills  together with the defence 
industry lead the DGP and the Ministry of Defence, in its role of customer, takes 
up a supportive role (DGP, 2013: 3). The DGP further involves academia and 
trade associations. In the Technology and Enterprise Team, one of the eight 
subgroups of the DGP, government and the defence industry will “identify key 
future customer defence needs” and the Intelligent Systems Team, another 
subgroup, will “work together to develop the next generation of world leading 
intelligent systems products and services” (DGP, 2013: 11). The Ministry of 
Defence spent over twenty billion pounds on the UK defence industry in FY 
2012-2013, of which nine organisations received more than £500 million (UK 
MOD, 2013: 1, 8). The majority of these organisations are members of the ADS, 
to which SCEG is a special interest group. Thus, at least in an indirect way, at 
the very least, PMSCs have access to policymakers and work in partnership 
with the UK government. None of the above forums include representatives 
from non-governmental organisations. 
 
Despite these close relations between the government and the industry, already 
in 2007, 103 members of the House of Commons welcomed the War on Want 
report Corporate Mercenaries: the Threat of Private Military and Security 
Companies and expressed their dissatisfaction with the self-regulation of the 
industry and proposed to instigate binding legislation (Early Day Motion 690, 
2007). The War on Want report argued against the self-regulation of the 
industry, for outlawing “PMSC involvement in all forms of direct combat and 
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combat support, understood in their widest possible sense” and for an individual 
licensing mechanism (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006: 21). 
 
5.2 Montreux Document 
 
5.2.1 Negotation Process 
 
Although a regulatory framework applicable to PMSC employees was in force 
before the development of the Montreux Document, the academic disagreement 
on the appropriate interpretation of the relevant legal stipulations serves to 
illustrate that, if not confusing, this framework was at the very least not 
straightforward. Combined with a lack of political will to instigate prosecutions 
(Dickinson, 2011, Human Rights First, 2008: 33),50 this uncertainty created a 
sphere of de facto impunity for crimes and human rights abuses committed by 
PMSC personnel in situations of armed conflict51 (cf. Ryngaert, 2008). The 
notorious abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law by PMSC 
personnel spurred the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (as the 
neutral “guardian” of international humanitarian law) and the Swiss Federation 
(as the “Depository of the Geneva Conventions”) to take up their role in 
protecting the accomplishments of international humanitarian and human rights 
law (Cockayne, 2009: 418) and to start a pragmatic approach towards more 
comprehensive regulation. In September 2007, the Blackwater incident of 
Baghdad52 reaffirmed the urgency of this matter and provided a renewed 
impetus to the negotiations which, at that time, did show some signs of slowing 
down and even stalling (Tougas, 2009: 324).  
 
                                                          
50
 Prosecution happened on an ad hoc basis, depending on the political will of the 
executive branch to enforce existing laws (Human Rights First, 2008: 33). 
51
 The immunity granted to PMSC personnel from prosecution under Iraqi law by Order 
17 (2.1) of the US Coalition Provisional Authority signed in december 2006, contributed 
to the impression of impunity. 
52
 In a gunfight at Nisour Square in Baghdad involving Blackwater employees, 17 
people were killed of which 14 kills were later found to be unjustified. (Johnston and 
Broder, (2007) “F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause”. New York Times. 
14/11/2007. A 1. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html? 
pagewanted=2&_r=1&sq=17.%20nov.%202007&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=5&adxnnlx= 
1273766420- cNwM0%202GG97voGrMuBOQeA>, (accessed 01/07/2014). 
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Let us start by immediately putting into perspective one of the central features 
of the Montreux Document, namely that it is an intergovernmental document. It 
was indeed the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the 
ICRC that acted as norm entrepreneurs and organised three meetings in the 
run up to the signing of the document. Government representatives, 
representatives from the private security industry and civil society delegates 
were present.53 In addition to these meetings, the ICRC and the Red Crescent 
Movement organised a workshop on the topic at their 30th International 
Conference (Tougas, 2009: 322). Some of the reluctance of the ICRC in this 
process is to be explained by the unintended consequence of drafting the 
Montreux Document: while not intended as a legitimation of PMSCs (Tougas, 
2009: 324), it implicitly accepts that there is a role for PMSCs in contemporary 
armed conflict and can thus be interpreted as a de facto recognition and 
legitimation of the industry and the services it provides (del Prado, 2009: 443). 
In this repsect, the signing of the Montreux Document might well have 
represented the institutionalisation of the political failure of the abolitionist 
approach. Nevertheless, far from solving all debate on the regulation of the 
PMSC industry, the Montreux Document only provides a “first step” in an on-
going regulatory process (Tougas, 2009: 345).  
 
Before analysing the content of the Montreux Document in depth, I will first 
briefly highlight its drafting process. The drafting strategy deliberately reached 
beyond governmental representatives and diplomats. In a search for additional 
expertise, the FDFA and the ICRC reached out to the International Peace 
Institute and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
both non-profit research organisations, to co-organise expert meetings on which 
non-governmental experts from the academic, NGO and industry sectors were 
also present (Cockayne, 2009: 420). This strategy succeeded in partly moving 
the drafting process out of the political realm and into a more technical-
administrative realm. Contrary to the UN Draft International Convention on the 
Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security 
Companies, that ran counter to the objections of mainly the US and the UK 
                                                          
53
 More information on the run-up to the signing of the document can be found at 
<http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html>, 
(accessed 01/07/2014). 
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(Juma, 2011: 2), the Montreux Document took an explicitly “humanitarian, 
apolitical approach” mainly driven by the desire to reach a practical result (FDFA 
and ICRC, 2009: 42). A more ambitious, hard law approach is taken by the ‘UN 
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights 
and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’ that 
presented its draft Convention to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2010. 
However, until now, two obstacles have always impeded progress in the 
negotiations on this draft convention. First, the drafters took a top-down 
approach towards regulation. That is: they intended to devise a new convention 
in order to “reaffirm and strengthen State responsibility for the use of force and 
reiterate the importance of its monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (UN, 
2010: 23). This strategy implied that some of the current PMSC activities, 
mostly in the US and the UK, would be outlawed, which led to a debate in the 
Human Rights Council that saw developing states, like Russia and China, 
defend the idea of a new binding treaty against the opposition of the US, UK 
and EU (White, 2011: 150-151). The US and the UK viewed the implementation 
of the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct as sufficient 
and did not favour the drafting of new binding law (Juma, 2011: 2). They also 
saw a new convention as an obstacle to their preferred policy option, namely 
the international standardisation of the criteria for national regulation (Juma, 
2011: 2-3). From a more pragmatic point of view, it was argued that the draft 
convention’s licensing procedure might be too costly for some states and that a 
new international treaty would require more encompassing consultations (Juma, 
2011: 3). Second, PMSCs were not officially included in the initial stages of the 
drafting process, which was reserved for state and NGO representatives and 
academics (UN, 2010). Because the Working Group still associates PMSCs 
with mercenaries, the industry itself did not support this process. 
 
In contrast, the FDFA and the ICRC actively propagated the pragmatic 
approach of the Montreux Document and lobbied with non-participating states 
to broaden the scope of the initiative. The success of the Montreux Document, 
in contrast to the UN Draft Convention, can partly be explained by the support it 
received from the industry. The Montreux Process succeeded in securing the 
support of the industry (e.g. the International Peace Operations Association 
(IPOA) and the BAPSC) because of its “non-judgmental” approach (Percy, 
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2012: 953-954). The IPOA welcomes the Montreux Document as an “affirmation 
of the global value of ethical private sector operations in conflict, post-conflict 
and disaster relief operations” and appreciates the light it sheds on PMSC 
employees’ legal accountability in these missions (IPOA, 2008). In addition to 
support from the industry, the Montreux Document also received considerable 
state support, because, in the middle of 2007, after two initial meetings had 
already clarified the state of the debate, participants settled on a “conservative” 
drafting strategy that sought to reconcile “the legitimacy of existing legal norms 
(attracting state legal advisers) to the legitimacy of existing practice (broadening 
the draft’s appeal to industry and government procurement, military and other 
relevant practitioners)” (Cockayne, 2009: 419). Since it is in states’ interest to be 
able to continue to use PMSCs, Percy (2012: 954) argues that the pragmatic 
approach of the Montreux Document was the “only possible international 
agreement”. On the contrary, the UN Working Group has aired critique. It 
considers the Montreux Document a “good promotional document” that 
nevertheless “failed to address the regulatory gap in the responsibility” of states 
for the actions PMSCs and their personnel  (UN Working Group, 2009, cited in 
White, 2011: 136). The UN Draft Convention, in contrast to the Montreux 
Document, also served a “higher purpose”, namely to define inherently 
governmental functions and safeguard these functions from further privatisation 
(Juma, 2011: 8). 
 
Towards the final stages of the negotiations, the opinions of two groups of 
negotiators came to differ. The US and the UK, Canada and Australia favoured 
the weakening of the emphasis on human rights, to be replaced by an emphasis 
on international humanitarian law; but a number of non-governmental 
organisations -including the ICRC, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Human Rights First and SwissPeace - propagated a human rights approach 
stressing, among others, states’ duties of “due diligence, prevention and 
remedial obligations” (Cockayne, 2009: 421). To their own disappointment, non-
governmental organisations were (physically) excluded from the final 
negotiation processes when states adopted the conventional intergovernmental 
strategy - a negotiation between legal advisers of participating governments 
(Cockayne, 2009: 422). NGO contributions were thus limited to the preliminary 
stages of the negotiation process, contributing to the clarification of the issues 
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at stake. We can conclude that the exclusion of NGOs in the final stages had an 
influence on the final outcome of the negotiations. This explains the 
disappointment of some NGOs with the final outcome. For Amnesty 
International, the future effectiveness of the document depended on the prior 
clarification of some “substantive gaps” in the international law framework. 
According to them, in contrast to the good practices section (that is explicit 
enough to help states make progress in respecting international humanitarian 
law and human rights law), part one of the document lacks the “detail and 
precision” to serve as a useful guide for states to identify their obligations in 
their dealings with PMSCs. This opens up room for interpretation to states. 
Disregarding some “key relevant propositions of international law”, for instance 
‘due diligence’, as well as contemporary initiatives on business and human 
rights, such as the Ruggie initiative, the Montreux Document is undeniably a 
step in the right direction, but “neither as comprehensive nor specific as it might 
have been” (Amnesty International, 2008). 
 
Despite the involvement of the ICRC and the opening up of the Montreux 
Document to interested non-state parties, its legitimacy is hampered by its 
initiation by an “ad hoc group of 17 states [which] clearly cannot represent the 
wider international community” (White, 2011: 134). Nevertheless, due to an 
active dissemination process, the number of signatory states now stands at fifty 
and three international organizations have also joined.54 This attests to the 
popularity of this pragmatic approach.  
 
5.2.2 Montreux Stipulations 
 
To recapitulate, on 17 September 2008, after an extensive consultation period 
during which state representatives, industry experts and civil society actors 
were heard, the Swiss FDFA and the ICRC jointly presented The Montreux 
Document: on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for 
States related to operations of private military and security companies during 
armed conflict, to which at that time seventeen states subscribed. The subtitle 
                                                          
54
 A list of signatory countries and organisations is available at 
<http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html>, 
(accessed  01/07/2014). 
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indicates that the document does not encompass all PMSC activities. The aim 
of the Montreux Document is restricted to “promote respect for international 
humanitarian law and human rights law whenever PMSCs are present in armed 
conflicts” (FDFA and ICRC, 2009:  31). In support of this, the Montreux 
document brings to mind “existing legal obligations” of states, PMSCs and 
PMSC employees and presents “good practices to promote compliance with 
international humanitarian law and human rights law during armed conflict” 
(FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 9). With regard to the former, part one of the document 
recalls international legal obligations of states, as found in customary 
international law, international humanitarian and human rights law and interprets 
these with respect to the activities of PMSCs. The good practices described in 
part two do not reflect existing law but intend to help contracting parties to 
respect relevant international humanitarian and human rights law and to 
promote “responsible conduct” when coming into contact with PMSCs whether 
in- or outside situations of armed conflict (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 16). Lacking 
legally binding effect, the good practices do not draw upon sources of 
international law, but on “corporate codes of conduct, national legislation, 
administrative instruments, judicial and administrative decisions and regional 
political statements” (Cockayne, 2009: 405).  This attests to the pragmatic 
approach of the document. It promotes nor prohibits their activities but merely 
wants to prevent international humanitarian law and human rights abuses. In 
other words, it strives for the removal of the negative consequences of PMSCs. 
Following Krahmann (2013), the Montreux Document incorporates two different 
interpretations of the state monopoly on violence. Krahmann (2013: 54) argues 
that “[t]he first part rests on the 20th-century understanding of the norm”, which 
reserves the right to armed force to states and their personnel. The second part 
legitimises the use of force by PMSCs. 
 
The first part of the Montreux Document clarifies the international legal 
obligations of states in their dealings with PMSCs.55 Existing international 
humanitarian law, human rights law and customary law provide that contracting 
                                                          
55
 The Montreux Document defines PMSCs as “private business entities that provide 
military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves” (FDFA 
and ICRC, 2009: 10). Acknowledging the international nature of the PMSC industry and 
in response some of the problems identified above, the Montreux Document is 
modeled upon a division of states into ‘contracting’, ‘territorial’ and ‘home’ states. 
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out to PMSCs does not release contracting states of their obligations under 
international law (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 11). States may outsource certain 
activities, but not those activities assigned to a state authority by international 
humanitarian law (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 11). Moreover, in doing so, states 
remain the ultimate (and only) principal under international law. This attests to a 
principal-agent model of a state-PMSC relationship whereby it falls to 
contracting states, as principals, to make sure that the PMSCs under contract 
respect international humanitarian law (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 11). As part of 
their obligations under international law, states should “take appropriate 
measures to prevent, investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant 
misconduct of PMSCs and their personnel” (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 11). Under 
some conditions,56 contracting states carry responsibility for violations of 
international humanitarian law, human rights law or other relevant law by PMSC 
personnel. When these are “attributable to the Contracting State” the latter 
should provide reparations  (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 12). The responsibilities of 
territorial and home states are broadly similar to those of contracting states, with 
this difference that they cannot be held directly responsible for breaches of 
international humanitarian or human rights law committed by PMSCs on their 
territory or by PMSCs registered under their law. The obligations of territorial 
and home states are mostly situated on the level of ensuring respect by PMSCs 
for international humanitarian and human rights law.  
 
With regard to the responsibilities of PMSCs and their personnel themselves, 
the Montreux Document states that they should respect national law, both the 
national ‘translation’ of international humanitarian and human rights law, as well 
as national “criminal law, tax law, immigration law, labour law, and specific 
regulations on private military or security services” (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 14). 
PMSC personnel should not only respect the national law of the state where 
they perform their activities, but also of their state of nationality (FDFA and 
ICRC, 2009: 14). Since the Montreux Document only recalls existing legal 
                                                          
56
 In line with customary international law, PMSC actions are attributable to states if 
PMSCs are “a) incorporated by the State into their regular armed forces in accordance 
with its domestic legislation; b) members of organized armed forces, groups or units 
under a command responsible to the State; c) empowered to exercise elements of 
governmental authority if they are acting in that capacity […] or d) in fact acting on the 
instructions of the State” (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 11). 
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obligations, it confirms the above observations that the status of PMSC 
employees under international humanitarian law is determined on a case-by-
case basis. In turn, this status determines their obligations and protections 
under international humanitarian law (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 14-15). On the 
responsibility of superiors of PMSC personnel, the Montreux Document asserts 
that in the absence of properly exercised control, for which international law 
provides guidelines, not only military or civilian government officials, but also 
PMSC directors “may be liable for crimes under international law committed by 
PMSC personnel under their effective authority and control” (FDFA and ICRC, 
2009: 15). 
 
The good practices of part two constitute soft standards, without binding legal 
effect, that are intended to guide and assist states in shaping their relations with 
PMSCs operating both inside and outside areas of armed conflict. In line with 
the first part, the second part of the Montreux Document is divided into good 
practices for contracting, territorial and home states. Where relevant, the good 
practices for contracting states might be extrapolated to apply to the broader 
client base of PMSCs, among others consisting of international organisations 
and non-state actors, non-governmental organisations and corporations (FDFA 
and ICRC, 2009: 16). The underlying aim of these good practices is to ensure 
“respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law”, to promote 
responsible state conduct in this domain and to help states implement their 
obligations under these bodies of law (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 16). The 
document does not legally bind any state to implement any specific good 
practice and recognises not only that states might not possess the capacity to 
implement specific practices, but also that some practices might not fit particular 
circumstances (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 16). The document therefore invites 
states to consider the good practices, while keeping in mind and respecting 
their other obligations under international law, for instance as members of the 
UN or as a consequence of bilateral agreements (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 16). 
Relevant for this research project is that “any of these good practices will need 
to be adapted in practice to the specific situation and the State’s legal system 
and capacity” (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 16).  
 
Contracting states should first of all evaluate the adequacy of their legislation 
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and “procurement and contracting practices” (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 16). The 
Montreux Document does not authoritatively determine which services are open 
to outsourcing. Rather, it passes this question on to contracting, territorial and 
home states, that should decide what services are open to outsourcing (for 
contracting states), which services may be performed by PMSCs and their 
employees on their territory (for territorial states) and which services are open to 
export (for home states). Territorial states are encouraged to “require PMSCs to 
obtain an authorization to provide military and security services in their territory” 
(FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 21-23). In addition, they might also take into 
consideration the development of “rules on the provision of services by PMSCs 
and their personnel”, as well as establishing a monitoring and accountability 
mechanism (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 23-25). Home states are equally 
encouraged to design an authorisation system, with concomitant procedures, 
criteria and terms of authorisation (FDFA and ICRC, 2009: 25-27). 
 
Having reviewed the content of the Montreux Document, we can safely state 
that this document serves as the justification of a technique of meta-
governance. Upon the instigation of the FDFA and the ICRC - whom we can 
conceptualise as norm entrepreneurs in the sense that they want to preserve 
existing norms - states have agreed to a document that creates no new legal 
obligations, but that serves to mitigate the international humanitarian and 
human rights abuses delegitimising the PMSC industry. Within the limits of 
national and international law, this document confirms the right of non-state 
actors to hire PMSCs.  
 
5.3 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers 
 
At present, 708 PMSCs have signed the International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Providers (ICOC), thus following the original 58 that did so in 
November 2010. This steep rise attests to the success of this form of self-
regulation. The ICOC is nevertheless not a classical instance of self-regulation 
since the ICOC Association, that promotes and oversees the implementation of 
the ICOC, consists of stakeholders from the industry, governments and civil 
society. The ICOC builds upon and endorses the stipulations of the Montreux 
Document and the ‘Respect, Protect, Remedy’ framework developed by UN 
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Special Representative on Business and Human Rights Ruggie (ICOC, 2010: 
3). The ICOC is itself the start of a more encompassing initiative aiming at the 
development of common international standards for the provision of security 
services and at the establishment of an external and independent governance 
and oversight mechanism (ICOC, 2010: 4).  
 
By signing the code, companies promise to abide by its stipulations, to respect 
applicable bodies of law, to address “allegations of activity that violates any 
applicable national or international law or this Code” and to cooperate with 
official authorities with regard to jurisdictional investigations (ICOC, 2010: 3, 
§6). However, the code only applies to those security providers working in 
complex environments and does not impose any legal obligations or liabilities 
on its members (ICOC, 2010: 6, §§13-14). Signatory companies promise to 
cooperate with interested stakeholders and national accreditation bodies to 
achieve, first, national standards and, second, a harmonisation of those national 
standards into “an international set of standards based on the Code” (ICOC, 
2010: 6, §10). The Code binds the signatory companies to erect a temporary 
multi-stakeholder steering committee that will start up the “governance and 
oversight mechanism” (ICOC, 2010: 6, §11). Signatory companies are required 
to undergo continuous auditing by an independent governance and oversight 
body (ICOC, 2010: 4, §8). By signing the code, companies signal their intention 
to respect (through due diligence) and require their personnel to respect, 
existing legal obligations and UN Security Council sanctions (ICOC, 2010: 7, 
§§21-22). When signatory companies or their personnel reasonably suspect a 
breach of these prohibitions, they are required to report this to their client and to 
the competent authorities (ICOC, 2010: 7, §24). The code requires signatory 
companies and their personnel to “treat all persons humanely and with respect 
for their dignity and privacy” and to report infringements of the code (ICOC, 
2010: 8, §28). The rules for the use of force to be adopted by the companies 
should be in line with relevant bodies of law and agreed upon by the client 
(ICOC, 2010: 8, §29). Force should only be used if unavoidable and in 
agreement with relevant legal provisions. It shall thus be limited to a “strictly 
necessary” and proportionate level (ICOC, 2010: 8, §30). Firearms can only be 
used in self-defence or defence of others when faced with an “imminent threat 
of death or serious injury” (ICOC, 2010: 8, §31). Signatory companies may take 
137  
part in activities of detention if stipulated in a contract with a state and if the 
PSC employees have received training in the relevant bodies of law (ICOC, 
2010: 8, §33). Concerning the use of force, detention and apprehension, we can 
observe that employees of signatory companies should observe all relevant 
legal stipulations, both national and international. In line with existing 
international law, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is forbidden under any circumstance and knowledge of any such 
behaviour should be reported to the competent authorities (ICOC, 2010: 9, 
§§35-37). Similar stipulations apply to “sexual exploitation and abuse or gender-
based violence”, “human trafficking”, “slavery and forced labour”, child labour in 
its worst forms and discrimination (ICOC, 2010: 9-10, §§38-42). The personnel 
of signatory companies should be identifiable when performing contractual 
activities and will register and license any vehicles and hazardous material used 
in performing these activities (ICOC, 2010: 10-11: §43).  
 
Signatory companies promise to “exercise due diligence” in their personnel 
selection, vetting and performance assessments procedures and personnel 
should possess the necessary qualifications, as determined by applicable law 
(ICOC, 2010: 11-12, §§45-49). A similar responsibility falls to companies with 
respect to the selection and vetting procedures of their subcontractors (ICOC, 
2010: 12, §§50-51). Companies are furthermore required to respect labour law 
and to professionally train their personnel in the content of the Code and in 
relevant bodies of national and international law (ICOC, 2010: 12, §55). The use 
of weapons and other war material is restricted to personnel that has received 
appropriate training in relevant bodies of law and is governed by applicable laws 
(ICOC, 2010: 13, §57). 
 
The Swiss-based, multi-stakeholder and not-for-profit International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICOCA) aims to “promote, 
govern and oversee implementation” of the ICOC and to “promote the 
responsible provision of security services and respect for human rights and 
national and international law in accordance with the Code” (ICOCA, 2013: 1, 
§2.2). The private security industry, civil society organisations and governments 
are the three stakeholders represented in the Association. Eligibility for 
Membership for PSCs depends on certification by the Association upon review 
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of the applying member’s respect for the principles and standards of the Code 
(ICOCA, 2013: 2, §3.3). For states and international organisations, membership 
criteria include supporting the Montreux Document, intending to back the ICOC 
principles and engaging in the association’s activities. Members of the civil 
society should be not-for-profit and independent organisations “with a 
demonstrated institutional record at the local, national or international level of 
the promotion and protection of human rights, international humanitarian law or 
the rule of law” (ICOCA, 2010: 2, §3.3.3).  
 
The ICOC Association consists of a General Assembly, a Board of Directors and 
an Executive Director who supervises the Secretariat, to be supplemented if 
necessary by other bodies (ICOCA, 2013: 3, §5.1). At least once a year, all 
members will convene in the General Assembly which is the “supreme 
governing body of the Association” and which has the right to oversee and 
dismiss the other corporate bodies (ICOCA, 2013: 3, §§6.1-6.3) as well as to 
vote on the decisions of and agenda items proposed by the Board of Directors. 
The executive decision-making Board of Directors meets annually and is 
composed of an equal number of representatives of each of the stakeholder 
pillars. Most relevant for the purposes of this text, is that the ICOC Association 
“shall be responsible for certifying under the Code that a company’s systems 
and policies meet the Code’s principles and the standards derived from the 
Code and that a company is undergoing monitoring, auditing, and verification, 
including in the field” (ICOCA, 2013: 6, §11.1). The Association equally assumes 
responsibility for the oversight of “Member companies’ performance under the 
Code, including through external monitoring, reporting and a process to address 
alleged violations of the code” and will issue public reports, at least annually, on 
these activities (ICOCA, 2013: 8, §§ 12.1, 12.3). The Association will help 
members establish “fair and accessible grievance procedures that offer effective 
remedies” (ICOCA, 2013: 8, 613.1). 
 
Together with the Montreux Document, the ICOC and its Association can be 
conceptualised as the institutionalisation of the legitimacy of non-state security 
providers. The legitimation process drove states, PMSCs and civil society 
organisations (to a lesser extent) to interpret existing normative and legal rules, 
to apply to emerging PMSCs. Especially in the ICOC process, states have now 
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taken a position of meta-governance. While they have been the major drafters 
of existing legislation on international humanitarian and human rights law, as 
well as national laws, the ICOC process in particular shows how PMSCs 
interpreted and explained these laws to the extent that they opened up room for 
the reframing of the state monopoly on force in favour of the legitimation of 
private security providers. In this process, civil society organisations took the 
role of norm defenders, in the sense that they acted upon the human rights 
violations by PMSC employees to make the case for the reaffirmation of the 
state monopoly. However, they were soon overtaken by the private military and 
security industry by their proposals of self-regulation. In contrast to the UN Draft 
Convention, which took a top-down approach disposed towards the 
preservation of “inherent government functions”, the Montreux Document and 
the ICOC were enthusiastically received by the industry. 
 
In conclusion of this chapter, it is revealing to briefly compare the terminology 
used in the various regulatory initiatives reviewed above. The shift in 
terminology from PMCs (in the Green Paper), over PMSCs (in later British 
consultations and in the Montreux Document), to PSCs (in the industry self-
regulation in the UK (PSC 1) and in the ICOC), illustrates a double evolution. 
Initially, PMCs did offer offensive military services, for instance in Sierra Leone, 
Angola and Papua New Guinea (Avant, 2005: 17). However, many of the 
companies originally performing combat activities in these regions are now 
defunct, partly because of the negative reputational impact of some widely 
publicised abuses and because these combat PMCs seriously undermined the 
sovereignty of African states (Howe, 1998: 528), partly because their activities 
could compromise Western states’ neutrality and drag them into breaches of 
international law (Vierucci, 2011: 246). In short, the use of combat PMCs 
impacted upon other norms of international law and was considered by many a 
bridge too far. Frontline activities were reaffirmed in the US as “inherently 
governmental functions” reserved to state employees (Cameron and Chetail, 
2013: 192-197). Similarly, although less formalised, the UK only outsources 
non-core functions (Kinsey, 2009: 98). The leeway for PMCs offering offensive 
services has thus narrowed considerably. Opinions on which functions are 
inherently governmental diverge, and especially in times of neoliberal 
privatisation and in times of war, “inherently governmental” is defined narrowly 
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(Luckey and Manuel, 2012: 6-8). Similarly, in the UK, the scope of core 
functions has narrowed (Kinsey, 2009: 98-99). Paradoxically, it is only the 
expansion of ‘non-inherently governmental’ and ‘non-core’ functions that has 
made it possible for states to engage in long-term military operations.  
 
The second evolution points at an expanding scope of defensive activities. The 
ICOC (2010: 5) speaks of PSCs as companies offering “guarding and protection 
of persons and objects”. The outsourcing and privatisation of these defensive 
services has now been legitimised and the use of defensive force is no longer 
the prerogative of the state. Nevertheless, offensive and defensive tasks are not 
easily distinguishable, especially in situations of armed conflict. The protection 
of a military convoy, while a defensive task, becomes offensive if the convoy 
has to pass through disputed territory. Furthermore, the protection of an 
extraction site in insecure environments shows can scarcely be labeled 
defensive, since control of natural resources might in itself constitute a military 
objective. Therefore, even if states have regained control over combat activities, 
the expansion of non-core, defensive services points to a significant 
infringement on the state monopoly on violence. The UN mercenary convention 
does not differentiate between offensive and defensive activities, but groups 
them together under the notion of “taking part in hostilities”. The same 
observation applies to the OAU Convention. Moreover, the distinction between 
offensive and defensive does not resurface in the interpretation of the concept 
of ‘direct participation in hostilities’. The ICRC, in its ‘Interpretative Guidance on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law’ (Melzer, 2009), equally does not make this difference. Direct participation, 
following this guidance, is an act that meets the following criteria:   
 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed 
conflict […] and 2. There must be a direct causal link 
between the act and the harm likely to result either from 
that act, or from a coordinated military operations of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation) and 3. The act must be specifically designed 
to directly cause the required threshold of arm in support 
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of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(Melzer, 2009: 46). 
 
Even defensive activities might be argued to fall under the notion of direct 
participation as they are in support of one party and might inflict damage to an 
adversary. However, the Montreux Document, the ICOC and the UK’s policy of 
self-regulation contribute to the legitimation of non-state authorised defensive 
services. Following a strict interpretation of the notion of direct participation, this 
implies that PMSCs can legitimately participate in hostilities, if they restrict 
themselves to defensive protection. This constitutes a reinterpretation of the 
concept of taking direct part in hostilities since it makes a difference between 
offensive services (reserved to the state) and defensive services (eligible for 
outsourcing). In this way, it partly undermines existing anti-mercenary 
conventions since neither the UN, nor the OAU convention makes this 
difference. In conclusion, the above regulatory initiatives contributed to a more 
narrow interpretation of illegitimate mercenary activity as ‘offensive combat 
force’.  
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Conclusion 
 
The legitimate use of force by private military and security companies (PMSCs) 
that are not only employed by states but also by non-state clients, challenges 
the relevance of the state monopoly on violence. The orthodox, realist-informed 
account has argued that in the neoliberal ideological environment of the 1980s, 
in light of changing demand and supply of military force, states deliberately 
outsourced and later privatised part of their defence functions. The former 
strategy can be said to enhance the defence capability of the state: states retain 
the steering function, but outsource the rowing to more cost-efficient private 
actors. However, when former superpowers are now dependent on operational 
support from PMSCs for major military operations, PMSCs possess some 
leverage to direct a state’s military policy and even this independent steering 
capacity is compromised. The latter strategy involves a direct transfer of 
decision-making authority on security provision to non-state actors.  
 
This outsourcing and privatisation strategy comes into conflict with at least two 
norms that were legally codified in the twentieth century. First, the anti-
mercenary norm precludes the exercise of violence for private gain, outside 
legitimate control. Second, the norm of the state monopoly on violence outlaws 
the non-state authorisation of coercive force. Both norms seem to have been 
undermined by the rise and institutionalisation of PMSCs. The United 
Kingdom’s policy of self-regulation of the private military and security industry, 
the international Montreux Document and, to a lesser extent, the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, have legitimised non-state 
actors as providers and auspices of defensive armed force. Realists argue that 
the above norms have lost their relevance in shaping the organisation of military 
force. Constructivist scholarship, on the contrary, maintains that these norms 
still exist and have decisively steered these regulatory initiatives. This text has 
taken a first step in bringing together these two perspectives. It addressed why 
PMSCs have emerged as legitimate wielders of coercive force, despite a 
normative environment that was hostile to the private use of force. It took 
seriously the findings of the constructivist style of reasoning, but argued that 
only the crossing of paradigmatic boundaries opens up venues for a credible 
answer to the research question.  
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In reply to the research question, this text started from existing constructivist 
models of norm change, but moved beyond them to incorporate a more explicit 
notion of realist-constructivist power to explain which norm entrepreneurs were 
more successful in shaping the changing normative environment. Only a realist-
constructivist account, it has been argued, can fully explain the rise of PMSCs. 
The resulting cycle-model of norm change, inserted with a notion of realist-
constructivist power, served as a heuristic tool for the subsequent analysis of 
normative change in the domain of military force. With the help of this tool, I 
traced the norm negotiations via which PMSCs were able to successfully claim 
a legitimate role in the global provision of security. Although the empirical 
analysis has suggested that this tool can help forward constructivist scholarship, 
further research is needed, in other domains, to substantiate it and to further 
confirm its usefulness.  
 
This text has followed Steffek’s (2003: 267) conceptualisation of international 
governance as a “negotiated consensus” that is subsequently written down in 
law or conventions. Furthermore, legal stipulations were seen as the reflection 
or codification of norms. Thus, a change in legal stipulations is indicative of a 
change in underlying norms. This text has traced the process of the negotiation 
on the above-mentioned regulatory initiatives. The cycle of norm change 
proceeded in the following steps. Norms inevitably have to be interpreted and 
translated into practical guidelines in order to cover real-life situations. 
Moreover, normative structures have to adapt to novel situations. The first stage 
of norm change, in a cyclic model, is a period of confusion and uncertainty that 
invalidates established meanings and practices, and that reveals friction 
between normative guidelines and new phenomena. If combined with an 
exogenous shock that obscures prevailing power relations, this opens up room 
for norm entrepreneurs to call into question existing meanings and norms and to 
engage in the construction of new ones. It was indeed in the state of confusion 
and flux of governance after the Cold War that PMSCs came to prominence. 
After the initial ‘peace dividend’ optimism, the new wars of the 1990s and early 
2000s blurred the boundaries between criminals, civilians and legitimate 
combatants. New security providers emerged on the international scene. Due to 
the reluctance of former superpowers to intervene in conflicts that did not 
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constitute a direct threat to their own survival, a market for force opened up, in 
which emerging private military companies (PMCs) offered combat services to a 
variety of state and non-state clients, for whom they delivered some notable 
military successes. This private involvement in the provision of armed force 
raised normative questions. Even if direct combat activities proved for many to 
be a bridge too far, later private military and security companies (PMSCs), 
offering mainly defensive services, rendered existing categorisations of armed 
forces obsolete. PMSC employees were not fully covered by existing anti-
mercenary conventions and did not have a clear status under international law. 
This desire for greater clarity is the first step in the cycle of normative change. 
The notorious human rights and international humanitarian law abuses by 
PMSC personnel and the culture of impunity conferred a sense of urgency on 
this debate.  
 
The normative debate takes place in the second phase, in which arguments are 
exchanged between participants. This text has argued that negotiations do not 
happen in an ideal-speech situation, where every participant has an equal 
opportunity to make his case and where a rationally agreed upon consensus is 
reached. Rather, a more powerful actor will be more successful in influencing 
the outcome of this negotiation. Power is understood, in this text, as realist-
constructivist power or the capacity to shape intersubjective understandings. 
There are different dimensions to this capacity. An actor’s success in setting the 
terms of the negotiation shapes every discursive outcome. This happens most 
visibly when a participant has the material resources to create the environment 
of the negotiation. The capacity to include or exclude people from the debate 
affects its outcome. Equally, the resources to participate in the negotiation 
contribute to the impact on its outcome. Actors who have the resources to 
attend meetings and issue briefings will more likely have a greater influence on 
its outcome than those who do not possess these resources. On a more 
fundamental level, the capacity to set the terms of the negotiation refers to 
those resources that allow one to create a secure environment within which a 
debate can take place. On a cognitive level, the ability to impose one’s 
worldview on other negotiators is a major source of realist-constructivist power. 
Epistemic power, as the ability to create a plausible worldview and to offer valid 
knowledge, is the most profound dimension of realist-constructivist power. 
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However, when different worldviews are presented to decision-makers, it is 
frequently the option most ‘usable’ for decision-makers that is adopted. 
 
These observations are confirmed in the cases under review. Early PMCs 
successfully offered offensive combat services in areas of armed conflict. 
However, the culture of impunity surrounding them raised moral objections from 
what we might call norm entrepreneurs, understood in the sense of Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998) as actors having strong notions of what is morally 
appropriate. These norm entrepreneurs, most notably civil society, did not 
envision a norm change. Rather, they aimed at the reaffirmation and 
enforcement of the previously existing norms against mercenaries and of the 
state monopoly on violence. In the case of the UK, these calls from civil society 
were only picked up by the government once the Sandline Affair had 
demonstrated that the unofficial sanctioning of PMCs by government officials 
might endanger the neutrality of the UK government and might drag along the 
UK in the breach of the sovereignty of another state. As Thomson (1994) has 
shown, one reason why non-state violence was taken of the market was 
because it might compromise the neutrality of the state of nationality of 
mercenaries. This line of reasoning still holds. The green paper on PMCs 
directly resulted from the Sandline Affair and set the terms of reference for the 
subsequent debate. This shows that the UK executive had a decisive role in 
staging the negotiation. In this debate, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
successfully framed PMCs as the only ‘realistic’ option available to provide 
security for the citizens of failing states in the global periphery and for 
humanitarian NGOs working in those areas. This implied that other options, e.g. 
internationalisation or scaling down state ambitions, were dismissed. The UK 
green paper recognises the straddle between, on the one hand, ‘morally 
optimal’ security provision, and on the other hand, the pragmatic provision of 
security by PMCs. The road to regulation can be seen as an attempt to align 
these two positions.  
 
It was clear from the outset that the aim of the British government was not to 
abolish PMCs, as some NGOs proposed. The green paper acknowledges that 
the private military industry might positively contribute to the provision of 
security, if properly regulated. In other words, the UK government recognised 
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that PMCs offered ‘usable knowledge’ - they had the expertise and the 
resources to provide security in an uncertain world. PMCs were, in other words, 
pragmatically legitimate. Underlying the green paper was the assumption that 
abuses were not inherent to the private military industry, but rather resulted 
from the lack of a conclusive regulatory framework. In this light, we can also 
think of the green paper as the start of the formalisation of previously informal 
procedures. Reminiscent of the anti-mercenary norm, legitimate control on 
private security provision became the key objective. In terms of this norm, the 
green paper recognised that, when hired by a ‘just authority’ and if 
comprehensively controlled, PMCs might legitimately provide security. The 
subsequent discursive negotiation aimed at clarifying who could legitimately hire 
PMCs, and what control mechanisms were appropriate. NGOs actively 
contributed to the debate, but, as their criticisms on the final outcome make 
clear, their contributions to the negotiations were largely overlooked. The final 
outcome of this debate in the British case showed close, not to say complete, 
resemblance with the preferred option of the private military and security 
industry, namely voluntary self-regulation. In the case of the UK, this policy 
concludes a cycle of norm change. Non-state actors can now legitimately 
control the provision of security and the exercise of violence for defensive 
purposes. The resulting regulatory framework has decisively been shaped by 
PMSCs, who were hired by state and non-state clients alike because of their 
knowledge of the (local) security environment. Especially the operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, where PMSCs performed essential security services, 
constituted the deathblow to NGO efforts at more stringent regulation. The 
expert knowledge provided by PMSCs in these situations proved more ‘usable’ 
for states than the options proposed by NGOs. As security professionals, 
PMSCs were not only considered to have the knowledge on how to provide 
security, but also on how to appropriately control that security provision. Due to 
the lack of publicly available information on the private military and security 
industry, PMSCs were a necessary source of information policymakers could 
turn to for advice during the regulatory process. For the UK, self-regulation ties 
to a long tradition of self-regulation of other industrial sectors (De Nevers, 
2010). It aims to preserve the agility of the private military and security industry, 
for which an image of stronger regulation is essential. In the wake of the green 
paper, the question on which regulatory approach to take was therefore 
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reformulated as: how to ensure high standards of conduct for the private military 
and security industry? However, throughout the regulatory negotiations, the 
scope of services PMSCs can legitimately provide has been somewhat 
narrowed. The UK government only outsources non-core functions and PMSCs 
are not hired for offensive purposes. Although non-state auspices can hire 
PMSCs for private protection, the range of legitimate services is limited to 
defensive purposes - as implicit in PSC 1, the preferred self-regulatory 
mechanism for the UK. The state retains the monopoly on offensive operations. 
This is reflected in the evolution of the terminology in the British case. While the 
green paper speaks of PMCs, later initiatives talk about PMSCs, and the PSC1 
only speaks of PSCs. 
 
A similar process has taken place in the negotiations on the Montreux 
Document. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs acted as norm entrepreneurs aiming to 
preserve international humanitarian law. NGOs were included in the primary 
stages of the negotiations. However, when the final discussions neared, NGOs, 
except the International Committee of the Red Cross, were excluded from the 
table. States acted as gatekeepers in the negotiation process and insisted on 
an intergovernmental negotiation of the final draft. In this way, the human rights 
focus of the document was somewhat weakened. Again, NGOs showed 
disappointment with the final outcome. Nevertheless, the pragmatic approach of 
the Montreux Document proved successful if measured in terms of the number 
of joining states. One reason for this success is that it does not create new 
obligations for states since it is only a reminder of existing state obligations. It 
thus serves as the de facto legitimation of the private military and security 
industry since it consolidates existing practices, within the limits of existing 
international humanitarian and human rights law. In other words, the Montreux 
Document offered a particular interpretation of the requirement of legitimate 
authority: if respecting the boundaries of existing legal stipulations, non-state 
PMSC clients are themselves legitimate authorities. This implies that PMSCs 
can only offer defensive services. The Montreux Document serves as the legal 
anchoring of a neoliberal approach to security provision, that prefers a 
decentralised decision-making of the market as the most efficient solution to a 
particular (security) demand. The state suffers from an information 
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disadvantage vis-à-vis market players and retreats to a meta-governance role: it 
defines the boundaries within which security provision is to take place. The 
more ambitious approach of the UN Draft Convention, that intended to define 
‘inherent government functions’, proved unsuccessful; partly because it did not 
have the full backing of the industry.  
 
In the case of the International Code of Conduct for Security Providers, this 
retreat of the state is even more pronounced. Whether to avoid more restrictive 
binding regulation, or to enhance the reputation of the industry, this initiative has 
received significant backing from PMSCs. It further aims to include states and 
civil society as stakeholders in its Association, thus conferring upon it some kind 
of participatory democratic legitimacy. The ICOC consolidates PMSCs as 
legitimate, defensive, security providers. 
 
None of the above initiatives have created binding legislation outlawing the 
private military and security industry. Rather, they have resulted in the de facto 
legitimation of a part of this industry, namely of those companies offering 
defensive services with respect to the rule of law. This was possible because of 
the coinciding interests of PMSCs and their clients. Contrary to the options 
proposed by NGOs, the knowledge and expertise brought to the debate by 
PMSCs was usable for states. In this way, a coalition of interests formed. Due 
to their pragmatic legitimacy, PMSCs were hired by both state and non-state 
actors to secure their operations in unstable environments. Other options - 
scaling back state ambitions, or retreating from insecure areas – proved less 
desirable. The road taken was to preserve the PMSC industry, while enhancing 
its accountability to a legitimate authority. In the end, this strategy resulted in 
the re-articulation of the anti-mercenary norm. On the one hand, offensive 
combat activities were brought back under the control of the state. Only non-
offensive - non-core, tasks in the UK, the so-called non-inherently governmental 
functions in the US - were on the table for outsourcing. Core, offensive, tasks 
stayed the prerogative of the state. At the same time, this realm of core or 
inherently governmental tasks has gradually shrunk - most notably in times of 
war - to allow for a broader use of PMSCs. On the other hand, defensive roles 
were open for outsourcing and privatisation. If respecting the boundaries of 
existing law, PMSCs could legitimately be employed under non-state auspices. 
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This division of military activity into offensive and defensive roles points to a 
reformulation of the anti-mercenary norm. In the anti-mercenary conventions of 
the UN and the Organisation of African Unity, no distinction is made between 
defensive and offensive tasks. These are grouped together under the concept 
of ‘taking part in hostilities’. Due to this reinterpretation of ‘taking part in 
hostilities’, PMSCs can now legitimately offer defensive services in situations of 
armed conflict, while this would have been considered mercenarism under a 
strict reading of the anti-mercenary conventions. Thus, the anti-mercenary norm 
has been partly undermined. Legitimate control on the exercise of violence is 
still considered essential, but self-regulation is assumed to achieve that aim. 
PMSCs themselves are considered to be best placed to promote high standards 
of the industry. The state monopoly on violence was also reframed in the 
process: the state now holds a monopoly on formulating a range of legitimate 
security goals, through meta-governance, but, in the case of privatisation, gives 
away the steering and rowing functions to non-state actors.  
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these observations. First, changes in 
the material environment, or, at least, the successful framing of changes, shape 
the opportunity to call into question existing norms. In this case, these changes 
were the collapse of the bipolar world order and the emergence of new wars. 
What is more, material resources underlie any attempt to participate in the 
discursive negotiation. In order to construct a new normative environment, an 
actor has first of all to be present in the discursive negotiation. In this debate, 
PMSCs possessed two kinds of material resources unavailable to NGOs. First, 
the well-organised professional networks of the private military and security 
industry and the revolving door between government and the private military 
industry proved an asset to PMSCs. Second, PMSCs’ pragmatic legitimacy was 
a leverage to gain a foothold in the normative debate. They offered usable 
knowledge to states, in contrast to civil society, and this granted them the 
opportunity to help shape the regulatory and normative framework. PMSCs 
proved capable of securing the operations of states and other clients and even 
contributed to the identification of security threats, for which they subsequently 
provided a cost-efficient solution. Looking for security, states still opt for 
strategies that will most likely further their own interests, but also take into 
account normative constraints. The aim of the governance initiatives on the 
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private military and security industry was then to devise a regulatory framework 
that offers states the opportunity to achieve as much of their security objectives 
as possible (i.e. for the lowest price), while precluding public criticism. States 
have remained the gatekeepers to this deliberation process, even literally by 
excluding NGOs in the final negotiations on the Montreux Document. The 
eventual legitimation of PMSCs was made possible through a process that 
aimed at bringing the pragmatic legitimacy of PMSCs in line with existing 
norms. Along the way, some of these norms were re-articulated. 
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